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Tab

1

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
Issue
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Award

Consolidated

11/11/43
J. Landes

right to require C.S.P.
printers to do splicing
simultaneously

yes, because Union Rule
not binding on anployer

Consolidated
15 LA 252

4/4/50
D. Cole

right to assign 1 inspector for 32 mm film
projecting two images

yes, under Art. 17(f);
Pathe may operate in same
manner

Consolidated
15 LA 249

9/11/50
T. Norton

right to transfer from
higher to lower classification, or lower to
higher, when employees
are working less than
full work week

no, because would deprive
other employees of actual
employment in violation
of Art. 13(a)

duty to prorate vacation pay for employee
discharged during his
vacation

yes, unless less than one
year of service per Art.
6(1)

De Luxe

8/15/55
L. Bailer

complement for 2 duplex
color devel. machines

8 for 2 machines, whether
or not sound applicators
in use

MDvielab

2/13/57
L. Bailer

classification of M.
Click

reclassify as Receiver(a)

Pathe

3/28/58
B. Roberts

right to operate 2 jet
spray devel. machines
simultaneously with 3

no, because not "same as"
DuArt's jet spray developers per 17(c)

opts.

Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
Issue
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Award

7

Du Art

6/15/59
A. Stark

complenent for 4 spray
devel. machines

5 for 4 machines; 6 if
operated continuously

8

Movielab

12/14/59
T. Knowlton

discharge of G. Mattola
for negligence

not justified

9

Movielab

2/24/60
E. Stein

right to assign opr
of ultra-sonic cleaning
machine to other tasks
while machin in opn

yes, under 17(c), because
Du Art does

10

Du Art

5/3/60
A. Stark

proper method of opn
of ultrasonic cleaning
machine

employee may not be required to perform other
work except cleaning film
by hand in emergency

11

Du Art

6/10/60
M. Rubin

discharge of D. Mintz
and L. Marx for conspiring to collect pay
for time not worked

reinstate Mintz with full
back pay, Marx with half
pay lost

12

Du Art

1/12/61
A. Stark

whether and to what extent B. McKiernan performed duties of Sensitometric Sound Control
Man

$250 retro, pay for 28
weeks

13

Movielab

2/1/61
H. Weston

right to extend lunch
hour and to discipline
employees who disobey

no, because changes method of opn of machines in
violation of 17(o)

14

Movielab

7/31/61
B. Turkus

right to operate 1 neg
color devel machine
and 1 pos col devel
machine with 5 men

no, because involves performance of 2 opns simultaneously in violation
of Art. 13(a)
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Tab

Laboratory
Case No.
Date of Award
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Issue

Award

15

Consolidated

12/21/61
S. Sugerman

failure to pay 2 weeks
wages in lieu of notice
under Art. 9(c) on occasion of going out of
business

employees entitled to 2
weeks wages

16

Du Art

12/27/61
A. Stark

rate for Negative Cleaner operating 2 Sonic
Cleaning Machines simultaneously

claim for higher pay denied

17

Du Art

2/4/63
J. DiFede

discharge of G. Martucci
for smoking

reduce to suspension for
30 days without pay

18

Pa the

8/26/63
H. Wechsler

pay J. DeCarlo and F.
Spataro as Precision
Machinists or Maint
Mechanics

pay "plumbers" as Maint
Mechanics

19

Pathe
141 NLRB 1290
(5842-B)

4/12/63
NLRB

discharge of A. Francis,
Shop Steward

no violation of NLRA to
discharge steward for giving unilateral orders to
employees and not confining himself to contract
grievance procedures

20

Pathe
(5842-A2)

11/26/63
I. Scheiber

discharge of brothers
D'Agostino for excessive absenteeism and
tardiness

just cause

21

Movielab

3/3/64
E. Corsi

right to require continuous opr. of printing machines from shift
to shift

no, because Art. 17(o)
requires Union 1 s written
consent to change practice

(5842-A1)
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Tab
22

Laboratory
Case No.
Date of Award
(Poletti File) Arbitrator
Movielab

1/20/65
J. DiFede

Issue

Award

complement for 3 and 4
strand color pos developing

7 for 3 strands; 9 for 4
strands, plus a spare for
absences, vac & relief

right to operate split
machines

yes, in emergency or when
other machine not in operation

23

Du Art

6/1/65
R. Silagi

rate for operating pos
devel machines in excess of 180 FPM

10% over Schedule A rate,
per 17(c)

24

Pa the
(5842-A1)

7/22/65
R. Feinberg

right to transfer F.
Spataro and J. DeCarlo
to afternoon and midnight shifts

no, because within maint
mechanic classification;
no separate classification of plumbers

25

Color Service
66-A2

7/7/66
McMahon

right to require Group
5 printer to loop print
2 machines in dual opn

no, because no such right
negotiated for color
printing

26

Du Art
66-A1

7/14/66
McMahon

rate and complement for
Pako color reversal
processing machine

color neg devel rate; 2
operators, 1 Dry End and
1 Wet End

27

Movielab
66-A3

9/16/66
McMahon

right to assign printers to relieve other
printers during lunch
and breaks

no, because not previously
done on daily basis

28

Mecca
66-A4
'6725.4001)

10/4/66
McMahon

right to require neg
developers to do pos
developing, and v.v.

yes, under Art. 13, "when
necessary"

29

Mecca
66-A-14

10/7/66
McMahon

right to require opr
of color printers with
loop attachment to wipe
negative with a velvet
pad while machine in opn

no, because not same as
wiping negative of
machine

-4-

Tab
30

31

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Issue

Award

Du Art
66-A5

10/14/66
McMahon

classification of opr
of magnetic sound 16
mm contact printer when
magnetic head not in opn

Group 4, not Group 3

Movielab

11/7/66
McMahon

right to operate 2
split color neg devel
machines continuously
with 5 oprs

no, because 2 1-strand
opns, not 1 2-strand opn

66-A15
(6725.4001)

32

Pathe
66-A8
(6725.4001

12/7/66
McMahon

right to promote less
senior employees to
Junior Timer classification

yes, under Art. 14(a) ,
because no film handling
experience

33

Movielab
66-A6
(6725.4001)

1/9/67 &
2/16/67
McMahon

rate and complement for
35 DR contact printer,
35 split optic reduction
printer, and 16 snakeover contact tracker
(all DR machines)

no additional compensation
for "double production";
1 opr for 2 machines; additional 20/d/hour for
simultaneous opn of 2
machines by 1 opr

34

Movielab
66-A10
(6725.4001)

3/13/67
McMahon

rate for panel printer

Group 5 plus

35

De Luxe
67-A18
(6725.4001)

4/20/67
McMahon

right to transfer an
entire crew to another
section or dept where
there is work available in home dept;
right to transfer neg
developers to pos developing

no, because of 15(g) bar
on changes pending arbitration, and because
transfer not temporary

36

Movielab
67-A20
(6725.4001)

3/28/67
McMahon

fair and reasonable
trial period for E.
Beckles where required
to work part-time in
another dept

entitled under Art. 14(d)
to training period of 160
hours in dept

-5-

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Issue

Award

37

Movielab
67-A22
(6725.4001)

5/31/67
McMahon

right to reduce nunber
of working foremen in
printing dept

yes, because Art. 16(d)
only limits employer's
right to increase nunber
of working foremen

38

Pathe
67-A27
(6725.4001)

7/31/67
McMahon

right to operate 2 contiguous B&W pos devel
machines as a pair
(with 3 men)

no, because 2 machines,
though contiguous, not
constitute a pair

39

Movielab
67-A23
(6725.4001)

8/3/67
McMahon

right of printing supervisors to determine
work flow, to deliver
pre-print materials to
printers, and to direct
working foremen to operate machines and/or
hand out work as supervisor sees fit

yes,

40

De Luxe
67-A25
(6725.4001)

8/23/67
McMahon

complement for 2 Duplex
color pos devel machines (4 strands) as
result of increasing
speed frcm 150 to 175
FPM

no increase in complement,
because up to 180 FPM
"deemed normal" in Scned.
A

41

De Luxe
67-A28

9/8/67
McMahon

right to transfer neg
developers to B&W pos
developing, when pos
developer refuse to
work normal OT

yes,

3/4/68
McMahon

union disciplinary proceedings against T.
Augeri for doing working forelady work while
her printing machine
was in motion

Union violation of
Art. 16(b)

Tab

(6725.4001)

42

Movielab
67-A30
(6725.4001)
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under Art.

16(a)

under Art. 13

Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
Arbitrator
(Poletti File)

Issue

Award

43

De Luxe
68-A1
(6725.4001

3/18/68
McMahon

rate for Modified J
Color Printing Machine

Group 5, since contract
does not limit speed to
200 FPM

44

De Luxe
68-A2
(6725.4001)

3/25/68
McMahon

right to discontinue
lunch money and OT for
6 B&W neg developers

no, because weekly anployees covered by Art.
12(a)

45

MDvielab
68-A5
(6725.4001)

4/11/68
McMahon

right of supervisors
to distribute work in
printing dept

no, because it is work
of working forenan & not
"incidental" under Art.
16(a)

46

Movielab
68-A11
(6725.4001)

6/17/68
McMahon

discharge of W. Heid
for excessive absenteeism

reinstate without back
pay

47

Movielab
68-A8
(6725.4001

7/11/68
McMahon

right to assign threading up and operating of
projector in inspection
room to color customer
complaint man

no, because is a nonbargaining unit employee who regularly handles film, in violation
of Art. 1(f)

48

Mecca
68-A9

7/16/68
McMahon

pay for S. Perdikakis
during training period
for developing job with
higher maximum rate
then former printing
job

developing rate; Art.
14(c) not applicable,
because move was a voluntary demotion

49

De Luxe
68-A7
(6725.4001)

8/19/68
McMahon

right to assign 3 men
to 1 strand without
commitment to pay lunch
money

yes; violation of contract for men to refuse
assignment

50

Du Art
68-A13

8/23/68
McMahon

right to operate #2 and
3 or #1 and 3 color devel machines simultaneously with 5 men

no, because no common
bridge, as between #1
and 2
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Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
Issue
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Award

51

Perfect
68-A16

9/13/68
McMahon

failure to pay severance pay to employees
who resigned after
notice of shutdown,
which was subsequently
revoked

employees not entitled
because notice of layoff
is not a layoff under Art.

52

Movielab
69-A1
(6725.4001)

2/21/69
Schnertz

discharge of R. Heid
for excessive absenteeism and away from
work station

reinstate without back
pay

53

Movielab
68-A10
(6725.4001)

2/28/69
McMahon

rate for Debrie 35/16 3R
Color Quad Reduction
Printers with Wet Gate

Group 5

54

Movielab
69-Al(d)
(6725.4001)

4/8/69
Schnertz

right to require Raw
Stock Clerks in consolidated stock room to
distribute both B&W and
color stock

yes, because contract
provides a single Raw
Stock Clerk classification

55

De Luxe
69-A2
(6725.4001)

4/8/69
Schmertz

right to operate Duplex
color pos devel
machines during lunch
with same crew and rate
as awarded in 67-A25

yes, because changes not
sufficient to trigger
Art. 17(c)

56

Movielab
69-A5
(6725.4001)

4/8/69
Schmertz

discharge of R. Ojeda
for negligence

change to layoff with
right to be recalled to
any open job he can perform

57

Movielab
69-A4
(6725.4001)

6/4/69
Schmertz

right to operate two
color neg devel
machines separated
by a wall with 5 men

no, because not a "2
strand" opn under Note,
or "side by side" under
award in 66-A15
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Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Issue

Award

58

Movielab
69-A6
(6725.4001)

7/2/69
Schnertz

right to assign reverted
employees out of seniority to immediately previous higher classification per Art. 13 for
a single night1s work

no, under normal circumstances, because deprives
senior reverted anployees
of work in violation of
Art. 13(a)

59

De Luxe
69-A9
(6725.4001)

9/2/69
Schmertz

failure to pay a 6th
day of pay for Wash.
Birthday holiday which
fell on Saturday

employees entitled to 5
days under Art. 12(a) +
1 day under Art. 5(ib)

Du Art

9/17/69
Schnertz

complement for duplex
color pos. devel.
machine

3 for developing 1 side
at a time; then 5 for 2
full Dack-to-back days

60

69-A23

61

Du Art
69-A16 &
69-A17

10/1/69
Schnertz

arbitration requested
3 and 4 days after
grievances telegraned
to Company

grievances not arbitrable,
because not filed for arbitration within 30 calendar days per Art. 15(b)

62

De Luxe
69-A13
(6725.4001)

10/31/69
Schnertz

3-day suspension of G.
Nbttola, R. Simolin
and V. Licari for refusal to work OT

just cause where employee
told to work OT or else
would be disciplined; not
where not so told

63

Du Art
69-A1 4

11/12/69
Schnertz

right to require- expeditors to do tape
punching

no, because not a regular
duty of expeditor classification and Union hasn11
consented in writing per
Art. 4(h)

12/18/69
Schnertz

right to run Gevachrome
color processing machine
without applicator
with 2 men

no, because of agreenent
to run other color devel
machines with 3 men,
even if only 2 may be
needed

64

69-A19
(6725.4001)
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Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator
Issue

Award

65

Du Art
69-A21
(6725.4001)

1/13/70
Schnertz

rate for Bell & Howell
panel printer

Group 5 plus 30/d, same
as other labs

66

Mavielab
69-A24
(6725.4001)

3/2/70
Schnertz

right of successor lab
to discontinue supplying of uniforms

yes, because predecessor" s
supplying of uniforms not
a negotiated benefit

67

MDvielab
(6725.4001)

3/17/70
NYS Div. of
Human Rights

discharge of E. Beckles

not discriminatory, becaused based on quality
of his work performance

68

De Luxe
70-A2
(6725.4001)

4/7/70
Schnertz

complement for B&W pos
devel machines as result of reconstruction
of dry-end take-up system when operating 2
strands

5, as prior to reconstruction, because 5th
crew member still needed

69

De Luxe
69-A26
(6725.4001)

4/7/70
Schmertz

rate for Hollywood Reduction Color Prints

Group 5

70

MDvielab
69-A27
(6725.4001)

4/7/70
Schnertz

remedy for negligent
overpayment of wages
to B. Levine

Company may recoup over
15 months, provided employee suffers no net increases in taxes

71

De Luxe
2-CB-4799

4/20/70
NLRB
General
Counsel

union failure to process grievance of J.
DeMarco over transfer
to night work

no violation of NLRA, because employee had lowest
seniority in dept

72

De Luxe
70-A1
(6725.4001)

5/18/70
Schnertz

rate for processing
internegative film
on color pos devel
machines

color pos devel rate,
not (higher) neg rates,
because of past practice

-10-

Laboratory
Case No.
(Poletti File)

Date of Award
Arbitrator

73

Mavielab
70-AQ3
(6725.4001)

74

Tab

Issue

Award

8/14/70
Schmertz

discharge of 5 employees
for failure to cooperate in investigation of
horseplay incident

not just cause, because
discharge was also to induce employees to admit
their own guilt or implicate others

De Luxe
70-A8
(6725.4001)

10/5/70
Schmertz

reassigrment, and discontinuance of 16/£ job
bonus, of A. Caleca

not improper, because
classification not changed
and bonus not negotiated

75

De Luxe
70-A7
(6725.4001)

10/8/70
Schmertz

right to transfer where
employee assigned, or
Union, believes it violates contract

yes, subject to right to
complain to Permanent
Arbitrator, except where
assignment physically
jeopardizes employee
or is illegal or unsocial

76

De Luxe
70-AQ4
(6725.4001)

12/14/70
Schmertz

remedy for 2-hour work
stoppage ordered by
Union in dispute over
manning of stripping
machine

Union directed to pay Company $300.54 in wages/benefits paid developers during stoppage, and not to
engage in stoppage even
if Company breaches Art.
15(h) "status quo"

77

De Luxe
70-AQ5
(6725.4001)

12/28/70
Schmertz

right to hire F.
Giovanelli to fill
vacancy though not
referred by Union
and Union not asked
for referral

yes, because those hiring
procedures not required
by contract

78

De Luxe
70-A13
(6725.4001)

4/12/71
Schmertz

transfer of P. Lamendola
from neg to pos devel

not violate his seniority
rights, because more senior neg developer had
not abandoned his seniority rights by working as
pos developer during his
recuperation

-11-

Tab

Laboratory
Case No.
Date of Award
(Poletti File) Arbitrator
Issue

Award

79

De Luxe
71-Q1
(6725.4001)

6/7/71
Schnertz

layoff of L. D'Agostino

violated his seniority
rights, because his "10%
Foremen" , with less dept.
seniority, was in same
classification -, R p

80

Titra

1/10/72
NLRB

Union1 s referral and
Company1s hiring of
employees on basis of
Union seniority per
Art. 27 of Union ByLaws

no violation of NLRA, because no evidence that
union status was part of
Union decision to refer
applicants to lab

194 NLRB 902

81

Du Art
2-CB-5115

3/31/72
NLRB
Regional
Director

Union1 s causing employer
to transfer S. Peet to
lower-paying job

no violation of NLRA, becaused based on his being
least senior man in classification

82

De Luxe

6/26/72
NLRB

forcing company to hire
employees, and not to
hire or revert or transfer other employees, on
basis of union seniority

violation of NLRA;
Union ordered to pay
back pay to 7 employees,
and rescind expulsion
of 2

Guffanti
72-A6
(7013-1)

10/30/72
Schnertz

overpayment of wages
to E. La Bracca

employee/union directed
to work out repayment
plan within 20 days

72-A7
(7013-1)

10/30/72
Schnertz

right to deduct from
severance pay of J.
Haviland upon retirement

no, because reasonable
for employee to believe
his pay was correct after
applying for and obtaining reclassification under Art. 13(d)

Cineffects
72-Q2
(7069.4001)

2/12/73
Schnertz

right to continue to require maintenance mechanics to work in Optical
Section of sister corporation not a signatory
to contract

Union directed, and Company
authorized, to remove Union
notice directing employees not to perform work

197 NLRB 937
(6668-A)
(6668.3001)

83

85
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Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator
Issue

Award

86

Movielab
72-A 10
(6725.4001)

3/26/73
Schmertz

right to require a single
operator to run Hollywood
Printer & Total Vision
Step Printer

no, though "dual operator" under Arb. 17(b)
not limited to 2 machines at same time,
because not in existance in another lab

87

Cineffects
73-A1
(7069.4002)

4/16/73
Schmertz

discharge of D. Torres

just cause

88

Du Art
73-A2
(7125.4001)

8/3/73
Schmertz
for

right to discontinue
25/5 paid to O. Temple
Expediter work when
he returned to negative
B classification

yes, because expressly
& uniquely applicable
to Expediter work for
CBS

89

Movielab
73-A11
(6725.4001)

11/19/73
Schmertz

discharge of L. Chiocco
for negligence

reinstate without back
pay to a different
level job for 6 months,
then to orig neg developer job

90

Cineffects
(7069.4003)

4/10/75
Schnertz

pay J. Linton as can
carrier instead of
vault man or expediter

pay as can carrier because duties haven't
changed since hired
in 1971

92

Du Art
(7125.4005)

12/29/75
Schmertz

pay vacation pay at
rates in effect at end
of May 1 - April 30
vacation year or at
time vacation is taken

latter required by
Art. 6, notwithstanding Union1 s insistence
on former in G. Flammer settlement

-13-

Tab

Laboratory
Case No.
Date of Award
Issue
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Award

(7223.4003)

5/10/76
Schmertz

discharge of S. Dworan
for negligence

reinstate without back
pay and with warning

94

Cineffects
(7069.4004)

10/12/76
Schmertz

failure to make Welfare
& Pension contributions
for OT hours as well as
straight time hours, up
to 40 hours/week

issue not decided in
view of Company offer
to make payments on
OT hours

95

Du Art
(7125.4006)

11/29/76
Schmertz

complement for Gevachrome when run continuously through meal and
break periods

crew of 3 set by
award in 69-A19
shall relieve each
other; no replacement required

96

RadiantTechnicolor
(7223.4004)

5/24/77
Schmertz

failure to pay working
foreman 10% over actual compensation

"highest base rate"
in Art. 16(e) means
highest actual hourly
rate paid an employee
supervised by the
foreman; includability
of merit increases
not decided

97

Du Art
(7125.3002)

8/17/77
Schmertz

right to exclude employee hired to perform plant clerical
functions in Maintenance Dept. from bargaining unit

no, because historical
performance of that
work by BU employee
who retired put it
within Art. 1

98

Du Art
(7125.4011)

8/17/77
Schmertz

complement for Photomec 16 color reversal
processor

2, under award for
Pako machine in 66-A1;
color neg devel Note
not applicable

93

Radiant

-14-

Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
Issue
(Poletti File) Arbitrator
failure to pay working
foreman J. Gazaway 10%
above special ECN II
rates in separate agreement

Award
special ECN II rates
not "base rates" within
Art. 16(e) or 5/24/77
award in Radiant case

99

Du Art
(7125.4007)

12/1/77
Schnertz

100

Technicolor
SONY 77 Civ.
2233 (MEL)
(7223.6002)

discharge of 0. Temple,
5/25/78
U.S. District and requiring him to
Court
punch out and in at
lunch

not discriminatory,
because based on employee1 sU»pdepend ability

101

Technicolor
SONY 78 Civ.
1181 (PNL)

Union1s refusal to re6/27/79 &
fer discharge of S.
9/18/79
U.S. District Dworan to arbitration
Court, afunder collective bargaining agreement
firmed U.S.
Court of
Appeals

not violate Union1s
duty of fair representation under federal law,
because of employee's
bad record and correspondingly small likelihood of success in arbitration

(7223.2001)

102

Technicolor
78 Civ.
1181 (PNL)
(7223.2001)

6/9/80
U.S. District
Court, affirmed U.S.
Court of
Appeals

Company1s refusal to
agree to ad hoc arbitration of discharge
of S. Dworan

not a "repudiation" of
contractual arbitration
such as to entitle employee to sue Company
in Court

103

Du Art
(7125.4012)

7/17/80
M. Glushien

complement for operating Gevachrcme &-ECN II
side-by-side

6, even though a common
bridge, because historically each operated with
separate crew of 3, and
industry practice not to
tandem neg & pos machines

104

Technicolor
(7223.4008)

6/28/83
N. Cohen

complement for Film Line
B & W pos devel machine
formerly a color pos
machine

3, because machine
was modified, but
not "reconstructed"
within Art. 17(c);
damages denied for
operation with 3
pending arbitration
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Tab

Laboratory
Date of Award
Case No.
(Poletti File) Arbitrator

Issue

Award

105

Du Art
(7125.4015)

7/30/83
S. Aiges

failure to recall P.
Schreiber to former
higher-rated Vault
job from which he had
reverted back to
Splicer

not improper, notwithstanding award
in 69-A6, because no
instance at DuArt of
recalling employee
reverted per Art. 7(e)
(1) to former job

106

Technicolor
(7223.4009)

1/16/84
Schmertz

failure to let M. Cohen
return to former higherrated Chem Mixing job
from which he had been
demoted, in lieu of layoff

improper, notwithstanding no right under Art.
7(c)(1) to revert to a
higher classification,
because of ad hoc agreement made at time of
demotion

107

Du Art
(7125.0003)

3/22/84
Schmertz

suspension, discharge,
& shift transfer of
R. Salinas

grievance dismissed
with prejudice, because
of employee1s desire to
proceed in EEOC or court
but not in arbitration
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33-Perfect

In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between -

9/13/68
J.E. McMahon
ARBITRATOR'S
OPINION AND AWARD

PERFECT FILM LABORATORIES INC.,
- And -

(68-A-16)

MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS,
LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.

On September 4, 1968 a hearing in a matter in dispute between
Perfect Film Laboratories Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Company")
and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
(hereinafter referred to as "Union") was held before the undersigned,
the permanent arbitrator in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Union Contract"), between the parties.

The

parties were afforded full opportunity to offer argument and evidence
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

APPEARANCES:
For the Company:
COOPER, OSTRIN, DE VARCO & ACKERMAN, ESQS,
By: Harold L. Young, Esq.

For the Union:
PINTO & STEIN, ESQS«
By: Nicholas Pinto, Esq.

ISSUE

Which of the ten (10) employees, if any, listed on
Schedule A submitted by the Union are entitled to severance pay/
pursuant to the Union Contract, and, if so, how much?
FACTS
The basic undisputed facts are as follows:
(a) At a meeting of employees and Union representatives
held on July 22, 1968, Robert Crane President of the Company announced
that the Company's laboratory (54th Street) would discontinue operations
as of the close of business August 2, 1968; that seme employees would be
given work at the Pathe laboratory (another laboratory owned and operated
by the Company); that some employees would continue working at the 54th
Street laboratory under the Pathe contract.
(b)

On July 26, 1968 a meeting of the same parties was held

at which time Mr. Crane advised that the Company had re-considered its
decision to discontinue plant operations on August 2, 1968 and had
decided not to close the laboratory, but to continue operations.
(c) That all of the ten employees who have demanded
severance pay have resigned from the Company and secured employment
elsewhere.
TESTIMONY
The Union stated that the men for whom severance pay is being
sought made arrangements for other employment during the period from
July 22 to July 26; that such action was taken because of, and, in
reliance upon the notice given at the July 22 meeting.

The Company representatives testified that resignations
from these men were received after July 26th; that although they were
requested to continue in Company's employ, they refused.

The resignations

received and the effective dates are as follows:
Name

Effective

James Dagro
Frank Jeannetti
Robert Jeannetti
Nicholas D. Beneditto
Gordon Davis
Gene Zippo
Peter Wilson
Harold Stroud
John Rizzo
Jerry DiGennaro

August 8
"
6
"
8
"
6
"
16
"
16
"
23
"
2
"
16
"
31

After notice had been given that the Company's plant would
close, the Union requested Company employees to refrain from making
applications for work elsewhere in order that the Union could work-out
plans to place the laid-off employees in other jobs on a seniority basis.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES
The Union contends the notice of July 22, that the Company
plant would discontinue its operations,justified employees in seeking
new employment and the men who secured positions elsewhere in reliance
on such notice, are entitled to severance pay; that the notice given on
July 22 was equivalent to being "laid-off?1 that the revocation of the
notice on July 26 could not deprive the employees who had obtained
other employment of severance pay; that the Company was estopped from
not
claiming that these men were in fact/laid off during the period July 22
to July 26; that any instructions given by the Union to its members

were a private matter and of no concern to the Company from which
the Company could acquire no advantage; that the resignations were
submitted as a matter of form din order for the men to secure earned
vacation pay.
The Company claims simply that these employees were in fact
never laid-off; that the notice of July 22 did not and could not
under the Contracts be interpreted as a lay-off; the lay-off would have
taken place on August 2, 1968 if the Company had not changed its
position.

Furthermore, the action of these men in voluntarily sub-

mitting formal resignations, irrespective of reasons for so doing, was
a direct contradiction of their claim that they had been laid-off.

DISCUSSION
The provisions of the Union Contract that are applicable
to this dispute are as follows:
"11.

Severance Pay:

(a) In the event of layoff, the permanent discontinuance
of all plant operations by the Employer for any reason,
permanent disability, retirement (at minimum age 62), or
death of an employee, there shall be paid the following
severance pay:
Severance
Where the employee has worked:
Pay:
1 year but less than 2 years
2 year but less than 4 years
4 years but less than 6 years
6 years but less than 8 years
8 years but less than 10 years
10 years but less -than 12 years
12 years but less than 15 years
15 years but less than 20 years
20 years but less than 25 years
25 years and over

1 Week
2 Weeks
3 Weeks
4 Weeks
5 Weeks
6 Weeks
7 Weeks
8 Woeks
9 Weeks
10 Weeks

"8. Permanent Plant Shutdown:
Where all plant operations are permanently discontinued by the Employer for any reason/ the
provisions of Sections 7 and 11 of this Agreement
shall apply."

OPINION

The primary question to be determined is what is the
affect

of the decision announced on July 22 that the Company plant

would cease operations on August 2, 1968.

Was this decision equivalent

to a "Lay-off" so as to entitle an employee/ who secured or made arrangements for another job prior to the revocation of July 26, to severance
pay.

The Union placed great stress upon the claim that the ten men

involved here were fully justified in relying upon the decision of
July 22 and the Company should be estopped from denying severance pay
to these men who, it is claimed, altered their individual positions by
seeking and obtaining other
the Company.

employment as a result of the action of

This arbitrator could find no precedent or authority that

a lay-off and a notice of lay-off are one in the same.
when employment is terminated.

A lay-off occurs

E: could be either temporary or permanent.

The Company's contractual obligation to pay severance pay is in fact
based upon the loss of employment by an employee.

Admittedly/ no

employee lost his employment as a result of the Company's decision of
July 22.

On the contrary, the ten men who left were urged to stay.
In the case of Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 34 L.A. 321/ the

arbitrator in considering a similar question relative to the date when
employment was deemed to have been terminated, stated:
5-

"The arbitrator believes that the date of the
decision to close the plant is irrelevant.
It is the closing of the department or plant
which deprives the employee of employment,
rather than the decision to do so, which
decision may always be reversed."
Similarly, in Ma11inckrpdt Chemica1 Works, 48 L.A. 11251137, in determining whether an employee would recieve severance pay
held:
". . .it is the actual closing of a plant or
department, rather than the decision to do so,
that deprives employees of employment. We
agree with the Employer's view, as expressed
at the bottom of page 8 of the Company Brief,
that in applying this case, 34 LA 321, to the
case before us, we must find and hold that the date
of actual layoff, and not the decision announced on
April 28, 1966, is the decisive factor that deprived
the Weldon Spring employees of employment. We therefore sustain the view of the Company that it was
correct in paying severance pay where theCompany
took the initiative in laying off an employee, and
that no severance pay whatever, under the contract,
is due to any employee who took the initiative and
quit his job when there was still work to be done and
the Company not only wished him to stay but took no
action to lay such employee off or to terminate his
employment, although everyone knew that it would not be
very long before the entire facility would be shut down."
(Emphasis ours)
In view of the terminology of the Union Contract, I was
not persuaded that a decision or a notice of lay-off is equivalent to
an actual lay-off.

To accept the Unionfs argument would be to add to

the agreement something that is not present therein.
hibited from doing.

This I am pro-

Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary

to pass upon the effect of the resignations submitted by these men.

6.

> .

AWARD
The Award, therefore, is that none of the ten employees
listed on Schedule A submitted by the Union is entitled to severance

pay.
Dated:

September 13, 1968

5EPH E. McMAHON
'Permanent Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW YORK )

ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
On the

day of September 1968, before me personally came

JOSEPH E. McMAHON, to me known, and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 1, 1968 to October 1,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Richard Held is reduced to a
suspension. He shall be reinstated without
back pay. The period of tine between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension.
Neither party is "the losing party." Therefore
the fee anc! expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally.

*

/s

r~7^

^C^C^t^U^^JL^.
Eric
y. Schrnertz
I
Arbitrator

DATED: February 21, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1

)s= .
) " "

On this 21st day of February, 1969,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the Individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and knov-rj to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO .
and

I
Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

This is the first case before me in my capacity as the
new permanent Arbitrator under the Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The stipulated issue for determination is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Richard Heid? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 29, 1969 at which time Mr. Heid, i
|
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives j
of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared. Full opportunity was

i

afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties waived the
Arbitrator's oath and the time for the rendition of the

!

Arbitrator's Award as set forth in Section 15(b) of the con-

i
It

tract.

i

The Company charges the grievant with violations of the
Company Rules; specifically excessive absenteeism and being
•way without authorization from his work station during his
shift on September 19, 1968.

The Company states that in

addition to these violations, it imposed the ultimate penalty
of discharge because of the grievant's prior disciplinary
record, which includes warnings and a suspension for previous

- 2infractions.
Irrespective of the magnitude of the grievant's prior
disciplinary record, I am persuaded that but for the specific
incident of September 19, together vith the charge of absenteeism, be would not have been discharged. Therefore, unless
those two specific violations are established up to the stand*
•rd required in discharge cases - by clear and convincing
evidence - the extreme penalty of discharge cannot be upheld.
i

Based on the record before me I an persuaded of the excessive nature of the grievant's record of absenteeism. And
because the Onion does not dispute the days he failed to report for work, for the periods involved, I see no need to recite the specifics of that record. However, the Coopany has
not proved, to the standard that I require, that the grlevant
was away fro* his work station improperly on September 19.
It has proved that he was away from his work area an unusual
number of times and for lengthy periods, but it has offered
no hard evidence to show where he was or that there was no
excusable reason for his conduct. The Company'* judgment
that his absences from his work station were improper and
violative of the tules is merely a conclusion based on the
grievant's prior disciplinary record.

But that conclusion is

founded on mere suspicion, and though the Company may be
right, I am not prepared to uphold a discharge based on mere
suspicion.

The grievant's explanation that certain personal

needs compelled him to leave his work station teveral times
during his shift on September 19, although questionable when
viewed in the light of his prior disciplinary record, is not

- 3 implausible, nor is it overturned by any evidence supporting
the Company's view.

And with the burden on the Company to

!

I
I

prove the charge by clear and convincing evidence, I shall not
i
resolve the doubt to the prejudice of the grievant.
It is well settled that a record of chronic absenteeism,
no matter what its cause, is grounds for an employee's termination if that record continues following warnings and lesser
disciplinary penalties.

But as I have indicated, I believe

the Company would not have fired the grievant on September 20
for his record of absenteeism, even if it may have had
grounds to do so.

Rather its decision was prompted not just

because of a continuing absentee record, but more specifically
because of the grievant's absences from his work station during the course of his shift.

Consequently, as the Company has

not proved the grievant1s culpability with regard to the
latter offense, I shall not uphold the discharge action simply
because I do not believe that absent the latter charge, the
Company would hai'e imposed that penalty.
But manifestly, because the grievant's excessive absentee
record is well established; because of the well settled rule
that an employer may discipline and need not indefinitely retain employees who fail to report for work regularly; and for
a reason unique to this grievant (to which the balance of this
Opinion relates) a disciplinary- penalty in the form of a suspension is warranted under the circumstances of this case.
It is critical to his continued tenure with this Company
for the grievant to forthwith disabuse himself of the notion
that he is entitled to unreasonable special privileges beyond

- 4those accorded other employees.

He compiled an admirable

military service record in Vietnam; was wounded; and suffers a
partial disability as a result. But this does not mean that
the Company must for long tolerate irregular and inadequate
job attendance. The dilemma for the Company and the grievant
would be most pronounced if the grievant's absences were in
fact necessitated by his disability.
1

But I am not persuaded

that that is the case. No doubt a few of his absences were
due to visits to the Veterans Hospital for periodic examinations and medication.

But these represented only a small per-

centage of his total absentee record, and I see no reason why
these visitations, with notice to and approval by the Company,
may not continue.

For I do not consider his request to be

absent for those few times each year to be an unreasonable
special privilege!.
But I am not satisfied that the balance of his absences
were required by his disability.

Frankly I think that be-

cause of some discomfort, perhaps at times connected with that
disability, and for other reasons at other times, the grievant
decided to remain away from work, when he actually could have
reported, in the mistaken belief that he was entitled to special consideration. His testimony at the hearing tended to
disclose this erroneous, albeit honestly held attitude.
So let me take this opportunity to try my hand at directing the grievant toward an understanding of the rules of
employment and a rehabilitation of his attendance record. He
has been warned by the Company; and I believe has undergone
instructional discussions with his Onion. As the permanent

- 5Arbitrator, I shall add my admonition, in the hope that as
the objective and final word, it will be heeded.
The grievant is expressly advised, and the suspension imposed by my Award shall serve as notice, that regular attendance is an absolute requisite to continued employment. This
applies not only to coming to work, but also to attending
to his duties and remaining at his work station when he is at
work. For whatever reason, even if it is beyond his control
or does not involve misconduct, his inability to regularly
•ttend to his Job and duties, would constitute just cause for
dismissal. But I believe that the grievant has the ability
to maintain a normal and satisfactory attendance record.
Accordingly, he is directed to do so. Visits to the Veterans
Hospital for regularly scheduled examinations and medication
shall be worked out with notice to and consent of the Company.
If he must leave his work station to take medication, he
shall notify and obtain the permission of supervision.
If the grievant's attendance record does not improve;
or if without satisfactory explanation he leaves his work
area at times and for periods beyond normal bounds; or for
other breaches of Company Rules or normal work requirements;
I would then be confronted with a strong if not irrebuttable
presumption that he is unable or unwilling to meet his obligations as an employee. And I would have no choice but to uphold any subsequent discharge action taken by the Company.
For all the foregoing reasons the grievant'• discharge
is reduced to a suspension. He shall be reinstated but without back pay. The period of time between his discharge and

-- 6 -

•

.

his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

Eric/O. Schtnertz
Arbitrator

•,-f

„.,

la the Hatter of the Arbitration
- between MOVIELAB, INC.

ARBITRATOR'S
AWARD

LOCAL 702, MOII08 PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS, I.A.T.S.E.

(68-A10)

TbU proceed log wa* heli pur«uaot to Article 15 of Collective
ftargaiaiag Agree«eat (herein »«wti»c» referred to «* the "Contrite")
MOVULAB, IHC. 0i*rein«fter referred to »• HCo»pany*') and Local 702, MOTI0H
PICTU8SS LABOtATORY TECHN1C1AMS, I.A.T.S.E. (hereinafter referred to as "Union'}.
Hearing* were held on June 25, July 3, it4S and January 21, 1969.
The Fftrtiet w*r« afforded tull opportunity to offer evidence and to ex^eiine
cro»» aiToifte «ritne*»e*. ft»»t Haarittg h«aor«nda were filed.
APRAXAHCKS :
For the Onion:

ratio
lyj

I. HlchoUi Pinto,

For the Coo^aay:
•D1XTTI. FREIBIM, FTLASluOta,
FtUHAM & GMtTMBK

Byi

trie Boaenfeld, Bcq.

SUBMITTED asm
What shall be the rate lor 35/16H* 3R Color Quad Reduction Printer
doc to the attachment of a Wot Gatet
Whst shall be the effective date of such ratet

On or about !fove»b«r 28, 1967, Company notified Union that it wa#
putting into operation a debris 35/16HK Color Quad Reduction Printer and paying
the operator thereof the Group 5 rate.
The Union did not question that rate until aoae aonths later wfc*n it
learned fron the ship steward that said machine had a "Wet G.*te'" attachment,
thereupon it attempted to negotiate a higher rate as DeLuxe laboratories vas
paying a premium rate to the operators of machinet hairing a similar attachment.
S»t being successful in this attempt, the Union instituted this proceeding.
^et Gate" attachment is in the form of a "Bo*", sonetine* referred
to as "aquerie*", which contains solution of ferchloroethylene (soeetiaea referred
to herein as "Chemical Solution") tfarou^ «fcich the file is run.
Vet Gate is closed while the naefaiae is running,

The door on the

the solution is drained off

into an overflow system after the machine is shut down.

The door is then opened,

aad the inside of the »qu«rlu* cleaned by the operator,

the ferchloroethylene

solution give* off m odor or snell *feich is offensive to aooe degree.

Occasionally,

there vas break down In the overflow system with result the ehevical solution
spilled on floor.

When this occurred, tike odor was greater.

The Cosy any, in an effort to reduce the odor to a ainimes, installed
a tuo-exh»ust ventilation system to dry film after going through the aqu*riuo.
It also redesigned the overflow systsn by Installing new valve system, as a faulty
valve was found 6s be Che cause of overflowing.
no overflowing.

Since August, 1968 there has been

The Company had tine* 1963 operated liquid printing machine with an
attachment which Coospany equates with • "Met Gate" and the operators thereof
were paid contract rat*.
POSITION OF THE PAtTIES
The Union contend*:
(1) That Arbitrator Bust decide if the machine with its Wet
Gate attachment it a new or reconstructed machine within the meaning of Section
17(c) of the contract;
(2) Ihat said Machine is, in fact, a new or reconstructed
machine;
(3) Ihat if it is not »uch a new or reconstructed machine,
then Arbitrator oust award the sane rate em other labs having same equipment pay
therefore;
(4) That the operator of the Vet Gatt printer is entitled to
additional compensation, i.e. ,-a prtaniun rat* of pay because it exits offensive
odors and causes skin irritation of various degrees when it contacts the operator's
skin.

•

The Company contends:
(1) that this is not a case where the Arbitrator has rate
Jurisdiction under the contract*s tectioa 17(c), which authorises the Arbitrator
to fix rates for nev, unusual and reconstructed equipment and for (accelerated)
existing equipment, unions it is the save as presently or may hereafter be
operated in any other laboratory.

The attachment of a wot gate to e Debric doee

not nake it new (or unusual or reconstruct^) within the meaning of 17(c). Such
a Debrie remains s piece of existing equipment.
(2) H»at tttonld the Arbitrator hold that a Bebrie with a wet
gate is new or reconstructed equipment over which the Arbitrator nay take rate
jurisdiction under 17(c), that the proper rat* would be the Group 5 rate.

(3) That the rate for the»a two Debrle printer* with wet

gates should be the rate stated la the contract for Color Printer - one or tvo
machine* - one operator, I.e., the Group 5(e) rate...because a Debrie with a wet
gate is etill a Color Printer within the meaning of the contract's Group 5(c).
PISCUSSIOM
The first question to b« decided is the applicability of Section 17(c)
Of the contract to the issue. The pertinent parts of that section are as follows:
"Employer shall be permitted to install and
Operate new, unusual aad reconstructed equipment,
and accelerate the speed of existing equipment after
negotiating wages and condition* with respect
thereto with the Onion.......However, if such new,
unusual, reconstructed or accelerated equipment
or machinery is the same as presently or a*y
hereafter be operated in any other laboratory
with which the Union has a collective bargaining
agreement, then the Employer shall have the
right, upon notification to the Union and upon
the mutual agreement that said machinery or
equipment is the same, to operate such equipment
in the same manner as the other laboratory upon
payment of the base rate of wages applicable to
the machine or equipment operated in such other
laboratory."
The Company argues that the Wet Sate attachment does not make the
Debrie Printer "new or unusual** any more than attaching a heater or radio makes
a ear new or unusual. Furthermore the attachment is superficial to the machine
and does not involve the whole machine. The analogy is not apt. One could think
of a number of other attachments such as double-barrel carburetors, mufflers,
etc., which could make a car new, unusual or reconstructed. As Company1* argument
is not p«rsuasiv«, it is my decision that section I7(c) is applicable.
It, therefore, is necessary to determine what should be a proper rate
for the operator of the machine or machines in question. The thrust of the Union's
for higher pay rests exclusively upon the claimed offensive odor of

Ferchloroethyiene and die claim that said chemical solution causes skin irritation
of various degrees when it contacts the operator's skin. The testimony of the
witnesses failed to support these claims,

The testimony of Mrs, Scala, an operator

of the machine in question for the past fix months, was particularly significant.
She stated that the swell (odor) was "not offensive" and the chemical burns one's
cuts "for a minute". Moreover, the Union witnesses testified that no operator lost
any time or consulted a doctor as a result of t*elliag or of physical contact with
the chemical solution.
Admittedly, Ferdtloroethylene unventilated or overflowed smells a
good deal. However, the testimony sad evidence indicated that the ventilation
Systeni installed by the Company has reduced the swell to the minimus and the
redesigned overflow system has reduced the possibility and frequency of an overflow.
Finally, there was no evidence offered that the Wet Gate attachment
requires more work, greater skill or imposes greater responsibility of the
operator than operation of machine without the "Wet Gate".
Regarding the higher rate paid by Reeves and DeLuxe to the operators
of a Wat Gate printer, the testimony with respect thereto has been disregarded.
In case of Reeves, it was entirely hearsay, and in case of DeLuxe, there was a
complete lack of proper foundation. Ho proof or testimony was presented to
demonstrate that machines were the same; nor was there any competent testimony
relative to die facts or circumstances that resulted in the payment of a higher
rate by those companies.

AWARD

The Award, therefore, is as follows:
The rate for the 35/16 3R
color quad reduction printer
due to attachment of a W-t bate
•hell be contract rate for color
printer — i.e. • Group 5.

Dated:

February'/'?* 1969
JOSEFn E. hcliAHON, Arbitrator

STATE OF HEW YORK

cousm OF wx YORK.
On tbe//v day of February 1969, before me personally cssie Joseph L.

McHahon, to &e known, and knowri to oe to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he duly acknowledged to ce that he executed
the ssaue.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR. MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technician*
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Ubdersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly beard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The present assignment of duties to the Raw
Stock Clerks is neither violative of Section
17(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
nor of established custom and practice. The
Company aay continue the present operation
of the Raw Stock Room with one clerk on each
shift, pending an early hearing before ae on
the question of whether the work load of the
clerks is normal or excessive.

.-r

--r .

•r

Eric a. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April ^1969
STATE OF Mew York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)„ .
)

On tills s*"day of April, 1969, before ae personally came
and appeared Brie J. Schmertz to ae known and known to ae to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to «e Chat he executed the same.
Case #69-Al(d)

,-;..rC-.-— --*
NC. ;'•-"

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Do the present assignment* of duties to the
low Stock Clerics violate the contract? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing vas held on April 4, 1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Prior to March 1968 the Company operated two Raw Stock
Supply Rooms, one for black and white raw stock and the other
for color. The former was located on the 7th floor and the
latter on the 8th. Each was manned by Raw Stock Clerks. In
March 1968, the two Stock Rooms were combined into one on the
6th floor.

Though the rooms were consolidated, the work of

the two Raw Stock Clerks on each of the first two shifts remained divided; one distributed color stock and the other distributed black and white stock. On the third shift the single
clerk distributed both types of stock.
Effective March 31, 1968 the Company laid off the two
Junior clerks end re-arranged the assignments so that one
Raw Stock Clerk manned each of the three shifts. As a consequence both of the single clerks assigned to die first and
second shifts were and are required to handle both black and
white and color stock.

In other words, before the leyoff,

- 2a clerk on the first or second shift handled either black
and white or color stock; but since the layoff the regaining
clerk is required to do both, The Union contends that the
Company's action Is violative of Section 17(b) of the contract and contrary to established custom and practice. Also
it claims that the layoff is not supported by a bona fide
diminution in vork within the Haw Stock Clerk classification,
and that consequently the present work load is excessive.
I agree with the Company that Section 17(b) is not
applicable, that Section, both by title and content relates
to the operation of machines. Though the first sentence of
Section 17(b) begins with the phrase "The parties agree that
present methods of operation within the laboratories shall
continue without change ...," the balance of the clause, together with a full reading of the entire Section, including
paragraphs (a), (c), (d), makes it clear that "methods of
operation" relates to the operation of machines. As the job
involved in this case is neither a machine job nor part of a
machine operation, faction 17(b) does not apply.
•or can I agree with the Onion's assertion that the
present arrangement, requiring the clerk to handle both color
and black and white stock is contrary to practice and custom.
The only present variation la on the first and second shift.
The third shift work, mil along, required the clerk to do
both. And the third shift clerk is classified no differently
than the clerks OB the first and second shifts.
Moreover, I find nothing in the contract which prohibits
the Company from requiring the Raw Stock Clerk to perform

." .
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- 3both assignments.

The contract provides for a single classi-

fication at • specified rate of pay.

It makes no distinction

between Raw Stock Clerks who handle color stock and those who
handle black and white.

There is no dispute that responsibil-

ity for black end white stock and color stock are both properly within the single classification of Raw Stock Clerk. Therefore, just as « clerk has been called upon to perform either
duty, he may now be required to perform both, provided the
vork load Involved Is not excessive.
The last point, namely the quantity of the present work
load of the clerks on each of the three shifts, relates to
the Union's final charge that the layoff was unsupported by
any significant diminution of work, and hence is improper.
The Company has a contractual right to reduce its work force
when the available work falls off.

In the instant case the

Company claims that the available black and white and color
stock work is sufficient to support only one full time clerk
on each shift.

And that this resulted from a diminution in

the work of die Printing Department (which the Stock Room
services) and a re-aasignaent of "einexlng" and splicing.

I

make no determination now of this question, simply because the
evidence offered by both sides was Insufficient.
may continue the present operation

The Company

of the Raw Stock Room, but

the parties shall come before me at an early hearing on the
question of whether the present work load of the Raw Stock
Clerks Is normal or excessive.

Eric j. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR. MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technician* I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

C9-A*
Award

and

De Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties. Awards
as follows:
The grievance in ease 169A-2 does not fall within Section 17(c) of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Accordingly the Union's claia regarding the present operation of the machine* during
lunch is denied.
The Arbitrator's fee in this case shall be borne
by the Doion.

DATED: April I" 1969
STATE OF Rev York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)
)BS.t

On this S"~day of April, 1969, before m* personally came
and appeared Brie J. Schaert* to me known and known to ue to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to M that he executed the saote.
Case f69A-2

.
A in N«»**'J

.. *»•*

In the Hatter of the Arbitration
betvecn
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technician*, I.A.T.S.K., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Da Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated Issue 1st
Does Grievance 69A-2 fall within Section 17(c)
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
It is stipulated that if the Arbitrator decides
that question in the negative, the Onion's claim
regarding the present operation of the machines
during lunch is denied. If answered in the
affirmative, the parties shall negotiate conditions for the operation of the machines during
lunch as provided by Section 17(c).
A hearing was held at the Company offices on February 28,
1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties
filed post bearing briefs.
The machines in question are three Duplex color positive
developing machines.

The question for determination la

whether certain changes in equipment on those machines which
have occurred since the Award of Arbitrator Joseph B. McMahon
in case 067A-25, dated August 23, 1967, together with the
changes which were before him in that proceeding, make the
Duplex machines new, unusual and reconstructed equipment or
accelerated within the meaning of Section 17(e) of the contract.
There is no dispute that since the McHahon Award the
kachines have not been accelerated beyond the speed of 175,
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which that Award held to be normal under the terms of the
contract.

So there has been no new acceleration in the

•peed of the machines, which standing alone, would now warrant the application of Section 17(c) of the contract.

The

main thrust of the Union's argument is one of cumulative
•ffect.

It argues that the accelerated speed of the mach-

ines plus the other changes weighed by Mr. McMahon, together
with subsequent changes in certain parts of the machines,
transform those machines into new, unusual and/or reconstructed equipment.
I have considered the changes which were before Mr. McMahon
when he denied the union's request for an increase in the
Duplex machine crew complement, namely:

1. The increase in machine speed from J.50 to 175.
2. An increase in the temperature of the developing solution.
3. Extra requirements of the IBM cards.
4. Extra supplies entailed in the use of "black
bags," and dimmer lights.
5. Extreme difficulty in making double splices;
together with the changes subsequent thereto, namely:

1. Alteration of the film feed mechanism from
sprocket gears to a friction system
2. Installation of a different type gear clutch.
3. A change in the position of the gear clutch.
4. Installation of a jet spray washer ("bird bath")
5. Installation of a squeege film drying system;
and I have concluded that the overall and basic function
and operation of the Duplex machines, which are of 1955

I
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vintage remain fundamentally unchanged, and consequently do
not constitute new, unusual or reconstructed equipment within the meaning of Section 17(c) of the contract.
Accordingly the Onion's grievance In case f69A-2 Is
denied.
~

Eric J S c h m e r t z
U
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Renaldo Ojeda is changed to a
layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated. Pursuant to the recall procedure he is entitled to be recalled to fill open
jobs he can perform. As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet End Black and White Developer
on the third shift was open or available. Therefore Mr. Ojeda may elect to come off layoff immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay. In
the alternative he may remain on layoff, subject
to his right of recall to a job he is qualified to
perform, without back pay, in "accordance with the
established recall procedure, when and if such job
becomes available.
The fee and expanses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally by the parties.

Eric/0. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 5 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this f** day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 69-A5

7*

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Renaldo Ojeda? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on March 3 and March 31, 1969, at
which time Mr. Ojeda, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Also, with the agreement of the parties, Samuel Miller, Esq.,
a personal attorney for the grievant, was present at both
hearings as an observer.
Based on two "negligence reports" and four warning letters, including a suspension, all during the year 1968, and
all for certain alleged errors in his work as a Relief Color
Developer, the grievant was discharged.
I am persuaded that the grievant made the mistakes which
are the subject of those negligence reports and letters of
warning.

It is obvious to me that the grievant w«» not and

is not able to perform the duties of a Relief Color Developer,
especially the specific task of operating the Applicator
which develops sound track, under the methods the Company pre-

- 2 scribes for the third shift.

Specifically, the evidence, in-

cluding the grievant's own testimony, reveals that the grievant is unable to adjust to the procedure of interchanging
sound and silent (dailies) developing, which requires activating or disengaging the Applicator more frequently than if
long unbroken periods are devoted to either sound or silent.
And there is no challenge by the Union in this proceeding to
that method of operation.

Also, it appears that some oerson-

ality conflict exists between the grievant and the third
shift color developing supervisor, Mr. Marino, at least on
those occasions when the grievant is under what he considers
to be the pressures of the Relief job.

In tny judgment, there-

fore, there can be little serious dispute with the wisdom of
removing the grievant from that particular assignment.
The classic approach

is to uphold the discharge of an

employee, who, following warnings and a suspension, is unable
to perform his job duties satisfactorily.

And this Arbitrator

has so ruled in a long line of ad hoc cases.

However, there

are times when the classical rule is either inappropriate or
unfair because of other overriding equitable considerations.
In my view the instart case is such an exception.
Prior to 1968 the grievant worked for the Company for
ten years as a Developer without any recorded trouble whatsoever.

For ten years his work was totally satisfactory, and

the Company does not dispute his present competence as a
Developer.

In short, he has established his ability as a

Developer over many years of service; but the Relief job on
the Color Developer he cannot do satisfactorily.

His ten years

- 3 of satisfactory service and his established competence as? a
Developer are not the only equitable factors.

Additionally,

is the total absence of misconduct or wilfull neglect on his
part in his failure to adequately perform the Relief job.
did not refuse to perform his work assignments.
leave his work area without permission.

He

He did not

He did not extend

break or lunch periods beyond prescribed limits.

He has no

record of excessive absenteeism or tardiness.

He did not en-

gage in proscribed activities while on duty.

And there is no

!
!

evidence that he did not try, to the best of his ability,
albeit inadequately, to perform the duties required of him.
In other words, he tried but failed on this particular job:
whereas he had succeeded on others.

And it follows that though

he may be unsuited to the Relief job, he has not been and is
not unsuited to this Industry.
For these reasons, unique to this case, I do not find
the penalty of discharge to be appropriate or fair.

Though

the grievant must be removed from the Relief job, he and his
competence in other capacities should not be lost to the
Industry.

Nor, as would be the case if the discharge WSE up-

held, should the Industry be lost to him as a source of employment after he has devoted so many satisfactory years to it.
What is proper is to disqualify the grievant from the
third shift Relief Color Developer Job as it is presently constituted.

And assuming other jobs were filled when he was re-

moved, to place him on layoff because of inability to perform
available work.

Thereafter he would be entitled to recall,

without back pay, in accordance with the established recall

- 4procedure, to a

job he is qualified to perform.

That then is what I direct.

The grievant's discharge is

changed to a layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated.

As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet

End Black and White Developer on the third shift was ooen or
available.

Therefore, the grievant may elect to come off lay-

off immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay.

Or in the

alternative, he may remain on layoff, subject to his right of
recall to a job he is qualified to perform, without back pay,
in accordance with the established recall procedure, when
and if such job becomes available.

•ft

Ericya. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

T-51
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1963 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The #5 and #6 color negative developing machines
as they are presently operated and positioned,
are not a "two strand" operation within the meaning of the Schedule A "Note" (on page 27 of the
contract) and the Company may not operate them
with a crew of 5 men, "Tie Company shall continue
to operate each machine with a crew of 3 men or
both machines with a crew of 6.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric X- Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June ~1969
STATE OF Hew York
COUNTY OF New York

>ss,

On this i day of June 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case f 69A-

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and

Opinion

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
The stipulated issue is:
May the Company under the contract, operate the
#5 (16aoi) and the #6 (35oua) color negative developing machines with a crew of five men?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on March 25,
1969 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The Union
and the Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," filed post hearing briefs. The parties expressly
waived the time limit for the rendition of the Arbitrator's
Award as set forth in Section 15(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
The Company claims the right to operate the two color
negative developing machines with a crew of five men under
the following contractual provision of Schedule A:
"Hotes

Color Negative Developing:
3 Man Crew: One Strand
5 Man Crew: Two strand,"

It contends that the operation of the two machines in
question constitutes "two strand" color negative developing
within the meaning of the foregoing "Mote."
The Union disagrees. It views the operation as that of
two machines producing one strand each; thereby necessitating

- 2a crew of three men for each machine or six men for both.
The Schedule A "Rote" has been the subject of interpretation in a prior arbitration Award between the same parties.
In Case #66A-15, my predecessor, Mr. McMahon, in an Award
dated November 7, 1966 held that the Company could not operate two color negative developing machines with a crew of
five men when those machines were separated by some ?5 feet
and between which three other unrelated machines were located.
Mr. McMahon found that the two color developing, machines involved in that case were a "split operation" requiring three
men on each machine. He stated;
"The Agreement is silent as to how close the
"two strand" operations must be or how far
apart they may be in order to come within the
purview of the "Note? ....thereof. I can find
nothing in the Agreement to clarify this point.
The Company's contention if correct would mean
that so long as it had two color negative developing machines in the laboratory, irrespective of whether they were located in different
rooms - different floors - the five iaan crev
complement would apply. In my opinion, this
position is untenable ...."
Mr. McMahon also stated:
"There is no dispute that, if these two machines were operated side by side, the Company's
contention would be correct."
In the instant case the Company does not contend that
it has the right to operate two machines with five men regardless of where the machines are located. Rather it claims
that it has now complied with Mr. McMahon's dictum that the
machines be "side by side."

It argues that the f5 and #6

color negative developing machines are not only positioned
"side by side" but are indeed "adjacent" and "contiguous"

- 3which qualifies them to be operated by * crew of five,
Mr. McMahon's opinion, in which he stated that the
Company would have the right to operate the two machines with
a crew of five a»en if they were "side by side" did not define or provide an example of what "side by side" sneant.
Both parties deem it synonymous with "adjacent" and "contiguous" though they disagree on the application of these words
to the disputed machines.
But I find that by practice, both before and after
Mr. McMahon's Award in Case #66A-15, the parties have attached specific meaning to those synonymous phrases.

The record

discloses that with the exception of the instant case before
me and Case #66A-15, no "two strand" operation of color negative developing machines was or is carried on without a
"common bridge" for the two machines involved.

And as the

Company lost Case #66A-15 (where there was no coonnon bridge
for the two machines) all instances prior to the instant dis:

pute, in which two color negative developing machines were
properly operated on a two strand basis, the relief or bridge
man was able to observe or attend both machines from a common
:

bridge, even if, as the Company now claimss he has no r»articui

lar duties or responsibilities to do so.

To my mind this

clarifies the conditions under which the machines were "side
by side, or adjacent or contiguous."

It means that the

machines were not only positioned next to each other with no
other machine or equipment in between, but that because of
a common bridge, both machines were openly accessible to
each other; each was observable and attendable from the

- 4other or from a location between then; and the proximity oi
each to the other was unimpaired.

In short by unvaried past

practice, these conditions were present when two color negative developing machines were . side by side or adjacent or
contiguous to each other as, a "two strand operation." And
therefore I conclude that unless these or comparable conditions obtain, the operation of two color negative develooing
machines would not qualify as "side by sice, adjacent, contiguous'' or a "two strand" operation, and a crew of fivt
would not be contractually permitted.
Indeed, this meaning to the words "side by side, adjacent
or contiguous," which I find the parties have given by practice, is quite consistent with the preferred dictionary definition.

"Adjacent" is held to be Synonymous with "adjoining."

B 'th words are defined as aeaning ''in contact; attaching,'' as
well as "lying next to" or "bordering uoon." (Webster's
Universal Unabridged Dictionary).

Similarly, the preferred

definition of "contiguous" is "attaching; actual contact of
bodies; a meeting or joining without intervening space."
(Same dictionary).
So there is a marked similarity between what "side by
side, adjacent or conti£juousTC has meant to the parties by
practice, and the dictionary definition.
As I see it, the physical positions of the #5 and #6
negative developing machines, as presently operated, are not
side by side, adjacent or contiguous within the foregoing

i
meaning.

The machines are next to each other but they are

- 5separated for virtually their entire length by an impenetrable
floor to ceiling wall.

The only access from one machine to

the other is around the dry ends.

This means that only a dis-

tance of about three feet of the total 25 foot length of each
machine is openly accessiblej observable and in unimpaired
proximity one to the other.

With the wall intervening, I fail

to see how the two machines can be construed as "side by side"
within Mr. McMahon'e dictum, or "side by side, adjacent or
contiguous" 86 reco;.;nizec and defined by both past practice
in this laboratory and common interpretation.
It is not for this Arbitrator to decide whether this particular operation can be run by five men, and whether a sixth
man is superfluous.

For even if only five men are needed,

the Company's right to use that number instead of six is limited to a "two strand" operation involving two machines that
are run side by side on a dual basis.

Unless the Company can

establish that condition, it tnay not reduce the crew of 6
(3 on each separate machine) irrespective of the quantity of
the work (or lack thereof) for the'oth man while he works on
the bridge of either.

Put another way, a reduction of a con-

tractually mandated six man crew, except as authorized by the
contract, is a matter for collective bargaining and not arbitration.
I do not find the Union's demand regarding the "Note,"
in the negotiations for the current contract, to be at all inconsistent with the foregoing interpretations and conclusions.
There is no dispute that the Union sought the following change
in that "Note:"

- 6 -

"Coarplecoent of one and two strand color operations 1 Strand - 3 men
2 Strand - 5 sen provided aaachines are on the
same level, have a coraaon bridge and are not
separatee by wall or divider and are not m.' re
than 5 feet apart." (Underscoring supplied*',
The Company claims that by naaking but failing to achieve
this demand, the Union acknowledged that two strand color
developing operations could be run even though the machines
involved die not have a consnon bridge and/or were separatee*
by a wall or divider.

I do not agree.

In the light oi the

events that took place prior to the negotiations of the
current contract, this demand by the Union was manifestly,
in my judgment, nothing more than an atteorot to codify into
the written agreement the practice which had been going on
up to that time.

The Union had been sustained by Mr. McMahon

in Nove«aper, 196o.

Yet the Company was so troubled by that

Award that it und ertook the unusual step of legal action in
the courts to upset it.

Though that failed, it is snsall

wonder that the Union sought to projtect itself against a
repetition of a similar attempt by the Company especially
when it was confronted in August 1968 with the Compare's intention to run the disputed machines as a dual operation.
Ac I see it, the Union wanted to clarify the "Note" so as
to make clear, based on existing practice, the circumstances
under which two color developing machines were properly a
"two strand" operation and when they would not b«.

So, con-

sidering the entire history of this particular problem, I
do not find that the Union's demand in 1968 was an attempt

- 7 to achieve a new benefit or new condition of employment;. Instead I conclude that it was an effort to reduce to contract
language a clarification of the meaning of a "tvo strand"
operation, based on practice and the McMahon Award of November,
1966.
For all the foregoing reasons, the £5 and #6 color negative developing saachines as the> are presently operated and
positioned,, are not a "two strand'1 operation within ;he meaning of the Schedule A "Note" (on pa.xe 21 of the contract) and
the Company taay not operate them vith a crew of 5 men.

The

Company shall continue to operate each machine with a crev of
3 men or both machines with a crew of 6.

Eric JT Schmerta
Arbitrator

PERHAKRJJT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Hatter of the Arbitration
between

Movtelab, Inc.
and

Award

Local 702 Motion »icture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 to October 1,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Avards as follows:
In the circumstances and under the conditions set
forth in the attached Opinion, the Company does
not have the right to assign reverted employees
out of seniority to their immediately previous
higher classification (from which they reverted)
pursuant to Article '3, Temporary Transfers.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric f. Schnertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July "^ 1969
STATE OF Hew York
)BS<:
COUNTY OF Sew York
)
On this *- day of July, 1969, before me personally case
ind appeared Eric J. Schaertz to me known and known to me to
>e the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
iInstrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
Same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and

Opinion

Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
The stipulated issue i§:
Does the Company have the right to assign reverted employees out of aeniority to their
immediately previous higher classification
(from which they reverted) pursuant to Article
13 Temporary Transfers?
A hearing vat held at the Company's offices on April 1,
1963 at which tine Che parties made oral statements; stipulated the issue; agreed to submit the case to the Undersigned
on briefs; and waived the contract time limit for the rendition of the Award. On May 8, 1969 the Company filed its
brief and on May 18 the Union filed its reply brief.
The events are not in dispute.

What is in dispute ie

whether an assignment of a reverted employee to his immediately
previous higher classification ahould be a "temporary transiei"
or a "recall from reversion."

If the former, the Union con-

cedes that seniority need not be observed.
Because of a diminution of work in the Printing Department
three employees, classified as Printers vere noticed for layoff from that classification under Section 7 (Work Distributlon and Layoff) of the contract.

In accordance with theii

rights under that Section they chose to "revert" to lower
classifications which they had previously held, in the
negative Workers Department.

i
j

- 2Among these three employees. Mattes! possessed the most
seniority. Thereafter, sometime In July 1963, work for one
night became available In the Printer classification. To
that work the Company assigned not Mattesl, but one of the
other reverted employees, junior In seniority. The Company
contends that that assignment was merely a temporary transfer
under Section 13 of the contract, and that such transfers may
be made without regard for seniority. The Union claims that

|

the availability of work In the Printer classification entitled

!

the most senior employee laid off from that classification to
be "recalled" to It from reversion, and that the grievant,
with the aost seniority was thereby entitled to the assignment.
I am not persuaded that Section 13 (Temporary Transfers)
was intended to apply to the circumstances of this case. For
overriding I believe, is the equitable right of the employee
been
who has/involuntarily reduced in classification (b, reversion)
because of lack of work in the higher classification, to return to the latter when work Is again available.
Matteei and the two other Printers were removed from that
higher classification and reverted to the lower classified
negative Workers Department simply because there was no work
for them as Printers. Though the contract i& silent on the
procedure for recall from reversion. It cannot be realistically
assumed that no practice or procedure has been followed or
that reverted employees have not be accorded a chance to return to their former and higher classified jobs.

In this re-

gard the Company did not challenge the Union's statement, that
recalls from reversion have been processed in accordance with

- 3seniority, i.e., the most senior qualified reverted emplo>ee
is first recalled to the higher Job he held and from which he
reverted when work fell off.
So, considering the practice of permitting the reverted
employees, based on seniority to reclaim the higher classification from which they had been laid off because of lack of
work, when work again becomes available, the temporary transfer provisions of the contract which do
not recognize
or rer
"
quire adherance to seniority are simply not appropriate.
My conclusion is reenforced I believe, by the fact that
MbT
the Company may, and hasjiitt temporary transfers under
Section 13 of the contract to cover work assignments for an
extended period of time.

Indeed Paragraph (d) of Section 13

allows the Employer to make a temporary transfer of an enployee from a lower classification to a higher classification
for three or more days per week for a period of thirteen consecutive weeks before required to ^rant the employee a promotion to a higher claesification.

If this temporary transfer

provision is applicable to the reactivation of a classification where work had previously fallen off and from which employees were caused to revert because of lack of work therein,
an employee from a lower classification, irrespective of seniority, could be assigned to the newly available work in that
higher classification for up to thirteen consecutive weeks,
in preference to an employee who had reverted when previously
there was no work in that higher classification. It could
mean that for up to thirteen weeks an employee laid off from
the Printer classification because of lack of work, could not

,-;tJi^yK€^-:
reclaim M§ job Whan work again bacama available, because It
had been assigned to • lower classified and possibly lass
senior employe* cm the basis of a "temporary transfer." And
it may also mean that he could never reclaim it, if the tan*
porary transferee received a permanent promotion after the
thirteen week period.

The inequity inherent in that circum-

stance is quite obvious to ma and I would hope to the parties
as veil.
In short, 1 think it an improper use of the temporary
transfer clause of the contract if the result is to depriy*
an employee laid off from a higher classification and revert•d to a lover classification, of the chance to return to the
higher rated job when work again becomes available.
It should be recognised that the inappropriateness of
Section 13 under the facts la this case, is exceedingly narrow.
It means that where employees have been involuntarily removed
from a higher classification because of Isck of work therein,
subsequent available work in that classification should be
first assigned to the senior smrployea who reverted from that
classification to a lower one. It doesy,constitute a ruling
one way or another on temporary transfers to cover work or
vacancies caused by the wide range of other circumstances.
One question remains, and that is whether this reasoning
ought to apply when, as under the facts in the instant case,
only a single night's work becomes available(even though the
stipulated issue does not embody a quantity of work.) I think
it should. The quantity, frequency and scheduling of work in
this laboratory appears to be cyclical and subject to change

;•' ''\'-i:^'--_^\. ' 'v:-":>:J:rw'JvA'-;'"'/ .'• .-'/.".;: Vl\-; •"* ''"'" •', - y': •. .'..
'•-.*.'

""^*':'i"i'- :':'-fr ••''•- 'l' '"' • ' ' '.C^' •<7.;i''-»*••"",'-^•'':-' "'•
•••'-. ',^' •':'' '

'. -

', '"'':

•'/:'•". «i.: '';'';.-'"'•'*•

• " -''•'•• •'

.' - '-••• '••

"•.."...-•''-••'..''''

•3 •
J;pc"-Jing

upo& custoutr u*ed». The various paragraphs of

Section 7 of the contract contemplate, at least in my mind
the "up and down" nature of the work in this industry.

The

provision therein for rotating and sharing the available vork
among qualified employees, so as to afford at least three
days vork per week for all the employees, suggests a recognition of, as veil as a method to cope with, the ebb and flov
of business. So it would appear that a single night's work
is not an uncommon occurrence, nor can it be deemed an insignificant quantity within the frame of available work for the
employees. Therefore I am not prepared to hold that a single
night's work is so insubstantial as to not require recall of
the senior employee who previously performed that work, but
who was laid off and reverted to a lover classification vhen
no work was available.
Of course the parties should recognize that all of this
must be administrated in accordance with a rule of reason. Under normal circumstances the employee laid off from the higher
classification because of lack of work and reverted to t> lover
classification, has, as indicated, a priority right based on
his seniority to reclaim work in the higher classification when
and if it become? available.

But there may be extraordinary

circumstances under which this right cannot be reasonably exercised. If because of short notice, or an emergency, or
•ome other bona fide unusual circumstance, the Company is unable to offer the assignment to the senior reverted employee;
or if by example, the latter employee cannot be spared from
or replaced on his lover classified work, the Company may have

•«DO choic* but Co fill the assignment in some other way.

But

if the available work in the higher classification continues
beyond a short run, none of these extraordinary circumstances
may be used as a basis to fail to make arrangements which
would allow the senior reverted employee to reclaim the work
of the higher classification, which he lost in Che first instance, only when and because no work was available.
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Eric /. Schaertz
Arbitrator"
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
N

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

"
"
it
it

De Luxe General, Inc.

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated In
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into b> the
above-tiaiaed parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five day
basis at straight tine under Section 18 is a
right and privilege to which the grievants are
entitled. Therefore, the grievants, Messrs
Robert Rubinstein, Edward Haucb and Martin Garrett
should have been paid that guarantee for the days
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington' s Birthday fell in the year 1969. Anc in
addition, under Section 5 of the contract, they
are entitled to holiday pay for Washington's
Birthday. Therefore they should receive a total
of 6 days pay for that week. The Company is directed to make the appropriate payment.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Arbitrator

is

Is1.-"!

DATED: September 1-1969
STATE OF Mew York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)*s.:

Oa this *- day of September, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schaertz to me known and known to
me to be Che individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

H
It

and

tf

Opinion

ft

De Lux* General, Inc.

«t

The issue as stipulated by the parties Is;
Are the three grievants, Robert Rubinstein,
Edward Hauch and Martin Garrett entitled to
8 hours pay for Washington's Birthday 1969?
Hearings were held at the American Arbitration Association and the Laboratory on June 18 and 20, 1969, at which time
representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived and
the parties filed post hearing briefs.
The parties recognize that as worded, the issue does not
precisely define the dispute. Actually the grievants, who are
Negative Developers on the midnight shift, received 8 hours
pay for Washington's Birthday 1969. But they received only a
total of only 40 hours pay for the week in which that holiday
fell, because, though the holiday fell on Saturday of that
week, the Laboratory worked only four of the week days (Monday
through Thursday). The issue in dispute involves the Onion's
claim on behalf of the grievants for a sixth day of pay for
that week, on the theory that the grievants were entitled to
a guarantee of 40 hours work and pay, Monday through Friday,

*•• '

- 2whether or not the Laboratory worked each of those days, plus
holiday pay for the holiday which fell on Saturday. So, more
accurately the issue is:
Are the grievants entitled to a sixth day of pay
(of 8 boure) for the week in which Washington's
Birthday 1969 fell?
Under Section 5 of the contract, Washington's Birthday is
an enumerated holiday for which employees shall be paid without being required to work, provided they report for work any
day during the week in which it fell. What is pertinent is
Paragraph (b) thereof which readsj
Should any of the foregoing holidays fall on e
Saturday, employees shall be paid an extra day's
pay for the week in which said Saturday holiday
falls.
The Union contends that the grievants are "weekly employ
ees;" that as such they enjoy a guaranteed work week of 40
hours; and that therefore for the week in question their compensation should total that basic guarantee plus the extra day's
pay for that week for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday • or in other words * total of *ix days pay.
The Company concedes that the grievants are "weekly employees" but not among those weekly employees guaranteed 40
hours work or pay; that the Company has the right to operate
its Laboratory on less than a five day week basis; that the
grievants art, entitled to pay only for time worked; end therefore the total pay they received for the four days worked that
week plus the holiday pay equalled their full entitlement.
As I ••* it the pertinent contract provisions are
Section 12(a) and (e), and Section 18. The former read:

- 312. Weekly and Hourly Employees:
(a) nothing herein contained ahall be deemed
to have modified the rights and privileges
presently enjoyed by weekly employees. Employ«r shall not change the status of any employee
from weekly to hourly or from hourly to weekly without the Union's consent.
(e) Employees on negative developing operations ahall not be paid for time absent, but
the pay so deducted shall be divided equally
among the remaining employees of the operating
crew affected by said absence.
and the latter:
18. Kewsreel Makeup.
The present night crew engcged In Negative
Developing, Positive Developing, Make-up News
Timers and Make-up News Printers at De Luxe
will operate on the basis of a six-hour minimum dally call and a 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five-day basis at straight time.
Though the Comp&ny concedes that certain 'Wekly employ•*«", specifically certain senior Timers, TlClemen and similarly highly skilled employees, enjoy a full week's pay guarantee whether the Laboratory works a full week or not. It
argues that the only contractual guarantee to the grlevants
Is the apportionment under Section 12(e) of the pay of an
absent Negative Developer among the employees of the crew
who report for work and who are affected by the absence. From
this the Company concludes that the grlevefits are entitled to
pay paly when they work and that no pay attaches to days
they are absent whether or not they are absent on their own
Initiative,

.
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or at here, because the Company decided to close the Laboratory.

And Section 18 Is considered inapplicable by the Com-

pany because the "newsreel work" under which it IB beaded, is
no longer part of the Company's business.

The Union's interpretations are different. It points
out that neither under Section 12 nor anywhere *ls* in the
contract is there a distinction between "weekly employees"
such as Timers and Tltlemen and the Negative Developers. And
that absent any contractual distinction, it is improper for
'the Company to accord a weekly guarantee to the former group
and deny it to the latter, especially in view of the explicit
language of Section 12(a). Moreover the Union does not accept
the Company's interpretation of the word "absent" in Section
12(e). It does not agree that an employee foreclosed from
working because the Laboratory has been closed, is "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e). And consequently the
Union concludes that one of the "rights and privileges" presently enjoyed by the grlevante, as weekly employees, is a
guarantee of pay except when they are absent within the meaning of Section 12(e) of the contract.
Alternatively the Union claims that the 40 hour weekly
guarantee as set forth in Section 18 of the contract is a
right and privilege which the grievants enjoy as weekly employees because they presently qualify under the conditions
and terms of that section; or, having undlsputedly once been
covered by Section 18, they may not now be deprived of their
rights thereunder without the Union's consent to a change in
their statue (per Section 12(a))even if the conditions of

- 5Section 18 are now not present In the Laboratory. Or in other
words, without the Union's consent any rights the grlevants
enjoyed because of their work on "newsreel makeup" they shall
continue to enjoy as "weekly employees" whether or not there
has been a material change In the nature o r quantity of the
Company's newsreel work.
In By view, the grievant's claim for a sixth day of pay
for the week In question, turns simply on whether they have a
guaranteed regular 40 hour work week.

If so they would be en-

titled to that guarantee for Monday through Friday of the week
In question, even though the Laboratory was closed on Friday;
plus a day's pay for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday.

If not, they were properly paid for the work perform-

ed plus the holiday.
I agree with the Onion's Interpretation of the word
"absent" in Section 12(e). Since that Section draws a distinction between those members of the operating crew who are
at work, and any employee thereof who Is "absent," It must
refer to the circumstances where the Laboratory is in operation and the "absent" employee is not at work due to his own
act, volition or incapacity. But clearly It does not apply
to a circumstance where an employee is ready, willing and
able to come to work, but cannot do so because the Laboratory
has been closed.

This is not to say that under proper cir-

cumstances the Company does not have the right to close down
its operations; but rather that If it does so, It cannot claim
that the employees who are unable to work thereby are "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e). But Section 12(a) and (e)

1

- 6are not enough in and of themselves to substantiate the Union's
claim that the grievants, as "weekly employees," are entitled
to a full week's pay guarantee. Rather, because Section 12(a)
only guarantees them a continuance of the rights and privileges
enjoyed by "weekly employees" and immunity from a change in
status without the Union's consent, the question of whether a
guaranteed work week is aaiong those protected rights and privileges, remains unanswered by Section 12.
The only pertinent contract language on the matter of a
guaranteed work week is Section 18. Therefore, in my judgment,
the grievants' right to any such guarantee over and above the
holiday pay depends on whether Section 18 applies to them.
There is no dispute that Section 18 once actively applied
to the grievants. It was during the years that the Company
handled a large and regular volume of daily or twice weekly
newsreel makeup work. At that time, as is now the case, the
grievants were members of the night crew, classified as Negative
Developers and worked at this Laboratory.

So as of May 23,

1966 when the present provisions of Section 12(a) and (e) were
negotiated the grievants did enjoy the weekly pay guarantee of
Section 18. As "weekly employees" they were not then distinguished under that category from other "weekly employees" such
as Timers and Titleaen, etc. The Company made the distinction
only when this type of newsreel work was either discontinued
or fell off sharply, some time in January 1968.

The Company

then deemed that its obligations under Section 18 to the
negative Developers were no longer applicable.

Its present

- 7position that Section 13 does not apply is based on the sauie
conclusion - that because there is no nevsreel work of the
type and quantity previously in existence, the grievants, who
may have enjoyed rights thereunder during an earlier period and
under different circumstances, lost those rights when those
circumstances changed.
Factually the evidence supports the Company's assertion
that any present newsreel work is markedly different in type
and quantity from what the grievants handled prior to January
1968.

It is now a very small part of their regular assignments;

whereas previously it was a significant part of their work. It
appears that the total quantity of any work which could be
classified generally as "newsreel" involves no more than a
total of a few minutes over any four week period. And while
this may well be a "newsreel" assignment I am not prepared to
conclude that it constitutes the type or quantity of the "newsreel makeup" work contemplated by Section 18. Ordinary logic
might therefore produce a conclusion that the rights and benefits under Section 18 are vitiated by the absence of conditions
contemplated by that Section. But I am constrained to find
that Section 12(a) of the contract dictates a different result.
Until January 1968 there is no dispute that the grievants
were covered by and enjoyed the benefits of Section 18, and
were as much "weekly employees" as any others so classified.
Under the contract in effect in January 1968, when the Company's newsreel makeup work case to an end, Section 12(a) of
the contract was the same as it is now.

It meant then that

for the life of that contract there could be no modification

0
- 8in the rights and privileges enjoyed by weekly employees and
any change in their status required the Union's consent.
It Is undisputed that at no time during the remaining
months of that contract, following the end of the newsreel
work, did the Union consent to any change in the status of
any of the employees covered by Section 18. So for the balance
of that contract, despite the significant change in the newsreel makeup work, the rights and privileges of the employees
under Section 18 and their status were not modified. And I
am unable to find that there was any change thereafter during
the negotiations or following the execution of the present contract. Section 12(a) was repeated In the present contract,
thereby preserving the rights and privileges that the grievants
and all other weekly employees enjoyed previously.

And their

previous status, unchanged because of the absence of any Union
consent, was similarly perpetuated. Also,significantly I believe, Section 18 was repeated in the new contract, even
though the newsreel work under which It is headed, at least in
the Company's view, was terminated almost 11 months earlier.
I can only conclude that it found Its way into the new agreement, not just to aubstantively cover the possibility of a resumption of the newsreel work, or as a mere oversight, but as
a continued recognition of the fact that the certain enumerated employees thereunder enjoyed rights protected by Section
12(a), which had not been changed over the 11 month period between the predecessor contract and the present agreement, nor
changed under the current contract because the Union had not
consented to any change in the status of those employees.

I- 9In chore, the change in the nevsreel work was not enough
to change their status, simply because Section 12 (a) requires
the Onion's consent to effectuate that change; and from the
time that Section 18 did apply, there has been no such consent.
And obviously, for an employee's status to be maintained, there
can be no diminution or deprivation of any of the rights or
privileges which attach to that status.
Therefore though the condition for which Section IS was
originally intended may no longer be present, the rights and
status of the employees, including the grievance, which they
acquired thereunder when it was actively applicable, are maintained not only by the continued inclusion of Section 18 in
the present contract, but by the express protection of Section

Accordingly the grievants are entitled to the 40 hour
cumulative guarantee on a 5 day basis at straight time set
forth in Section 18, and should have received 5 days pa> for
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington's Birthday fell cm a Saturday, and in addition they should have received holiday pay for Saturday as a sixth day.

The Company

is directed to make payment thereof.

Eric/J. Schmertz,
Permanent Arbitrator
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Date

September 19, 1969
Mr. Donald E. Quigley
Personnel Director
De Luxe General, Inc.
850 Tenth Avenue
New York, New York
Arbitration No. 69-A23
(Complement - No. 11-12
Color Positive Developing
Machine)
Dear Don :
at

the end of £ h e i r s t day of hearing on September 17 ,
1969 is as follows:
Without prejudice to the rights of the
parties, and specifically without prejudice
to the rights of the Company under the third
sentence of Article 17 (c) , and without precedent for any other case , the Company shall
debug one side at a time with a crew of three
men, working separately. Six men shall not
work at the same tine.
(
When the debugging is completed, the Company
may run both sides together with a crew of five
iaen for two full back-to-back days. On the
next day the /Arbitrator shall observe.
If within the two days with a crew of five
men, there are mechanicc.1 problems, the procedure
will be to return to the debugging process with
three m»n on a aide until the machine is ready.
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Septeraber 19, 1969

At that time, the Company may operate for two
good days back-to-back with five men (at least
five hours will be a good day).
During this period there shall be no discipline for spoilage or mistake unless willful.
After the observation the parties ir.ay offer
testimony.
Sincerely,

Eric Rosenfelrl
ER/lr
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D. E. Sluss*
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
43-Duart

In the Matter 'of the Arbitration
between

E > J i Schmert z

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
Award

and

DuArt Laboratories

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The grievances involved in these cases (69A-16
and 69A-17) arc not arbitrable because they were
not filed for arbitration within the time limit
required by Section 15(b) of the contract.
-

The fee and, expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
borne by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

) .
) "'

On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Mric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case* 69A-16
69A-17

I

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR
, MOTION PICTURE FILM

_

_

LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

and
Award

DuArt Laboratories

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The grievances involved in these cases (69A-16
and 69A-17) are not arbitrable because they were
not filed for arbitration within the time limit
required by Section 15(b) of the contract.
The fee
borne
by and
the expenses
Union. of the Arbitrator shall be

Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October / 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

•

On this

)SS.
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ted the -

Cases 69A-16
69A-17

J <;

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

L/

and

Opinion
Cases
69A-16
69A-17

DuArt Laboratories

The threshold issue is procedural, - namely, whether
the grievances filed by the Union are 'barred from arbitration on the merits by Section 15(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on September 24, 1969 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to present their respective cases
on the arbitrability issue.

The Arbitrator's oath was ex-

pressly waived.
The Union's grievances were set forth in telegrams
dated May 21 and 22, 1969 to the Company which read in pertinent part respectively as follows:
We are in dispute with DuArt Laboratories ....
regarding C Printer in Color Printing Section.
We are in dispute with DuArt Film Laboratories ...
regarding the elimination of a foremanship in
Printing Room.
By letter dated June 25, 1969 to the Undersigned, Counsel
for the Union referred these grievances to arbitration.
Section 15(b) of the contract reads:
Should the employer and the Union be unable to
resolve the dispute within five working days
after written notice of said dispute has been
served, either party may refer the matter to
Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., as permanent arbitrator.

\l 702, Motion Picture Laboratory

- 2 -

'

In any event, the request for arbitration to
the arbitrator must be made within thirty (30)
days after the giving or receipt o£ written
notice of such dispute, otherwise the right to
arbitrate is waived. The permanent arbitrator
shall render his decision within ten (10) days
of the final hearing of the dispute. (Underscoring supplied.)

J
i-^

^ Based on the foregoing contract language I have no
choice but to uphold the Company's contention that the grievances are not arbitrable.

There is n(o doubt that the "30

days" referred to in Section 15 (b) means calendar days. For
elsewhere in the contract where the parties intended a time
limit to include only working days, or where Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays are excluded, the language so states
explicitly.
In the instant case the grievances were presented to
the Company on May 21 and 22 respectively, but were not referred to arbitration until June 25, or beyond the 30 calendar days required by Section 15(b).
The language of Section 15(b), which the parties negotiated as part of their Collective Agreement, is not only
clear but mandatory.

It leaves no discretion in the hands

of the Arbitrator, and allows for no exceptions.

It states

that the requests for arbitration must be made within 30
days after notice of the dispute.

And it goes on to provide

that failure to do so in any event constitutes a waiver of
the right to arbitrate.

The phrase "in any event" ousts

the Arbitrator from considering the reasons or even extenuating circumstances which may have prevented the Union from
filing for arbitration within the time limit.

-

-
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I remind the parties that the language of Section 15 (.b)

i
is what they themselves negotiated, and what they agreed to
V_--

'

as part of the contract bargain.

ted by the parties.

As the Arbitrator under

J \s contra

It is my task to interpret and enforce

those terms and conditions, not to vary them.

In the face

of the explicit language of Section 15(b), for me to allow
these grievances to be arbitrated on the merits though they
were not filed for arbitration within the required 30 days,
would be to change the provisions of Section 15(b) of the
contract, no matter if I felt the Union's explanation to be
.1
reasonable.
With the foregoing decision, Section 15(b) has been interpreted and applied as requested by the Company.

Therefore

there is no doubt as to the meaning and application of that
Section in this case and in connection with the processing of
future grievances to arbitration during my term as Permanent

\.

and will continue to be preserved.
With that done it seems to me that the Company might be
amenable to a recommendation, applicable solely to the two
v—-

grievances involved in this dispute.

It is, without any change

in my Award so far as the meaning of Section 15(b) is cortcern-

,

ed, but in the interest of amicable labor relations, that these
grievances now be arbitrated on their merits, without creating

!

any procedural precedent whatsoever for the future.

i

As this

recommendation in no way alters my Award, it is for the Company, in its discretion, to decide whether it wishes to agree.

In sh

.
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;

If not, arbitration of the instant two grievances is barred.
If willing to accept the recommendation the Company would,
solely for these two grievances, waive the application of my
procedural Award.
In my view, since the Union's delay was not excessive,

J

but only 3 and 4 days beyond the limit, the cause of sound
labor relations might best be served if, in this instance,
the Company agreed to permit these matters to be arbitrated
on their merits; with the clear understanding that the Union
is hereafter bound without exception to the time limits of
Section 15(b).
.1
I ask the Company to let me know what it wishes to do.

fau^L<C^<L*u^X
Eric J/ 'Schmertz
*
Permanent Arbitrator
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100-ie JAMAICA AVENUE
JAMAICA, NEW YORK 11432
LEONARD COOPER
MICHAEL J. LAZAR
EDWIN OOLD

July 8, 1969
Eric J. Schmertt, Esq.
122 East 42nd Street
New York . NY 1001T
Re: Local 702 and DuArt Laboratories
(The simultaneous Operation of two (C) printers in the
Color Printing section);
(Unilateral elimination of a foreman's job in the
printing room).
Dear Mr. Schmerts:
This office represents Du Art Film Laboratories Inc. In response to
both your letters of July 2, 1969, be adrised that in accordance with
Article I5(b) of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the company and the union, more than thirty days hare elapsed since
written notice of the dispute was served upon my client by the onion.
Enclosed find copies of two telegrams sent by the union to my client.
Please note that these telegrams notify the company that a dispute
exists relative to the above two issues and are dated respectively
May 21 and May 22. 1969. Enclosed also find copy of letter dated
June 25, 1969 addressed to you asking that the disputes be scheduled
for arbitration.
•
In accordance with Article 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
I respectfully submit that the union's right to arbitrate has been waived
and that it may not further pursue the above matters.
Very truly yours,

Leonard Cooper
Ic/fw
ec: E. Nicholas Pinto, Esq.
Du Art Film Laboratotes Inc.

I
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 792, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

('/-/>
Aware

De Luxe General, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designateo in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into oy
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard tnt proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
There was just cause for the three day suspensions
of George Mottola and Rudy Sirnolin. There was not
just cause for the three day suspension of Vincent
Licari. Licari's suspension is reversed and he
shall be paid for the time lost.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be Dome 2/3 by tht
Union and 1/3 by the Company.

•it/lAXX*!

Eric
Schser
;i tz
*
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
)BS.
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this 3f day of October, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to ae to bt
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the sane.
Case #69A-13

£
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

De Luxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the three day suspension
of George Mottola, Vincent Licari and Rudy Simolin?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on September
9, 1969, at which time representatives of the Company snd
Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross exaxine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath

and the contractual time limit for the rendition of the Award.
Post hearing briefs were filed.
The three grievants were suspended (together with seven
others whose suspensions are not contested by the Union) for
refusals to work overtime on Friday, February 21, 1969.
The Company contends that grievants Licari and Siaoliri
agreed to work that day, as evidenced by their names appearing on a list prepared by the working foreman1, but that they
refused and failed to do so despite requests by the Company,
and warnings of disciplinary action.

The Company asserts

that grievant Mottola was directed to report for work that
day (as the Company needed one more employee in addition to
those nine whose names appeared on the foreman's list) but

- 2 that he failed and refused to do so despite the Company's repeated requests and warnings of disciplinary action.
The Union contends that the names of Licari and Simolin
were placed on the foreman's list without their authorization;
specifically, that Licari, when asked by the foreman if he
would be willing to work the overtime, responded that ho
first would have to check with his wife, and therefore neither
*
gave nor was requested by the foreman for final ansver; and
that Simolin was not asked at all.

The Union's position

with regard to Mottola is that his selection was tnar.catorily
imposed on him, contrary to the voluntary selection procedure agreed to by the Union and the Company for the conpila •
tion of the foreman's list.
These are disciplinary grievancefo, with the burden on
the Company to establish the grievants' wrongdoing.

I am

persuaded that the Company has met this buroen with regard
to Mottola and Simolin but not in the case of Licari.
I agree with the Company's assertion that there i= a
presumption in favor of the accuracy of the list prepared
by the working foreman.

The presumption is that the names

appearing thereon are of employees who voluntarily agreed
to work the day in question, as solicited by the foreman.
And having voluntarily agreed, the employees are so bound.
But obviously the presumption cannot be irrebuttable.
Licari testified that when asked if he would work the overtime, he responded that he would first have to check vith
his wife to see if they had other plans.

He stated that

thereafter he did not tell the foreman that he would work,

- 3 nor was he asked for a final answer; and that accordingly his
name, indicating an agreement to work, was imoroperly olaced
on the list.
sumotion.

Standing alone this testimony rebuts the pre-

The Company offered no direct evidence- contrary

to Licari's testimony.

The working foreman who prepared the

list did not testify (and I am not persuaded that merely because he is a member of the Union he would not have testified
truthfully if called) nor could any other Comoany witnesses
place Licari (who worked the night shift) at any of the
meetings between Comoany representatives and the affectea
employees at which the latter were urged, at the risk of
disciplinary action, to perform the overtime work.

So I

find no direct evidence which would impute to Licari knoviedge that his name was on the list and/or notice to hi-.ii
that he had better work or be disciplined. Therefore the
Company has not established to my satisfaction any wrongdoing
on the part of Licari.
The evidence is different with regard to Sitiulin.
worked the day shift.

He

Testimony by the Company placed him

at meetings, with the other affected day shift employees,
at which those employees were requested and directed to
work pursuant to the list compiled by the foreman, and were
warned of disciplinary action if they refused.

That testi-

mony together with the presumption in favor of the foreman's list stands unrebutted.

Simolin did not testify at

the hearing (he is now retired).

The Union offered only

secondary evidence, namely testimony that Simolin advisee

- 4 the Union that he was never asked by the foreman if ht wished to work overtime.

Weighing the evidence on this point,

the testimony advanced by the Company is obviously more probative.

Accordingly, I conclude that Simolin placed his

name on the list,thereby agreeing to work, and thereafter
despite requests by the Company and a warning oi cisciplinary
action, refused to work the overtime.

Therefore his thite

day suspension is upheld.
I find it immaterial whether or not Mottola's ai^i_;r.ment was consistent with the Union-Company agreement 31: hov
the men would be selected.

Confronted with a directive fro.n

the Company to work the day in question, Mottola should r,a ,-e
obeyed that order, and grieved had he or the Union thought
the order improper.

This is such a well settieo rule of

industrial relations that it need not be rc-iteratea her..-.
And the conditions which permit certain exception? tc triau
rule were not present in the instant situation.

So I auEt

reject the Union's contention that Mottola had a right tc
refuse the assignment because his selection was net on a
voluntary basis, or in accordance with agreed upon seniority.
In doing so I make no decision one way or the other or. the
question of whether the assignment of overtime wor*. is voluntary or may be mandatorily ordered; but only that a directive to work should be carried out, reserving to the grievant and to the Union the right to grieve the propriety of
such a directive.

Accordingly, Mottola's three day suspen-

sion is upheld.

Eric f. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

ii

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

': In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
' Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., APL-CIO
''
;

and

Award

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties,and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
I find there is no presently effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering
the performance of tape punching work. Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt
to negotiate a written understanding covering
which employees are to be assigned to that work '
and their rate of pay. The parties shall have
30 calendar days in which to negotiate that agreement. If an agreement is reached, its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of the
instant grievance. If an agreement te not reached within 30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for a final and binding determination. Pending the negotiation of an agreement
or my determination, the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the
expediter rate of pay.
The Arbitrator's fee and room rental expense for
the first hearing, which was adjourned at the Company's request, shall be borne by the Company.
The balance of the Arbitrator's fee and the room
rental expense for the second hearing shall be
-.- shared equally by the Company and the Union.

V '

^uX
•
Eric
Permanent Arbitrator
_

i
DATED: November ^*1969
STATE OF Hew York
)
COUNTY OF New York )
On this /^day of November, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schtnertz to me known and known to
as to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case * 69A-14
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Notion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Under the circumstances presented, may a man
classified in one Job occupation regularly perform duties of another job occupation? If not
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were scheduled or held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on September 11 and October
20, 1969. Representatives of the above named parties appear*
ed and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition
of the Award were expressly waived by the parties.
Specifically, the dispute involves the perforrjance of
"tape punching" by employees classified as "expediters."
It is conceded that tape punching is not one of the
regular duties of the expediter classification. The evidence
discloses, however, that that particular assignment has been
performed by the expediters at the expediter rate of pay,

V

since that classification was established in 1959. The Company asserts that its assignment of tape punching to expediters was and has been in accordance with an oral agreement
reached in 1959 between the Company and the then Union leader-

.**- ' . -'"

1
- 2•hip; that the tape punching work has been performed primarily by expediters in accordance with that agreement consistently over the years; and that the Union is bound by it.
It ia the Union's position that it knows of no euch
agreement; that a search of its files fails to disclose any
notation or record of such an understanding with the Company.
It contends that, as at certain laboratories cited, tape
punching should be performed by employees of the timing department or by the Control Strip Cutters (Kiscellaneouc) at
the rate of $3.34 an hour.

(The expediter rate, at which the

employees are presently paid for tape punching, is $3.12 an
hour.)
I conclude that there is not now an effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering the performance of the tape punching work.
Not only is it conceded that the work of tapa punching
is not one of the normal or regular duties of the expediter
classification, but the contract does not place ic within any
other classification or department. Consequently, except in
situations involving a temporary transfer (which is not the
case here) the assignment of tape punching work on « regular
basis, to any job classification under the contract, including the expediters, changes the classification to vhich that
duty is attached. But except for certain circumstances, also
not present here, Section 4(h) of the contract prohibits
changes in existing classifications -"withaut the written consent of the Union."
The Company's reliance on an alleged 1959 agreement with

•

-.-..•

- 3the Union for the assignment of tape punching to expediters
is evidence of the Company's recognition that it could not
unilaterally and regularly assign to any particular job classification, a duty not encompassed therein.

I am persuaded

that an oral understanding was reached in 1959 between the
Company and the then Union leadership which authorized the performance of tape punching work by expediters at the expediter
rate of pay. I find that understanding to be valid and binding for the years that the employees worked under it, or until
the Union complained by its Instant grievance. In other words,
though oral it was not void. But it is no longer enforceable.
Because Section 4(h) of the contract requires the written conBent of the Union to changes In classification, that oral understanding may now be avoided by the Union.
This places the tape punching work in a "no man's land."
It is no longer properly assignable to the expediters because
the Union's grievance rescinds the prospectively unenforceable
1959 oral agreement. And neither the contract nor any other
agreement permits its regular assignment elsewhere. Therefore,
as the parties did in 1959, albeit imperfectly, and apparently
as the employers and the Union have done at other laboratories
throughout the Industry, the parties must now negotiate an
effective understanding covering the handling of the tape

V-

punching duties.
Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt to
negotiate a written understanding covering which employees are
to be assigned to tape punching work and the rate to be paid
for that work. The parties shall have 30 calendar days in

i
-

•
.-•
v-lfzi&. .,*"~-
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- 4which to negotiate that agreement.

If an agreement Is reach-

ed its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of
the instant grievance.

If an agreement is not reached within

30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for
final and binding determination.

Pending the negotiation of

an agreement or my determination the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the expediter
rate of pay.
^JL^f

Eric J: Schaertz
erz
*
Permanent Arbitrator

.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

and

Award

DuArt Fila Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Based on an agreed upon arrangement, the complement of the Gevachrotne machine shall be three
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the
Company.

r

trie J/Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED! December /^ 1969
STATE OF New York
) ,
COUNTY OF New York
) "
On this fo day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmert2 to ma known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

. . i . •. .•

.-•••/
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the proper complement of the
Gevachrorae machine?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on November 4, 1969
at which tine representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract tiiae limit for rendition of the Award.

The Union filed

a post hearing memorandum on November 20, 1969.
The Union contends that the Gevachroine machine should be
operated at all times with three men. The Company concedes
that three men are necessary when the "applicator" on the machine is used, but that when the machine is run without utilizing the applicator, only a crew of two is needed.
The Company asserts that the Gevachrome machine, when
operated without the applicator, is no different than the
Ektachrome machine (Pako) which runs with a crew of two, pursuant to the arbitration decision of July, 1966 of my predecessor, Mr. McMahon. \g&-(\\)
The Union argues that because the Gevachrome machine does
have an applicator it is different from the Ektachrome and the

- 2McMahon Award therefore is not controlling.
As I have indicated in prior decisions, any conflict between the provisions of the contract or an agreement between
the parties and the actual complement needed to run a machine
must be resolved in favor of the former.

So, if the contract

requires, or if the parties reached a prior mutual agreement
on the use of three men on this type of machine, it is beyond my authority to fix the crew at two men even if that is
all that is necessary to run the operation.
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached applicator.

It is undisputed by

the Company that other color developing machines with applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines (1, #2 and
#3, are run with a crew of three when one strand is developed
and with a crew of five for two strands.

The testimony of

Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the Union and Company respectively, coincide on one crucial point, and that is that by
agreement between the parties, color developing machines with
applicators are and have been ru-a with a crew of no less than
three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether this latter
referred to agreement applies to the Gevachrome machine, on
which the applicator is utilized only infrequently.
clude that It does.

I con-

The testimony discloses that at the time

color developing was introduced, the parties negotiated an
arrangement providing for a

minimum crew of three men on

color machines with applicators producing one strand of devel-

- 3oped film.

Mr. Vltello stated and Mr. Kaufman conceded that

this arrangement applied to machines with applicators, irrespective of the amount of time that the applicator was in use.
Accordingly, though two men may be all that is necessare to run the Gevachrome machine when the applicator is not
in use, I must find that the arrangement expressly agreed to
by the parties, which was not conditioned upon when or the
quantify of time that the applicator is used, preempts any
actual need to the contrary.

Thus the instant case is dis-

tinguished from the facts before Mr. McMahon which led to
his Award of July 14, 1966.

Eric /f. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

V
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY i
In the Matter of the Arbitration
;between
Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians. Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
Award
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
. accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The proper rate for the Bell & Howell panel printer
shall be 30c above the 3roup_5_rate when the machine is operated at a speed of over 180 and up to
and_including 240 feet per minute. Eligible etnploy•ees shall be so paid retroactively for the period of
time that the machine has run under that condition.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

T

Eric J^Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: January
< 1970
STATE OF New York
)as.:
COUNTY OF Hew York
)
'

-tDn this /13 day of January, 1970, before me personally canc>
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged_to Jie-thafhe executed the sane.

I
:

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
As Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the above named parties, the following stipulated issue was submitted to me for determination:
What is the proper rate for the Bell & Howell
panel printers?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on December 22,
1969 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for the rendition of the Award.
After a review of the entire record 1 conclude, consistent with ay oral observations at the conclusion of the hearing, that under Section 17(c) of the contract Duavt is obliged
to pay the same base wa gs rate for the operation of this machine as the Union previously negotiated at other laboratories
under the same contract, namely 30c above the Group 5 rate
when the machine is run at a speed over 180 and up to and including 240 feet a minute.
There is no dispute that the Bell. & Howell panel printer
, Is 'View equipment" within the meaning of Section 17(c) of the
contract.

There is also no dispute that the same equipment

- 2Is in operation at certain other laboratories under thle contract, and that subsequent to the effective date of the contract the Union negotiated the aforementioned rate of pay
for the operation of this machine at those other laboratories.
With these factors undisputed I find that Section 17(c)
of the contract mandates the same wage rate for the same operation of the machine at DuArt.
of Section 17(c) to be clear.

I find the meaning and intent
When a piece of new equipment

is installed the parties are to negotiate the wages and conditions with respect thereto.

Falling to agree within the

specified period of time, unresolved questions of wages and/
or conditions may be referred to the Arbitrator.

But if the

same equipment either existed in other laboratories under
this contract when the contract was entered into, or installed in other laboratories "hereafter" (or in other worde during the term of this contract), any bate wage rate agreed to
by the Onion and that Employer is thereafter applicable to
all other employers under the contract who subsequently, during the term of this contract, install the same new equipment
in their laboratories.
The facts in the Instant case square precisely with the
circumstances covered by Section 17(c) of the contract. After

V

the effective date of the current agreement, this type of
7
7
equipment was installed at Movielab, DeLuxe, VP1 and other
labs. And the Union negotiated a rate of 30c above the
Group 5 rate when the machine ran aX a speed over 180 and up
to and including 240 feet a minute.

Subsequently, the same

new equipment, to be run at the same speed, was installed at

- 3DuArt, giving rise to the instant dispute. Consequently I can
reach no conclusion other than that DuArt must pay the same
rate as the others.
I am persuaded that my conclusions in this case are In
accord with the purpose and intent for which a master Collcct! ive Bargaining Agreement was negotiated.

I am satisfied that

the single contract, applicable equally to all covered Employers, was intended to insure uniformity of conditions, wages
and practices between and amongst the Union and those employers.

Distinctions, if any, are set forth expressly within

that Agreement.

But Section 17(c) clearly applies to all. And

It does so I believe, in order to insure that the rate of pay
for new equipment, operating in the same manner, should be
•

, the same throughout the Industry, BO that no laboratory can ob!

tain an unfair competitive advantage or Indeed be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with regard to wages oaid for the
same work.

Eric J/Schxertz
Permanent Arbitrator

- —
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTIOK PICTURE FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitratoi", having been designate:1 in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement enterec into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs anc
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Because there is no present contract provision
granting uniforms to the affected employees and
because I do not find that the policy of BerkeyPatb.4 to grant such uniforms was a negotiated
benefit with the Union, Movielab, as the successor to Berkey-Pathi need not continue suoplying
those uniforms.
The Arbitrator's fee and hearing room expense
shall be borne by the Union.

< • »-„ ^c-'
Eric J. Schaertz
/
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: March ]/ 1970
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of March, 1970, before me personally cane
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that ft- executed the same.

Case No. 69A-24

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
i
i
i
t

and
Movielab, Inc.

Opinion

The stipulated issue is;
Are certain employees entitled to uniforms at
Movielab East?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on February 16, 1970 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath

wae waived as was the contract time limit for rendition o.
the Arbitrator's Award.
The Company acquired Movielab East at the end of June,
1969.

The predecessor owner, Berkey-Pathe, had supplied cer-

tain types of uniforms to certain employees (negative workers,
developers, expediters, chemists and tnaintenanc- men). BerkeyPathi bore the entire cost of those uniforms including cleaning.
Some time after acquisition, the Company decided to discontinue supplying those uniforms and posted a notice to that
effect on August 28, 1969.

The Union complained, and the

parties agreed to maintain the "status quo" pending this
arbitration.
The Union contends that the Company, as the successor to

Berkey-Path£ Is obligated to continue the benefit of free uniforms to those certain employees.

It further asserts that the

plan to supply uniforms was bilaterally negotiated by the
Union and Berkey-Pathe, to which the Company (Movielab) as the
successor to Berkey-Path£ is bound.

And finally the Union

argues that continuing to supply the free unifor *.s during the
months of July and August after the Company acquired the installation, constituted a ratification of that arrangement
which the Company may not now avoid.
If the evidence persuaded me that the free uniform program was in fact a bilaterally negotiated benefit between the
Union and Berkey-Pathl subsequent to the effective date of the
present contract, I would sustain the Union's oosition and
find the Company obligated to continue that benefit.
am not so persuaded.

But I

The Collective Bargaining relationsulp

between the Union and Berkey-Path£ was under the same industrywide contract as then obtained and nov obtains to the Union
and the Company.

Based on my experience with the parties to

that industry wide agreement, I believe that benefits bilaterally negotiated subsequent to the effect date o^ the contract,
especially i.i case of such a significant benefit as uniforms,
would have been reduced to writing, at least in stipulation
or memorandum form.

This is not to say that a subsequent oral

agreement cannot add to or modify the written contract. Rather,
I am convinced that in connection with free uniforms, the
Union and Berkey-Pathe would not have consummated an agreement
on such a benefit in so casual and informal way.

- 3In this regard I do not dispute Mr. Vitello's testimony.
There is no doubt that he, on behalf of the Union, urged
Berkey-Path£ to supply uniforms for certain employees.

But I

am convinced that Berkey-Pathe's decision to supoly uniforms,
though prompted by the Union's request, was unilaterally made
and in the nature of a grant rather than as a result of a
bargain struck with the Union.

The Union may well have con-

cluded that the grant of uniforms constituted a negotiated benefit.

But based on the evidence and circumstances before me

I cannot endow the arrangements with that status.
It is clear that the Union gave no contractual consideration for the uniforms nor apparently was there any other discernible quid pro quo.

This is not to say that what Berkey-

Path4 did was not wise and conducive to improved productivity
or morale, but only that the adoption of a Union request or
suggestion, absent any give and take in the classic bargaining
sense, and where unrecorded in stipulation or memorandum forte,
does not reach the level of a negotiated benefit to which
either the predecessor employer or the successor company is
bound.
I agree with the Company that even during the BerkeyPath£ administration,

the supplying of the free uniforms had

not continued for such a long and uninterrupted period as to
become an implied contract benefit.
Union's theory of ratification.

Nor can I accept the

It seems to me that a success-

or employer is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine what changes and adjustments it wishes to make and

then to make them consistent with their rights and obligations.
Two months, from acquisition to the notice of discontinuing
the uniforms is not, in my judgment, beyond a reasonable period.
Accordingly, because there is no present contract provision granting uniforms to the affected employee ^ and because
I do not find that the policy of Berkey-Pathi to grant such
iniforms was a negotiated briefit with the Union, Movielab as
the successor to Berkey-Pathl need not continue supplying
those uniforms.

Eric 3/ Schmert^
Permanent Arbitrator

STATE OP NEW YORK t EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE DIVISION OF ROMAN RIOIT3

X
STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN BIGHTS

.

I

on the complaint of
i

EOS TAGS BEOOES,
t

ORDER ON RBOPEHING

I

Case Ho. C-18239-69

Complainant,
- against s
MOV1ELAB, INC. and RON GABEL,
Chemical Analyst,

Respondents.
On April 23, 1969, a complaint was filed charging the above-named
respondents with unlawful discriminatory practices relating to employment.
On May 29, 1969, a determination was Issued after investigation
finding that there was no probable cause to believe that the respondents had
engaged in the said unlawful discriminatory practices.

The complainant has applied for reopening of the dismissal, which
is permitted pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Division of Human Rigttts.
After a review of file, I find that justice does not require that proceedings
before this Division be reopened.

The respondent company has produced a con- i

siderable volume of documentary evidence to substantiate its position that the
complainant was discharged because dt the quality of his work performance.
There is no evidence of discriminatory intent.
Therefore, pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Division of
Human Rights, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the application for reopening be denied.
Dated: Mew York., Mew York
March 17 1970
Robert J. Mandum
Comet•lionet 7
TOi Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc.
2133 8th Avenue
New York, New York 10026
Mr. Eustace Heckles
P. 0. Box 801 Morn ingside Station
New York, New York 10026
Eric Rosenfeld, Xsq.
777 3rd Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Courtney E. Brown, Regional Manager
State Division of Hunan Right* '
62 East 125th Street
Mew York, New York

!

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians

'

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

'
i
i
i
i
i

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
I find that prior to reconstruction of the takeup system on the dry end, the complement of the
#13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing
Machine when operating two strands was five men.
Accordingly, the present complement shall be five
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April / 1970
STATE OF New York
)88 .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this / day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared E/ic J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 70A-2

r.' •' L
\RY ' ^ •
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

;

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DeLuxe General, Inc.
_______MH__~_____H___W^_«__M~.___^__^___
The stipulated issue is:
Shall there be a change in the present cotnoletnent
of the #13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing Machines as a result of the reconstruction
of the take-up system on tt e dry end when operating two strands?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on February 18, 1970
at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for rendition of the Award.

Both sides filed post hear-

ing briefs.
Because of the reconstruction of the take-up system on
the dry end, the parties agree that this case falls within
Section 17(c) of the contract.
However, as I see it, there is a subsidiary but threshold question about which the parties are in dispute.

And that

Is over what the complement on the disputed machine was prior
;to the reconstruction.

An answer to this threshold question

Will be determinative of the basic issue in dispute, simply beI!
Cause both sides argue that the present complement should be
o different from what it was prior to the reconstruction.

'

- 2 The Union claims that a crew of five men previously operated the machines when two strands were run.
asserts that the crew was four.

The Company

(At present, subsequent to

the reconstruction and pending the outcome of this case, the
crew in four.)
On these different premises the Union asserts that there
is nothing about the reconstruction which would justify a reduction in the crew complement from five to four; and the
Company argues that because the reconstruction simplified the
operation there is no reason why che complement should be increased from four (prior reconstruction), to five.
The weight of the evidence presented at the hearing, including testimony by Company witnesses, supports the Union's
claim that the crew complement prior to reconstruction was five
(two on the wet end; two on the dry end and a bridge-man for
relief.)

Therefore, since the positions of both sides in this

case rest on their respective but differing contentions regarding the prior crew complement, it follows that the present
crew complement on the machine in question, when operating two
strands, should be five.
Moreover, I am persuaded that a crew complement of five is
proper because, despite the thoroughly plausible contention of
the Company that the reconstruction simplified the mechanical
operation of the machines (though I was unable to make a comparison because the old take-up system has been abandoned and
abolished) I find no difference now, in the amount of time that
wet and dry operators require or are entitled to relief, from

V

- J those circumstances prior to reconstruction,

the same rest

breaks, meal periods and personal needs obtain as before, and
a fifth crew member is needed, in part at least to cover in
those situations.

In short, the reconstruction of the dry

end take-up system did not change the prior need for or use
of the bridge-man, whom I have found to have been the fifth
crew member prior to reconstruction.

Eric J/ Schmertz/
Permanent Arbitrator

'

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702. I.A.T.S.E.
Award
and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue Is:
What shall be the rate for the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine?
Hearings were held at the Laboratory on January 12, 1970
and at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on
February 16, 1970, at which time representatives of the above
named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was waived as was the con-

tract time limit for the rendition of the Award. Both parties
filed post hearing briefs.
The machine in question Is admittedly "new" within the
•caning of Section 17(c) of the contract, and hence the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the rate of pay.
For a number of reasons sat forth in its presentation and
briaf, the Onion contends that the operator of this machine is
entitled to 65$ an hour above the present contract Croup 5
rate. The Company's position is that the machine warrants no
more than the present Croup 5 rate for a color printer, namely $4.01 an hour.
Baaed on the entire record before me, together with my

- 2ob»erv*tlon of the operation of the machine in question; the
duties performed by the operator of that machine; and ay observation of other color printing machines in the Laboratory,
I aa not persuaded that the operation of the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine and the duties of the operator in
connection therewith are significantly more complex, more demanding or of a more responsible nature than what is presently
expected of the operators of other color printing machines for
which the Croup 5 rate is paid.

Of course, because the machine

in question is new, It contains certain indigenous variations
and differences from other color printing machines.

But I am

not satisfied that these differences or variations are of a
magnitude to justify a higher rate of pay.
The Arbitrator's fee and the hearing room expense shall
be borne by the On 1cm.

•rlc J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 71970
! STATE g lew fork
)SB.
COUNT? Or New York )

I

On this
/ day of April, 1970, before me personally earn*
and appeared fjfic J. Schatertx to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed die
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, PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE

LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
Motion Picture Film Technicians

Award

and
Movielab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was Ben Levine overpaid for the period week ending March 9, 1968 through week ending June 14,
1969? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 10, 1970
at which time Mr. Levine, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's oath was waived as was the contract time limit
'' for rendition of the Award.

The Union filed a post hearing

brief.
Actually the parties are in dispute only over the second
question of the issue - namely the remedy.

It is clear that

the grievant was overpaid for the stipulated period of time.
As I see it, a non-negotiated or non-mutually agreed to
overpayment constitutes "unjust enrichmeg.t" for which recoupment is Justified. This is true even if the employer, as seems
to be the case here, was negligent in making the overpayment
and had at least one opportunity (when the contract rates were
increased) to correct it, but failed to do so. For even if
negligence be the reason, the grievant received more money than

- 2he was entitled to for the services he performed.
Accordingly I find that the Company is entitled to recoup
the overpayment in proportionate amounts from the grievant*s
pay, over a period of time not less than the approximately 15
months of the overpayment, unless he and the Union agree to a
shorter period of time.
I also direct that the grievant not suffer any financial
loss due to any increase in income tax he may have paid as a
result of the higher reported compensation during the period
of time that he was overpaid.

If, prospectively, his gross re-

ported compensation is reduced because of the recoupment deduction, it would appear that any excess tax he paid earlier would
thereby and in the future be offset. But if not, then the Company may recoup only an amount equal to the overpayment less any
net increase in taxes which the grievant paid as a result of that
overpayment.
Consistent with this Award I leave it to the parties to
i
I calculate the exact amount of the overpayment; to arrange the
method of repayment; and to work out the details concerning the

•

' tax question, if any. Any dispute on these matters shall be re-

;

1

ferred to me for resolution.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J'. Schmertz /
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: April / 1970
STATE OF New York
)gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this / day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me, that he, executed ,the same.
. Mil *>>•
!«:«' Uv :'f i.... i
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
OFFICE OF THE G E N E R A L COUNSEL
Washington, D.C. 20570

April 20,

~70

1970

Re: Local 702, IATSE
(DeLuxe General, Inc.)
Case No. 2-CB-4799
Mr. Joseph DeMarco
1105 Korf itsen Road
New Mil ford, New Jersey 07646
Dear Mr. DeMarco:
Your appeal in the above matter has been duly considered.
The appeal is denied^ In view of the evidence that seniority was
by department and that you had the lowest seniority in the department where you were working when transferred to night work, it
could not be established that the Union had acted unreasonably
in considering that your grievance was without merit. Moreover,
the letter of April 11, 1970, from you indicated that you had
been returned to day work.
Very truly yours,
•

Arnold Ordman
General Counsel

By\g M«/Herman
Director, Office of Appeals
cc: Director, Region 2
Local 702, IATSE, 165 West 46th Street, New York, New York

10036

Pinto, Stein & Mozer, 270 Madison Avenue, New York, New York
10016, Attn: Robert Mozer
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker, Feldman & Gartner, 777 Third Avenue,
New York, New York 10017, Attn: Edward Medman, Esquire
CERTIFIED MAIL

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Hatter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
Award
and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Company required to pay negative rates for the
processing of the present type of Internegative film
such as Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm),
and 72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive developing machines?
A hearing was held at the Company on March 31, 1970 at
which time representatives of the Company and Union appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's oath and the contract time limit for the rendition of
the Award were waived.
Based on the record I conclude that In processing and use,
the present type of Internegative film referred to in the stipulated Issue has characteristics of both positive and negative
developing.
But this fact, which in my judgment makes it a film that
I squares exclusively with neither negative nor positive developing, points up the overriding fact that It is a film materially
unique unto itself.
Accordingly I can find no more basis for It to be treated
as negative developing, at the higher negative rate, than as

A
'-' '-' '

- 2part of the positive developing process, where it is presently located.
But based on "past practice" I shall leave it where I
find it, namely as part of the color positive developing machines at the regular rate of pay for those machines.

I do so

because this has been the practice for a number of years with
regard to this type of film, during which time contracts
were negotiated by the parties.

It seems to me that because

of the special characteristics of this type of film, a determination as to which rate of pay should obtain and where the
developing work is to be performed, should have been specially negotiated in those contracts, if its location, methods
of processing and pay were to be changed.
In other words I am satisfied that a change in what has
been a practice for a number of years of processing this
type of film on the color positive developing machines at the
color positive developing rate (which has required little or
no change in the technical methods or operations of those
machines from what is required to develop regular color positive prints) is a matter for negotiation between the parties
and not arbitration.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, having duly heard the proofs and allegations of tha parties, renders the following Award:
The grievance is denied. The Company It not required to pay negative rates for the processing
of the present type of later-negative film such as
Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm) and
72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive
developing machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the, Union.
Eric J./Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

- 3DATED: May /<f-1970
STATE OF Hew York )86 .
COUNTY Of New York)
On this fa day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE, AFL-CIO

and

Award
and
Opinion

Movlelab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there Just cause for the discharge of E. Jacobs,
F. IMO, M. Germaine, 6. Pizeolorusso, Jr., and R.
Kuklinski. (Messrs. M. Chylak and D. Scheurich were
also discharged but were subsequently granted Immunity.) If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 7, 1970 at which time the above
named employees, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants,"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appear
ed, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties expressly waived the contract time limit for rendition of
the Award, and each side filed a post hearing brief.
What I do not like about the Company's action is my conclusion that it imposed the penalty of discharge on the grievants not solely because they failed to satisfactorily cooperate in the Company's investigation of a potential incident of
Misconduct (presumably dangerous "horse play"), nor because it
suspected one or more of them of that misconduct, but rather,
in addition, as a device to induce them to admit their own
guilt or to implicate others.
Arbitrations are not criminal proceedings and the "privilege against self incrimlnation" Is not technically applicable

1

I
Yet somewhere between the Company's right to investigate an
Incident which it believes to be dangerous and improper, and
the right of an employee to job security unless Just cause for
discharge is shown, are found certain fundamental concepts of
due process, which do obtain in matters adjudicated in arbitration.
I see a distinction between an objective investigation of
an incident, in which the Company seeks information from employees either as witnesses or as the "source of knowledge," and
«n investigation in which the questioned employees are deemed
suspects of the alleged misconduct under investigation.

In the

latter situation - which I conclude was the circumstance involved in the instant case- the Company's right of investigation does not extend to the point where the employees face discharge or other severe penalties unless they admit their guilt
or implicate others.
In my judgment I consider it manifestly inconsistent with
fundamental due process for an employer to discharge or Indefinitely suspend an employee suspected of misconduct; when the
employer has no other independent probative evidence of the
employee's guilt; where the discharge or suspension is designed to induce if not compel the employee to provide answers
satisfactory to the Company regarding the alleged misconduct;
and where the only "satisfactory answer" is a statement by the
employee tantamount to an admission of his own guilt or that of
others.
In doing so the Company steps beyond the scope of the
right of investigation and the attendant duty of employees to

.-

I

I

•3 •
cooperate with that investigation, encroaching into a proscribed area reserved for certain basic protections accorded anyone
accused or suspected, whether in the employment relationship
or elsewhere. And it is my conclusion that that is what took
place here, whether the Company overtly intended it that way
or not.
The Company suspected that one or more of the grievants
had something to do with a broken coke bottle and the splattering of its contents on one of the grievants. It was not satisfied with the various explanations advanced by some of the
grievants; namely that they "did not know" or "did not see anything" or that "the bottle fell off the table," or no answer
at all.

It seems to me that if the Company thought the griev-

ants guilty of some offense in connection with that incident
it should have taken disciplinary action for that reason.

Or

if it disbelieved the grievants' explanations, it should have
disciplined them for that disbelief. Both actions of course,
would have been subject to the grievance procedure of the contract. But though the Company asserts that its action was
based on the latter (or in other words on the "failure or refusal of the grievants to cooperate in the Company's investigation"), I am persuaded that it went significantly beyond
that point. That the grievants were treated as suspects cannot seriously be disputed.

(Immunity is granted to either a

suspect or one who might incriminate himself - end Immunity
was granted two of the grievants, situated similarly with the
others, at the arbitration hearing.) Also, the Company's
claim that the grievants did not cooperate is questionable.

- 4The fact is that they or spokesmen on their behalf answered
the Company's inquiry as to what happened.
The "lack of cooperation" is based on the Company's determination that those answers were either untrue or incomplete.
It appears therefore that "satisfactory cooperation" is equated by the Company only with answers that the Company deems
satisfactory. I am not sure that the Company is the sole judge
of the meaning and standard of "cooperation." But that need
when
not be decided because the Company went further. I believe/it
decided the grievants' answers were unsatisfactory, it imposed
the penalty of discharge not just for that reason, but also as
a device to induce the grievants to supply different answers
which, in the judgment of the Company, would be either more
complete or more accurate. And it is this latter purpose and
procedure which I find improper and objectionable.
Let me explain what I think to be the absence of fundamental due process. The grievants were discharged, in part at
least, for refusing to tell on themselves (or on others situated similarly);and if they had purged themselves of that refusal, they or others they implicated would have been subject
to the same discipline as a result of the admission.
words the

In other

grievants could not escape the penalty of discharge

for failure to "cooperate with the Company's investigation"
without providing the Company with the only answer that it
deemed acceptable - an admission of culpability. Obviously that
would be no escape at all.
Also, in disciplinary matters the burden is on the employer to prove the misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.

i

- 5To me this means that the employer has the duty to collect
marshall and present evidence Independent of the statements of
the accused or suspected employee unless those statements are
voluntarily made or are admissions within a 'Voluntary context.'
I think it improper that the Company's case be based solely on
evidence or admissions out of the mouth of a suspected employee,
when such statements are obtained, apparently as the Company
attempted here, by penalizing the employee with discharge. To
my mind this simply does not meet the well settled burden on
the employer, to produce clear and convincing evidence of an
employee's misconduct.

Rather it is evidence of misconduct

produced by the employee himself, and involuntarily.
Indeed if the Company has no evidence independent of what
it obtains in this manner from a suspected employee, it simply
has no case for disciplinary action.

For it to attempt to con-

struct a case under those circumstances, by obtaining the evidence from the employees themselves under penalty of discharge,
or because that evidence was not forthcoming from them, is to
effectuate the very discipline which the Company otherwise, because of the absence of just cause, would not be able to sustain.
Contrary legal and arbitration citations, advanced by
the Company during the hearing and In Its brief, if not distinguishable from the facts in the instant case (and I think
the Company's analogy to the duty of a witness to testify has
been distinguished) are conclusions with which I simply do not
agree.

My research discloses a sufficient body of law and

arbitration cases in support of my view to assure me that what
_ I have sa'd ie by no means unique.

- 6Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator tinder
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
-

parties, makes the following Award:
There was not just cause for the discharge of E. Jacobs,
F. Izzo, M. Germaine, G. Pizzolorusso, Jr. and R.
Kuklinski. As they have continued at work pending the
outsome of this arbitration, no remedy is necessary.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric Jv Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: August'1970
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) * "
/W
On this ' day of August, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case # 70A-Q3

mJKSsr^

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE, AFL-CIO
Award
and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.
The stipulated issue Is:

Was Anthony Caleca improperly reassigned? Was he
improperly reduced in his rate by 16c an hour?
If so what shall be the remedy in connection with
both questions?
Hearings were held at the Company offices on July 30 and
September 8, 1970 at which time Mr. Caleca, hereinafter referred to as the "grlevant," and representatives of the Company and Union appeared, and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived.
I find nothing In the contract which prohibits the Company from changing an employee's duties or assigning him from
one set of duties to another within the same job classification.
I find that the work whiih the grievant performed first In
the Finishing Department; then on the VPI account; and after
his removal from the VPI account, all fell within the Checker
B job classification. So I find nothing contractually Improper about his involuntary transfer from the VPI account to

i

0

-2other work within the same classification.
It Is undisputed that while on the VPI account the grlevant received 16c an hour above the Checker B rate, and that
this Increase In pay vas unilaterally granted by the Company
because of the Importance which It attached to that account.
The additional 16e an hour was not an increase Jointly negotiated by the Company and the Union.

Therefore, as a bonus

attached to that particular job, unilaterally by the Company,
I see no reason why the Company could not delete It from an
employee's pay when the employee no longer worked on Che VPI
account, provided the affected employee continued to receive
at least the contractual Checker B rate for other work to
which he was assigned in that classification.
And that was the situation here. While the grievant
worked on the VPI account he enjoyed the higher rate of pay
unilaterally granted by the Company.

When he was reassigned

to other duties within the Checker B classification, the Company reduced his pay by 16e an hour, but continued to pay him
at the Checker B rate.
Had the additional 16$ an hour been jointly negotiated
by the parties, it would then have assumed the status of a
contract rate and the affected employee would have enjoyed the
protection of Section 4 Paragraph (c) of the contract. But
because I find that Section of the contract applicable to contract rates or rates negotiated or mutually agreed to by the
parties, the additional 16c an hour involved in the instant
case is not "wages over the prior base rate" within the meaning of that Section.

Accordingly the grievant1s reduction In

i

- 3pay by 16$ an hour was not improper.

i
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collect-

ive Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following AWARD:
Anthony Caleca was not improperly reassigned nor
was he improperly reduced in rate by 16e an hour.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

X
DATED: October
1970
STATE OF New York ) ,
COUNTY OF New York) * "

X
On this 3 day of October, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
ae to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case Mo. 70A-8

i
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October 8, 1970

In the course of the Arbitration hearing in Case #70A-7
between De Luxe General, Inc and Local 702, I.A.T.S.E. the '
permanent Arbitrator issued the following directive;
When the company makes a transfer under Article 13
of the contract, the employee so £»d-t<i>'ated must
perform the assignment even if he or the Union
beleives that the assignment and the transfer is
in violation of the contract or any other
agreement between the Union and the Company.
The right of the employee and or the Union
is under the grievance'procedure of the contract.
In other words, the employee must perform the work
assigned subject to his right and the right
of the Union on his behalf to complain to
the permanent Arbitrator subsequent to performing
the assignment that it is in violation of the
contract, and to seek whatever remedy or relief
would be appropriate.
The intent of this directive is to make clear
to the parties that the permanent Arbitrator
believes that work assigned nust be performed
by the employee so assigned whether or not
in violation of the contract subject to his
right to thereafter grieve before the permanent
Arbitrator.
The only exception to this worj€^se"u-tleitren t is
when the assignment would place the employee
in physical jeopardy or when the ^assignment is
illegal or unsocial.

,
"' "

Eric J Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

7
FENTH AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019 • TELEPHONE (212) 247-3220 • CABLE: DELGEfs

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
'between
De Luxe General Incorporated
and

FINDINGS AND AWARD
CASE #7AQ4

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD
1. On November 17, 1970 a dispute arose over the manning
of the striping machine and the performance of striping work. As a consequence, and one orders of the Union,
the Developers in the Developing Department interrupted
regular production and engaged in a work stoppage within the meaning and proscription of Section 15(h) of the
contract, by putting up "leader" on the Developing
machines. This violated Section 15(h) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
2. The Union must bear responsibility for placing the
Developers in a position which caused their suspension
by the Company. Therefore the Union is responsible for
the duration of time between the beginning of the stoppage
and the employees' return to productive work—approximately two hours. The Union's defense of "lockout" is rejected. The Company is entitled to receive from the Union,
as ordinary damages, the amount of wages paid and welfare
and pension benefits credited to the Developers during
that period of time. Accordingly the Union shall pay the
Company the sum of three hundred dollars and fifty-four
cents ($300.54).
3. I am not persuaded that the expenses incurred by the
Company in shipping striping work to the West Coast and
receiving it back was an inexorable consequence of that
stoppage. While I understand the Company's decision
as a matter of prudence, in view of my rulings at the
first hearing I cannot conclude that the handling of
striping work at the Company would again have been
interrupted or refused by the employees or the Union.
Therefore the Company's claim for money damages arising
from its decision to have striping work done on the
West Coast, is denied.

-24. Pending the final determination of any dispute between
the parties, including disputes arising from the temporary transfer clause, other contract provisions, oral
agreements, and the meaning and application or alleged
breaches of the "status quo" of Section 15(h), the
Union and the employees may not engage in strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages, cessations of work or other interferences with normal production during the life of this
contract. Section 15(h) expressly forbids such action.
Even a breach of the "status quo" by the Company does
not justify such action. And therefore I need not determine in this proceeding whether there was such a breach.
The proper procedure in the case of any dispute is to
process a claim through the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. The arbitration forum is
fully adequate to fashion appropriate remedies and orders
in the event of any violations.
5. Therefore as a response to a dispute during the life of
this collective agreement, a strike, or any action which
falls within that definition by the Union and/or the
employees, just as is a "lockout" by the Company, is
totally unnecessary as well as prohibited by the contract
and this AWARD. Also, pending the determination of any
dispute under the procedures of Section 15, the parties
are required to maintain the "working conditions or
methods of operation as they existed prior to the dispute
except as they may be otherwise permitted by .(the)
Agreement". Henceforth, in the adjustment of disputes,
the parties shall follow and comply with the provisions
of Section 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6. The Arbitrator's fee totalling $600.00 shall be borne
2/3rds by the Union ($400} and l/3rd by the Company
($200).

Eric J/" Schmertz
/
Permanent Arbitratoir
DATED: December 14th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) ~'
On this fourteenth day of December 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

t

1

r

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE F.luM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
DeLuxe General Incorporated
/'
and

FINDINGS
CASE I#70AQ5

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

The Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective;
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD:
\. In virtually all instances, vacancies which the Company

/

decides to fill in the skilled classifications are
filled by employees referred to the Company by the
Union; or are filled from other sources after the
Union has been asked to refer candidates and is unable to do so because none with that skill are on
layoff or available.
2. The foregoing has represented a realistic business
judgement by the Company and a procedure in furtherance
of sound labor relations. For both reasons I recommend
it be continued wherever possible.
3. However I do not find that the Company is required to
follow the foregoing procedure under the Contract. The
two Sections upon which the Union relies are not applicable. The effectiveness of the pertinent part of Section
l(e) awaits the happening of a condition precedent. And
under the facts in the instant case Section 25 does not
bind the Company to the provisions of Article 27 Section
l(a) of the Union's By-Laws. Therefore, the hiring of
Mr. F_. Giovanelli by the Company is not and would not
~be violative of the Collective Agreement.
4. There is evidence that the Union committed two ad hoc and
temporary violations of my AWARD of December 14, 1970 in
case #70AQ4, and threatened one additional violation.
I reiterate that AWARD, and as stated therein, direct
compliar.ee for the balance of the Collective Bargaining
penalties in this case because I have not previously
given notice ;hat such remedies vo-ild be applicable.
Rather I shall T.ake use cf this case to serve notice that
as Permanenc Arbitrator I expect .r.y orders and Awards to
be strictl\. Willful failures or refusals to
do so wll r^aveafter bo subit':t to c'r^-jic-;;

-

-

-

-v-'^e-r^T'.f

-25.

/

Much of this case including a ruling on the "status
quo" is in the nature of a Declaratory Judgement.
Accordingly the Arbitrator's total fee of four
hundred and fifty dollars ($450.) shall be shared
equally by the parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: December 28th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty eighth day of December 1970, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
Award and
Opinion

and
DeLuxe General, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:

Was the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative
to positive developing a violation of his seniority
rights? If so what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 18, 1971,
at which time Mr. Lamendola, hereinafter referred to as the

!

"grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and

i
Company appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
This proceeding is in the nature of a "declaratory judgmerit" to determine which of two employees, the grievant or

i
|
t

Robert Twilley (who was also present at the hearing) is entitled to a single available negative developing job.
The answer turns on whether Twilley, who concededly had
more seniority than the grievant as a negative developer,
abandoned or relinquished that seniority.

I conclude he did

not.
While working as a negative developer Twilley became ill
and underwent a serious operation.

Upon his return to work,

at his request, and in apparent recognition of his need for a

- 2period of recuperation, he was permitted to work at the less
demanding task of positive developing, though he retained his
negative developing classification and the higher rate of pay
of that classification. This arrangement was agreed to by the
Union and Company and confirmed in a letter dated April 22,
1969 from Mr. Quigley to Mr. Vitello. Though that letter states
that Twilley "will return to negative developing when the first
opening occurs," I am satisfied the parties intended to allow
him to remain in positive developing until his health permitted
him to return to the more difficult negative developing work.
Therefore unless it can be established that Twilley was physically capable of assuming the negative developing job on a full
time basis when first, one, and then a second job opening for
that classification was posted, his failure to bid in each instance cannot be deemed prejudicial to his seniority rights as
a negative developer.
The evidence in the record does not support a conclusion
that at the time those two openings were posted the grievant
had sufficiently recovered from his illness to resume work in
that classification on a full time basis. It is undisputed
that at that time, and at the request of the Company he did
perform assignments as a negative developer, on a straight
time and overtime basis, and he concedes also that he worked

I
occasional "double shifts." But he also testified, without refuI
tation, that it was very difficult physically for him to do so;
that he was not fully able to perform that work on a regular
continuing basis; and that he did it out of a sence of obligation to the Company because it had allowed him to retain his

- 3negative developing classification and rate of pay while working as a positive developer during his recuperation.

I find no

reason why his explanation and characterization of his physical
condition at the time he willingly undertook negative developing
assignments, should not be believed and accepted.
Also, though I appreciate the grievant's equitable argument
that he should not have been removed from negative developing to!
make room for Twilley after the latter passed up two posted
openings in that classification, I find no contractual reason
why Twilley was obliged to either bid for those openings or

I
j

claim those jobs in order to keep his seniority as a negative
I

developer. While Twilley worked as a positive developer, he rei
tained the negative developing classification and the higher
rate.

So there was no need for him to seek a classification or

rate of pay which he already enjoyed.

Also it is undisputed

that Job postings are promotional in nature - from a lower to a
higher classification, rather than to a specific job opening.
So, put another way, because Twilley remained classified at the
higher negative developing level there was no "promotion" for

•
I

j
j

him to seek or claim.
This is not to say that an employee, ready and able to
assume regular work in a higher classification to which his
seniority attaches, cannot abandon his seniority rights to
that position by failing to claim Job openings when they occur, j
Rather it is that I do not find that the particular facts in
this case can be interpreted to have reached that point.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator un-

I

der the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:

i

Because Robert Twilley had neither abandoned nor
waived his seniority rights as a negative developer, the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative to positive developing was not a violation
of Mr. Lamendola's seniority rights.

j
\e Arbi

the parties.

Eric T. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 12, 1971
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

j
.

j

On this 12th day of April, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual desxribed in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
, Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
'Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
• (.-•."".>•-*
„
•*
and

V '

Award and
Opinion

"beLuxe General, Inc.*'
The stipulated Issue Is;
. Was the layoff of Louis D'Agostino In violation of
his seniority rights? If so what shall be the remA hearing was held at the Laboratory on May 28, 1971 at
which time Mr. D'Agostino. hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The Union does not dispute the economic need for layoffs
in the Raw Stock Department.

It contends however, that be-

, fore the layoff reached the grievant, the "101 Foreman" Mr.
Lorenzano, who had less departmental seniority than the grievant,

should have been laid off.

w

The question is whether the "101 Foreman" is to be In-

cluded for layoff purposes, with the "rank and file" as part
of the same job classification within the meaning of Section 7
(1) pf the contract; or rather, whether the "101 Foreman" is
a different classification from In this Instance, Raw Stock

•

o
- 2-

clerk, and subject to layoff only within the Foreman category
irrespective of the layoffs and seniority of Raw Stock Clerks.
I find a contractual presumption in favor of treating the
"101 Foreman" as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification
for purposes of layoffs.

Schedule A of the contract is entit-

led "Classifications of Work and Rates."

No where in that
i

schedule is the "101 Foreman" or the Working Foreman or the

Sub-Foreman listed as a classification. The Raw Stock Department enumerates only Raw Stock Clerks, Raw Stock Handlers and
Read Raw Stock Receiver (the latter two not involved in the
instant dispute.) In short. Schedule A which contractually
enumerates two job classlciatlons, does not Include the Foreman
job assignment.

Accordingly Section 16 of the contract, parti-

cularly Section 16 (e) cannot be construed as establishing the
Foreman assignment as a job classification.

Instead, I am sat-

isfied that its purpose and intent is limited to fixing a pay
premium of 101 above the existing classification, for performance of certain supervisory duties.

I Interpret it to mean

that the supervisory job assignment carries a 101 premium above
the highest base rate ef the classification of the affected
employee.

In other words, narrowed to the instant dispute, the

"101 Foreman" is paid the highest base rate of his classification
plus 101 for performing certain supervisory work; but he remains classified pursuant to that base rate, namely as a Raw
Stock Clerk.
'••-

The intent and spirit of the relationship between the

"101 Foreman" and the "rank and file" in sharing the available
vork is found, I believe, In Section 9, though it relates spec-

- ..-.

••f'Sf-r-.

I

-
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ifically to sharing overtime.

In substance that Section pre-

cludes either » preference or disadvantage to the Foreman in
the allocation of overtime work; permitting him to participate
in

regular departmental overtime on precisely the same basis

as the rank and file. To my mind that means not only that
nor
contractually there may be neither a preference for/a restraint
on the Foreman's entitlement to the extra available work together with the "rank and file" in his department, but that
implicitly and reciprocally no preference should be accorded
the Foreman if the available work falls below a full regular
quantity.

Sat contrary to this intent, a Foreman would enjoy

such a proscribed preference, if though junior in seniority,
be is retained in a layoff situation and thereby continues at
work while others within the rank and file who enjoy greater
departmental seniority, are laid off.
Finally I consider it significant that the "101 Foreman"
is within the bargaining unit and covered by this Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Though undisputedly he performs

certain '••
i
supervisory functions (like a group leader or leadman) he cani
aot be considered a managerial supervisor because he Is not en- !
!
compassed within the managerial ranks. The Company's argument
i
In this case, that the Foreman must be retained or dealt with j
i
separately in layoff situations because of the essentiality of
i
his supervisory assignment, and because his layoff might paralyzfe
the work of the department, endows these bargaining unit Fore- |
i
men with the kind of supervisory authority ordinarily attached
to managerial supervisors who are excluded from the bargaining
unit for that very reason. Absent proof in this area, I am not

'-4-

J

persuaded that the "10% Foreman" who Is covered by this Collective Bargaining Agreement as part of the bargaining unit enjoys
that level of Importance or authority. Also I think the Company exaggerates the Impact of a ruling favorable to the Union
In this case.

It suggests that a determination which combines

the "101 Foreman" with the rank and file for purposes of layoff
would cripple Its ability to operate the various departments

i
Involved.

The fact however, Is that the circumstances In the

t
Instant dispute are unique.

Both sides recognize that In the

j

overwhelming number of situations the "101 Foreman" is an employee with the highest seniority in the department, and there'
fore under any theory, not reachable in a layoff unless the

i

less senior rank and file employees of the department have been
laid off first.

So as a practical matter, the concern express- i

ed by the Company la most unlikely to develop.
The evidence on Industry practice and the practices of
this Company do not change the foregoing.

Uncontroverted is

j
j
!

the Union's testimony that elsewhere in the Industry, involving
Bnployers covered by this same master Agreement, departmental

|
j

layoffs Include the working Foreman and the rank and file as a
group within the same classification.

So apparently, absent

j
evidence to the contrary, other employers faced with the same
adverse economic conditions, have managed to maintain the re-

I
j

maining production even where a "101 Foreman" junior to employees In the "rank and file" is laid off.
The evidence advanced by the Company In connection with

i
i

its practice is neither sufficiently extensive nor sufficiently

i
comparable to the Instant dispute to be controlling.

I cannot

€

»
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consider only two prior layoffs (in the Developing Department
and in the Printing Department) to be of the quantity or con•latency required to establish a "past practice."

i

Also It

appears that in the layoffs in these two departments, though
affecting the rank and file first, and the foremen later (i.e. as
i
separate groups) the foreman involved possessed higher seniority than any of the others first laid off, Hence under the
Union's theory in the Instant case, those layoffs were and would
not be objectionable to the Onion. And therefore the Union's
failure to grieve in those instances cannot be deemed prejudicial to the Onion's position here. Instead, as I previously indicated, the facts in the instant case are unique; indeed the
first time that the problem has arisen.

j

!

Here, as distinguished

I

from any other prior departmental layoff, the "101 Foremen"

ii

just happened to be junior in the seniority to the rank and file
Raw Stock Clerks; hence for the first time, in an unusual cir-

j

cumstance, the problem arose and the grievance was filed.
For all the foregoing reasons I am persuaded of a contractual presumption in favor of treating the "10% Foreman" in the

i
i

Raw Stock Department as part of the Raw Stock Clerk classification.

Consequently he should have been included amongst the

other Raw Stock Clerks for purposes of the layoffs which took
place on or about Friday, May 21, 1971 in accordance with
Section 7 (1) of the contract. As such, because his departmental seniority was less than that of the grievant's, his layoff
should have preceded the latter's, and because the layoff went
no further, the grievant would and therefore should not have

- 6been laid off at all.' Accordingly he shall be reinstated and
'made whole for the time lost.
'- ' ' As the Permanent Arbitrator in the Industry I wish to make
it clear that the presumption which I have fashioned in deciding this case, is Just that - a presumption.

It should not be

deemed irrebuttable. For example, though in this case I have

j

not been persuaded that the supervisory work of the "107. Fore- J
i
man" in the Haw Stock Department (where only one Stock Clerk
i
i
and one Foreman remain) mandates the retention of Mr. Lorenzano,i
I

there may be other situations where, based on evidence present-

i
ed, the retention of a foreman, albeit junior in seniority, is a

i
eompelling business necessity. In other words, the presumption
may be rebutted If the Foreman's supervisory function is essen- ;
tial and I am persuaded that there is no other bargaining unit

;
I

employee realistically and contractually able and willing to
assume the supervisor assignment, and/or no managerial supervisor similarly available.

Then the implicit right of the Com-

i

pany and its manifest need to continue the department at work

|
to meet remaining business needs, would negate the presumption

i
and allow the retention of the less senior foreman.

But this

exception to the presumption was not shown in the Instant case.
I do not know for example that the remaining senior Raw Stock
Clerk, Mr. Contino, lacks the ability or willingness to assume
Mr. Lorenzano*s supervisory assignments; or that other senior
employees elsewhere in the Laboratory are unqualified or unwilling to accept a transfer to that work; or that the managerlal supervisory force would be unable to cope with or absorb

- 7(

the supervisory vork In the event of Mr. Lorenzano'e layoff or

'•

his replacement by some other employee.

(This IB not to critlze ;
I
the Company's case herein. Obviously It could not know or an- I
•
.
I
ticlpat* the presumption on which I rely until the rendition of
this decision. )
Therefore I want the parties to clearly understand that the

I

contractual presumption involved In deciding the instant case
is not irrebuttable and therefore not absolutely controlling In
all departmental layoffs.

Instead it is a presumption favorable

to the Onion's argument that the Foreman and the rank and file
-

arc to be deemed within the same classification; but rebuttable
on a case by ease basis as indicated. For this reason I think

j
I

it fair and appropriate that the Arbitrator's fee in the Instant
case be shared equally by the parties.
Accordingly the Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following Award;
The layoff of Louis D'Agostino violated his seniority
rights. He shall be reinstated and made whole for theI
time lost.

For reasons stated in the Opinion the Arbitrator's fee
shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric . Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: June 7, 1971
STATE OF New York )„ .
COUNTY OF »ew York)
On this 7th day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described In and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
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Titra Film Laboratories, Inc. and Clement Falzarano
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 of
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO and
Clement Falzarano. Cases 22-CA-4375 and
22-CB-1850
January 10, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
On July 30, 1971, Trial Examiner Benjamin K.
Blackburn issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: The charges
in these cases were filed on February 26 and served on
March 1, 1971. The complaint was issued on April 16. The
hearing was held on June 2 and 3 in Newark, New Jersey.
The issue is whether Titra, in violation of Section 8(aXl)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and Local 702, in violation of Section 8(bXlXA) and (2),
have entered into and are giving effect to an exclusive
hiring arrangement or practice in which length of
membership in Local 702 is the controlling factor. For the
reasons set forth below, I find that the General Counsel has
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the Act has been
or is being violated.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
oral argument at the hearing, I make the following:
194 NLRB No. 155

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Titra, a New York corporation, has a plant at North
Bergen, New Jersey, where it processes motion picture film.
Titra annually sells and ships film valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from New Jersey to customers in other
States. It is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Local 702 is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A.

Background

Local 702 represents the employees of a number of
companies engaged in the business of processing motion
picture film in the New York metropolitan area. Among
them is Titra. Titra was originally organized and brought
under contract by Local 702 in 1952.
From 1949 to 1961 Local 702's contracts, including its
contracts with Titra, contained an exclusive hiring
provision known as the industry experience roster. The
provision was dropped in the contract which was negotiated in 1960 and took effect in 1961. It does not appear in the
current contract, which took effect on October 1,1968, and
runs until September 30, 1971. The current contract
between Local 702 and the various film processing
companies, Titra included, does contain a valid unionsecurity clause (paragraph 1, Shop Agreement) which
requires membership in Local 702 as a condition of
employment after 30 days. Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 1
reads:
(e) In case of repeal or amendment of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 or in case of new
legislation rendering permissible any union security to
the Union greater than that specified in this paragraph
of this Agreement, then and in such event such
provisions shall automatically be deemed substituted in
lieu hereof. In such event, and if permissible under law,
the Union agrees to supply adequate, competent and
qualified employees for the job requirements of the
Employer in the classifications covered by this Agreement, and if the Union fails to do so within 48 hours the
Employer may secure such employees from any source.
The contract also contains a provision (paragraph 25,
Union Requirements) which reads:
No employee shall be required to perform any act or
work violative of the Constitution or By-Laws of this
Union. The Union hereby represents that the provisions
of this Agreement are not violative of said Constitution
or By-Laws.
Paragraph 7 of the contract is entitled "Work Distribution
and Layoffs." It provides for termination of employees with
severance pay in situations where work becomes scarce. It
also provides for employees in higher paid, more skilled job
classifications to bump those in lower paid, less skilled
classifications. Employees terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 have no recall rights.
Local 702's bylaws provide, in article 27:
Union seniority, as distinguished from plant seniori-

'...-'-..
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TITRA FILM LABORATORIES, INC
ty, shall be fixed for each member as of the date of his
initiation into membership in this Local.. . . When one
or more unemployed members are equally available and
competent to fill a job, preference shall be given in the
order of the Union seniority of said respective
unemployed members, but in the event that one or more
of said available unemployed members were inducted
on the same date, then and in that event, preference
shall be given to such of said unemployed available
members, who had been unemployed for the longest
period of time.
Article 26 of Local 702's bylaws provides, in part, for a $10
fine, suspension, and/or expulsion of a member found
guilty after trial of "soliciting employment in laboratories
under collective agreement with the Union, without the
Union's consent."
Local 702's membership is the only pool of experienced
film laboratory technicians in the New York area.
Consequently, despite the fact that they have not been
required by contract since 1961 to seek employees first
through Local 702, film laboratories have continued to call
Local 702 when they need experienced help to see if anyone
is available. When Local 702 refers an applicant to a
company, it fills out a three-part form. It keeps the pink
copy for its own file. It gives the white and yellow copies to
the applicant to take to the company The white copy is for
the company's records. The yellow copy goes to Local 702's
steward at that laboratory. There was little or no
unemployment in the film processing industry in the New
York area until 2 or 3 years ago. Since then, there have been
some experienced film technicians out of work.
Inexperienced persons breaking into the industry start as
preparation men, the least difficult and lowest paying job
classification in Local 702's contract. As they become
experienced they advance through jobs of increasing skill
and higher pay. Timers are the highest skilled and paid
technicians in the industry. Any experienced film technician can do the work of a preparation man.
B.

The General Counsel's Case

Neither Respondent presented any evidence at the
hearing, electing, instead, to stand on the record made by
the General Counsel. As a result, there is no dispute as to
the facts set forth above or in this section. The General
Counsel specifically disclaimed any contention that there is
an industrywide practice that film laboratories in the New
York area will hire through Local 702 exclusively. Indeed,
the testimony of three officials of three other laboratories
called by the General Counsel belies any such theory
because it establishes affirmatively that firms other than
Titra have no such arrangement with Local 702. The
General Counsel called these witnesses, in part, in an effort
to prove Local 702's desire to establish an exclusive hiring
arrangement with Titra by showing that it has made such a
demand on other employers in the industry. Their
testimony established, at most, that Local 702 has forced
other employers to rescind the hiring of new employees for
higher paying jobs such as timer and promote from within.
It has no probative value on the question whether Titra has
an exclusive hiring arrangement or practice with Local 702,
the basic allegation of the General Counsel's case.
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Eight other witnesses called by the General Counsel gave
testimony which did bear on this question. One was
Richard Gramaglia, executive vice president of Local 702
from 1940 to 1958 and president from 1960 to 1966.
Gramaglia testified that, as of the time he left office in 1966,
there was an "agreement" between Local 702 and
employers, Titra included, that "the employers, if they
needed any employees, would ask Local 702 for reference
of any people they had for jobs," Much of Gramaglia's time
on the stand was spent in a dispute with the General
Counsel as to whether Gramaglia had told the General
Counsel, before the hearing, that employers were required
to call Local 702 at the time he was president. Any value
that his testimony might have had to establish that Titra
had agreed to an exclusive hiring arrangement with Local
702 was destroyed when it became clear that he did not
know the meaning of the word which counsel had been
using to categorize Titra's commitment, if any, to Local
702, i.e., "obliged." On the basis of Gramaglia's testimony,
I find that Titra did not, in the period following the
abolition of its contractual obligation to use Local 702
exclusively as a source of new employees, make any explicit
agreement with Local 702 to continue to do so although it
did continue to ask Local 702 to refer experienced persons
to it when it needed help.
The other-seven witnesses called by the General Counsel
all worked for Titra at one time or another. One was
Corroado Nastasi, secretary-treasurer of Local 702. Nastasi
worked for Titra from 1947 until 1958. He was the steward
from 1952, when Titra was first organized, until he left. He
testified flatly that in the period from 1952 to 1958 Titra
hired persons who came to it from sources other than Local
702. In view of Titra's contractual obligation under the
"industry experience roster" during this period, I find this
testimony by Nastasi incredible. I have not, however,
discredited Nastasi generally. His testimony is, for example,
the basis for my findings above about Local 702's threecolored referral slip and how it is used.
Another ex-employee called by the General Counsel was
Louis Chiocco. Chiocco worked for Titra from 1954 until
1957. He was a member of Local 702's executive board
from 1965 until he resigned in November 1970. Chiocco
testified that, while he was an officer of Local 702, he
recommended that five or six persons be sent to jobs at
Titra, all but one of whom were hired. Among the persons
successfully recommended by Chiocco during this period
were Clement Falzarano, who was hired by Titra in 1967 or
1968, Joseph D'Amico, who was hired in December 1967,
George Chiocco, Louis' brother, who was hired in July
1968, and Emil Ognisanti, who was hired in 1966 or 1967.
In each case, Louis Chiocco recommended to Local 702's
president that the applicant be sent to fill an opening at
Titra and the man was sent to Titra, usually with a referral
slip. Louis Chiocco testified to no specific incident which
occurred on or after September 1, 1970, the 10(b) date in
these cases.
Two other witnesses, Joseph Conti and Chris Karinja,
went to work for Titra in 1952 and have been there ever
since. Conti was hired just at the time the plant was being
organized. He testified that he checked with the plant
manager every day for a period of several months. When
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the manager finally said he had an opening and would hire
Conti, he sent Conti to Local 702's office. When Conti
returned with a referral slip, he was put to work. Karinja
testified that he was called by an unnamed friend who knew
he was out of work and told to go to Local 702. He did so
and was sent to Titra with a referral slip.
The General Counsel's last three witnesses were all hired
by Titra in the period when the contract between Titra and
Local 702 contained no exclusive hiring agreement. Edward
Lanzillo testified that he was hired in November 1967. His
brother was working for Titra at the time. Lanzillo was
working as a tmckdriver and wanted a change. He asked
his brother to help him get a job at Titra. His brother spoke
to Local 702's steward. Lanzillo went to the plant, talked to
both the steward and the plant manager, and was sent by
the manager to Local 702 to get a referral slip. Lanzillo
returned the next day with the slip and was put to work.
Lanzillo was the only one of the three post-1961 hires called
by the General Counsel to testify about the manner of their
hiring who was interviewed by the plant manager before he
went to work.
Joseph D'Amico was hired in December 1967. He was
working as a longshoreman at the time, and work was
getting scarce. He asked Louis Chiocco to help him get a
job at Titra. When an opening developed, Chiocco asked
D'Amico if he wanted it. D'Amico said he did. Chiocco
brought a referral slip to his house. D'Amico went to the
plant and was put to work by the steward. He did not see
the plant manager until an hour or so later when the
manager arrived. The manager merely had him fill out the
papers, such as a W-4 form, usually required of new
employees. D'Amico testified that 13 persons were hired by
Titra after him. The only hirings which can be dated, from
D'Amico's testimony, as coming after September 1, 1970,
were those which took place in February 1971, about which
more below.
Finally, George Chiocco confirmed his brother's testimony about how George was hired by Titra. In June 1968
George asked Louis to get him a job in the film industry
because his job with a trucking firm was getting slow. Louis
Chiocco told him to go to Titra around the first of July. He
went, apparently without a referral slip. The plant was
closed for vacation at the time. Consequently, George
Chiocco spent his first 2 weeks in Titra's employ doing odd
jobs. When the plant reopened, Local 702's steward put him
1 The charges in these cases also allege that Local 702 and Titra
required employees to join Local 702 sooner than 30 days after they were
hired and that Titra discriminated against the Charging Party and others at
the behest of LocaJ 702. On April 13, 1971, in a letter to Clement
Falzarano. the Regional Director dismissed all allegations of these cues
other than the one litigated, i.e.. that Titra and Local 702 are "parties to an
exclusive hiring hall arrangement whereby job applicants [are ] referred by
the Union to employment on a preferential basis according to their
respective length of union membership." That letter also said, in pertinent
part:
The evidence adduced during the investigation is insufficient to
establish that the above-named labor organization caused or
attempted to cause Titra Film Laboratories to refuse to hire you
because of your political activities within the Union or that such
activities were the reason you were not hired by Titra. Rather Local
702 did refer you to Titra for employment and, contrary to your
contention, the investigation revealed no evidence to support the
conclusion that such referral was not made in good faith. Moreover,
the evidence does not establish that the Employer failed to hire you by

to work learning the duties of a preparation man. Like
D'Amico, George Chiocco did not see Titra's plant
manager until after the steward had put him on production
work. The interview, as in D'Amico's case, concerned
paperwork and not whether George Chiocco would or
would not be hired. George Chiocco testified that six
persons were hired after him. None can be dated from his
testimony as coming after September 1, 1970.
The whole thrust of the General Counsel's case is that
Titra has delegated the hiring function to Local 702. To this
end he elicited testimony from all his witnesses except
Gramaglia and Nastasi to the effect that everyone who
comes to work at Titra gets hired through Local 702. Based
on this testimony about what has happened in other cases
as well as what has happened to the witnesses themselves, I
find that Local 702's steward plays the key role in deciding
who will be hired when a job opens up at Titra. The
principal consideration, however, is not union membership
but nepotism. Once again, with the exception of the events
of February 1971 related in the next paragraph, all of the
evidence about the hiring of specific individuals, as
distinguished from Gramaglia's vague generalizations,
relates to persons inexperienced in the film processing
industry who were put to work initially as preparation men
and advanced to more skilled jobs as they learned the
business. Anyone who works in the plant or, apparently,
anyone associated with Local 702 can recommend to the
steward that a relative or a friend be given a job when one
becomes available. The steward keeps a list and decides,
according to his own discretion or according to the clout of
the recommender, who shall be hired. The lucky applicant
is sent to Titra with a Local 702 referral slip, reports to the
steward, and is put to work by him. The result is that Titra's
entire work force is made up of numerous groups of
employees who share close family and social ties. Since
there is no evidence that anyone has been hired by Titra in
recent years in any other manner, 1 find that Titra has, in
fact, delegated hirjng to Local 702. Therefore, I find, Titra
has continued to engage in the practice of using Local 702
as the exclusive source of employees even though its
contractual obligation to do so ended in 1961.
Joseph D'Amico and George Chiocco also testified about
the events in February 1971 which apparently gave rise to
these cases.1 On January 8, 1971, Titra terminated the last
13 men it had hired, pursuant to paragraph 7 of its contract
reason of any activity in which you engaged protected by the Act,
rather than as contended by the Employer because of your attendance
record during your previous employment by Titra, which reveals that
you were absent for approximately 64 days during calendar year 1970.
It is further noted that although your charge alleges that other
applicants for employment were not hired by Trtra because of their
intra-umon political activity, the evidence fails to establish that either
Titra or Local 702, through its exclusive hiring hall, denied
employment to any other applicant because of his activities within the
Union. Contrary to your contention that Titra assisted Local 702 by
referring newly-hired employees to the Union's office where they were
allegedly coerced into joining the Union prior to the expiration of the
30-day statutory grace period, the evidence adduced during the
investigation revealed that the actual referral procedure was not an
integral part of the hiring process and that such employees were not
advised that they were required to join the Union before the expiration
of the 30-day grace period as a condition of obtaining or maintaining
their employment with Titra.

. . . . .
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with Local 702. The order of their plant seniority was the
same as the order of their union seniority. George Chiocco,
a finisher at the time, was seventh from the bottom of the
list. Some, if not all, of the six below him were preparation
men at the time they were terminated. D'Amico and
Clement Falzarano were also among those terminated. As
their hiring dates set forth above indicate, they were higher
than Chiocco on the seniority list. In early February, Titra
called Local 702 for preparation men (whether two or five is
unclear in the record). Local 702 referred men to Titra who
were among the six below George Chiocco on the seniority
list and who were still preparation men at the time of their
termination. D'Amico and Chiocco protested to Local 702
that they should have been given the jobs because of their
greater seniority. They were told that the referrals had been
made on the basis of job classification and not on the basis
of seniority as, in fact, they had.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
I have found that Titra and Local 702 do, as contended
by the General Counsel, have an exclusive hiring arrangement or practice2 whereby Titra looks to Local 702's office
for experienced employees and to Local 702's agent, the
steward in its plant, for inexperienced help. That finding,
however, meets only half the General Counsel's burden, for
exclusive hiring halls are not, per se, illegal. Hoisting and
Portable Engineers, Local302 (West Coast Steel Works), 144
NLRB 1449. To supply the second half—operation of the
arrangement- in a discriminatory manner—the General
Counsel relies on an alleged presumption that Local 702
has given effect to article 27 of its bylaws in its dealings
with Titra. No authority for the existence of such a
presumption at law has been brought to my attention.
However, assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is
such a presumption, it is negated by the General Counsel's
evidence of the manner in which Titra's and Local 702's
exclusive hiring arrangement actually works.
The only incident which clearly falls within the 10(b)
period is also the only incident in the record in which
experienced union members rather than inexperienced
persons who had not yet joined Local 702 were referred to
Titra by Local 702. In that instance, both Joseph D'Amico
and George Chiocco, having been hired without experience
and trained initially as preparation men, and having
progressed to better paying jobs before they were
terminated, were clearly, in the words of article 27 of Local
702's bylaws, "competent to fill" the jobs for which Titra
sought men in February 1971. Both had greater union
seniority than the men who were referred by Local 702. If
Local 702 had given effect to article 27 at that time,
D'Amico and Chiocco, or possibly even ex-Titra employees
who were above them on the seniority list and yet were
caught in the January 1971 termination, would have gotten
the jobs. With respect to the other incidents in the record
where inexperienced persons were referred to Titra by
2 The General Counsel argues, in the alternative, that paragraph 7(e) of
the contract presently in effect between Titra and Local 702 constitutes an
agreement between them for an exclusive hiring hall. He reasons that
exclusive hiring halls are not illegal per se under the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, therefore, the language of paragraph 7(e) indicates
the parties' present agreement. Such an argument is obviously without
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Local 702, it is equally clear that article 27 was not invoked.
None of those persons had any union seniority at the time
he was referred. Presumably they all joined Local 702
somewhere along the way. But, as in the Regional Office's
investigation of the charges, there is no evidence in this
record that any person hired in this manner has ever been
required to join Local 702 as a condition of getting a
referral slip or sooner than the legal grace period allowed
him under the union-security clause of the contract
between Titra and Local 702. In fact, all of the evidence
relating to these incidents demonstrates affirmatively that
the union status of the applicant played no part in Local
702's decision to refer him.
If an inference is drawn that Titra, having called Local
702 for experienced help in February 1971, did so on other
occasions when article 27 was given effect by Local 702, the
General Counsel's case runs afoul of Section 10(b) of the
Act. The only evidence from which a finding could be made
that Titra hired anyone in the period after September I,
1970, other than the incident already discussed, is Louis
Chiocco's testimony that he recommended Local 702 send
five or six persons to Titra while he was an officer and that
his term ran until early November 1970. It is, I think,
insufficient to support a finding that any of the persons
recommended by Chiocco were, in fact, hired by Titra after
September 1, 1970. Therefore, the only hiring which took
place during the 10(b) period, insofar as the record is
concerned, is the one in February 1971 in which Titra and
Local 702 did not invoke article 27 and thus did no wrong.
On this state of the record, Section 10(b) of the Act
precludes a finding that the Act has been violated. Cargo
Handlers, Inc., 159 NLRB 321,327 (fn. 12).
For the reasons stated, I find that the General Counsel
has not sustained his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Local 702 has referred employees
to Titra, pursuant to their exclusive hiring arrangement or
practice, according to length of union membership,
especially during the 10(b) period.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire
record in these cases, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Titra Film Laboratories, Inc., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 of
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United
States and Canada, AFL—CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Titra has
violated Section 8(aXl) and (3) and that Local 702 has
violated Section 8(bX 1XA) and (2) of the Act have not been
sustained.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
merit. It requires a strained reading of the language which states what is to
happen in the event the law as it presently stands is changed The parties
could not have made clearer their intention, when they included paragraph
7(e) in their contract, of explicitly agreeing to an exclusive hiring hall only
if the Act is amended.
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and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER
The consolidated complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REGION 8
Federal BoiWmS, Room 3614, !6 Federol Plaza
New York, New York

10007

T.Wp*»« KU-O300

March 31,
M r . Samuel Ptct
2615 Honecreit Ave.
Brooklyn, N . Y . 11235
M"ti;>n - i c t u r e Lab;-ratory
L^cal 7 0 ? , I A T S E , A F L - C K '
(Du-Art Laboratories, I n c . )
Case Ho: 2-CB-5115
Re

:>eir Sir:
Your charge in the above-entitled case a l l e g i n g a v i o l a t i o n under
Section 8 of the National Labor Relation* A c t , ai amended, has been
c a r e f u l l y investigated and considered.
•

AJ a r e m i t of tb* lnTC«ti|ation, it doe« not appear that further
on tb* charge arc warranted.
TS» aridattce 4o«« net t»t«J to •»ta»ll«h that the «bjTe-ni»»fl Unior.
violated tke BitlOBal Labor Relation* Act as alleged »jr fw.
The
•rridenee eitablliheg t h a t although the Union caused your employer,
Du-Art Laboratories, Inc. to t r a n s f e r you rather thae a n o t h e r mmpl^vee
to a lovtr-paying job in the b l a c k and w h i t e procaasing operation, said
aetloe *as ka»*d solely on the f a c t that you vere the least senior tun in
the pcrmaoont-eolor c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Ac U n i o n ' s actions in t h i s reg*r j
tb*r«fort cannot be deesed to have been su>tivated by aay a r b i t r a r y ,
Lavi4ious or othcrvise unlawful considerations. F u r t h e r , the evidence
40** not tend to establish that tb* Union violated the a f o r e s a i d Act ii
any other manner encompassed by your charge. J
to isioa a eo«— laiat IB this s»tt«r.

tf-3*
Rev. 8/70
- 2 Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
you may obtain a review of this action by filing an appeal with the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, Washington,
D. C. 20570 and a copy with me. This appeal must corrtain a complete
statement setting forth the facts and reasons upon which it is based.
The appeal must be received by the General Counsel in Washington, D. C.
by the close of business on
April 13, 1972.
Upon good ca--t
shown, however, the General Counsel may grant special permission for a
longer period within which to file. A copy of any such request for
extension of time should be submitted to me.
If you file an appeal, please complete the notice forms I have enclosed
rfith this letter and send one copy of the form to each of the other
parties. Their names and addresses are listed below. The notice forms
should be mailed at the same time you f i l e the appeal, but mailing the
notice forms does not relieve you of the necessity of filing the aroea'.
itself with the General Counsel and a copy of the appeal w i t h the R e g i o n a l
Director within the time stated above.
Very truly -yours ,
i

'
Enc.

'•

Ivan C.

Regional Director
REGISTERED MAIL
R.R.R.
cc :

General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
Washington, D. C. 20570
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, 1ATSE, WL-CIO
Attn: Mr. C. W. v i t e l l o
145 II. 4***
fci.
--- —
BOT Tork. I.T. 10036
M»to tt«U a»d Hour
Attn: Robert Mos«r, !•*.
270 Mtdison Ave.
•n Tork, H.T. 10016
Du-Art Laboratories, Imc.
245 Wait SStb St.
Ba» York, V.T. 10019

jj STATE O F N . Y . )
1 COUNTY OF N . Y . ) SS:
COSMO W. VITELLO, being duly sworn, depose? and says:
I reside at 95 Wayne Ave. , R i v e r e d p e , N. J.

My telephone ¥ Co 2-

7432 (201).
I am president and business agent of local 702 I A T S E , and have beer.
in this position for 6 years.
Around December of 1971, there was a layoff at D u - A r t , and b e c a u s e
|j of the layoff, a man was needed to fill a b l a c k and w h i t e d y e r s job or. t h < 'I
' day shift.

|;
I

'

Mickey DiGiacomo > the shop steward at Du Art i n f o r m e d the e x e c u t i v
board of the company's information that Vincent Seips, a wet end color m a n ,

i| on the third s h i f t , was low man and that he w o u l d be bumped i n t o the d a \t job, which w

tion, the union took the position that Seips w o u l d be the one to m o v e to the
day shift.
Seips appealed to the executive board of the union, c l a i m i n g t h a t the
union took the wrong position. We then had D i G i a c o m o check the company
records and found that even though Samuel Peet has more d e p a r t m e n t
seniority in the positive developing d e p a r t m e n t , Seips had m o r e s e n i o r i t y
in the classified color.
The union called both men up to the union o f f i c e , listened to t h e i r
fitories, and finally decided that a m i s t a k e had been m a d e , and c h a r g e d its
position. The executive board decided that Peet would be bumped, and not
Seips^ because Seips has more time in the color c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
It has always been the industry-wide policy that regardless of
seniority, the last man i n t o the color c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , will be the first man
out.

In this case, Seips was classified color before Peet, and therefore

Peet would be the one to move not Seips. Seips was classified color on
May 10, 1971( and Peet was classified color July 9, 1P71.

The p r i n t i n g d e p a r t m e n t is also broken down into black and w h i t e and color, and the same procedure is followed in thai d e p a r t m e n t .

In fact

any department with color and black and w h i t e b r e a k d o w n s would follow the
same procedure.
There is nothing in the c o n t r a c t t h a t covers this type of s i t u a t i o n .
The union suggested that Dave Blum should t a k e the job on the dav
shift and that Peet should take Blum's job, a wet end color job.

But Pet-t

told the union that he did not want the wet end j o b ( so we could not moveDave Blum.
Before the layoff took place, the company asked for men to pc or. the
third shift which it was just opening up.

Peet was asked to work the t h i r d

shift dry end job, but he refused it, because he did not want to work rr.iJnight s h i f t .

Seips took the job, but only if the company would c o n t i n u e to

pay him wet end pay.

He took the job and was classified color in May 1971.

The union is not carrying out any v e n d e t t a against P e e t , and is not
treating him unfairly in this case. There are no hard f e e l i n g s against Pee:
in the union. The union is simply treating the case the way it would any
other case. The union is following the past practice that it has always
followed, and is not making any exceptions in t h i s case.

He is a good u n i o n

man and there would be no reason for the union to be out to get him or to
treat him unfairly.

t•
\e read the above/statement and find that is true and a c c u r a t e .
C. W. Vitello Pres.
Sworn to and subscribed to before me the
15th day of M a r c h , 1P72.
Elbert F. Tellem,
NLRB Examiner
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Motion Picture Lahonitor) Technicians, Ixiral 702,
International Alliance of llu-alrical Stage Employees and M o v i n g Picture Machine Operators of the
I nilcd Slates and Canada, AKl^C'lO and Deluxe
General, Incorporated. Frank Cknanelli and Rose
Tardalo. Case 2 CB 4929

In fmilmg a violation of Sec. 8(bx3), Member b a n n i n g does not relv on
H r U f a l r Pamlinff and Decorating Corp. el al 186 N L R B No 140.453 K.2d
78.1 (C .A. 2. 1971). cert denied 31 L t d . 2d 455 (1972). cited by Ihe Trial
Examiner. In Member Tanning's view the legality of the Union's conduct m
this case, u n l i k e t h a t in H'eilgale Ptnnnnf> from which he dissented, does not
fall w i t h i n the criteria of lawful conduct set forth by the Supreme Court in
Scofield \. N L.R H., 3s>4 U.S. 421. and is not otherwise protected conduct

June 26. 1972

T R I A L EXAMINER'S DECISION

DECISION AND ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

BY M I M H I R S FANNING. JINKINS. AND
KENNEDY

SAMUEL M. SINGER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
was tried before me in New York, New York, on August 31
and September I, 1971, pursuant to complaint issued
March 19 based on charges filed on January 22, 1971. The
complaint alleges that Respondent Union violated Section
8(b)(lXA), (2). and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. as amended, by various acts and conduct including
forcing DeLuxe General Incorporated ("DeLuxe" or
"Employer") to hire and fill vacancies on the basis of
unionwide seniority (length of union membership): directing union members not to accept employment on othei
than union seniority under threat of union disciplinary
action; threatening the Employer with a work stoppage if it
employed an employee on other than union seniority basis:
unilaterally modifying its collective agreement with the
Employer to require filling vacancies in order of union
seniority; and disciplining and expelling two union
members (Charging Parties Giovanelli and Tardalo) for
accepting employment in violation of the Union's seniority
rule.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard and examine and cross-examine witnesses. All
filed briefs or memoranda. Lipon the entire record, 1 and
my observation of the testimonial demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following:

On No\ember 3. 1971. Trial Examiner Samuel M.
Smgei issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. I'hereat'ler. the ( i e n e r a l Counsel and the
Respondent I ' m o n filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Charging P a r t y . D e l u x e General,
Incorporated, filed cross-exceptions, and an answernit 1 hnef 10 Respondent Union's exceptions.
Pursuant to t h e p r o x i M o n s of Section 3(b) of the
N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s \ct. as amended, the
N a t i o n a l I .ibor R e l a t i o n s Board has delegated i t s
a u t h o r i t v in t h i s pioccedmg to a three-member panel.
I he Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to a f f i r m the Trial Examiner's
r u l i n g s , f i n d i n g s . 1 and conclusions- and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
I ' u r s u a n i to Section I0(c) of the National Labor
R e l a t i o n s Act. as amended, the N a t i o n a l Labor
R e l a t i o n s Hoard adopts as i t s Order the recommended Ordei of the I r i a l E x a m i n e r and hereby orders
t l i . i t t h e Respondent Motion Picture Laboratory
1 ccimicians. l o c a l 702. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Alliance of
The.itncal Stage Employees and Moving Picture
Machine Operators of the L'mted States and Canada.
A EL CIO. its officers, agents, ami representatives,
s h a l l l a k e the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
recommended Order, as so modified.
S u b s t i t u t e the name "Frank Ciiovanelli" for that of
John Cunningham in paragraph 2(c) of the recommended Order.
' I he I N.I! I \ a i n i n c i . in p.u -id of his recommended Order.
c n t ' i u • • • : N | \d the name John C unninj:h;im. m-.le.id of Ihe name
} rank v H o v . i n e l l i as t h e expelled member We shall modifs the Order to
eorrct. l (his i n a d v e r t e n t e r r o r
-' \ e agree w i t h the I rial Examiner's conclusions that Respondent's
conducl in seeking to e n f o u e its union-seniority rule violated Sec
K l h K l i ( A ) and m b j ( - t of the At! We also agree that its unilateral actions as
scl f o r t h rn the Trial Fxammer violated Sec. 8(b>(3) of the Act However, m
the C i r c u m s t a n c e s . we f i n d it unnecessarv to pa*.s upon or to consider
w h e t h e r Rcspondenl's unum-senu»nt\e is^vr \ vioiative of the Act Nor
Ji> w e pass upon the I r i a l Examiner's conclusion that absent an exclusive
hinnj; hall a r r a n g e m e n t , a union mas refer its members on the basis of
l e n g t h of u n i o n membership

'

•;

FINDINGS 01 FAO
I. JURISDICTION
DeLuxe. a New York corporation, maintains its office
and place of business in New York City, where it is
engaged in film processing and related services. During the
past representative year, it performed services valued in
excess of $50,000 for customers located outside New York
State I find that at all material times DeLuxe has been an
Employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce 'within the meaning of the Act and that
assertion of jurisdiction herein is proper.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION

INVOLVED

Respondent Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1

Transcript corrected bs my order on notice dated September 30. 1971.
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I I I . A U K . I I ) ( M A I K l A H H K PRACTICTS

A.

I.

Contractual lelalions

because of race . . . union membership." etc. Section 2^
slates:
No employee shall be required to peitorm a n v .:ct CM
work v i o l a t i v e ol the ( o n s t i t u t i o n 01 Hv I a w s o! t!"i
L : mon. I h e Union h e r e b y r e p r e s e n t s t h . i t the p i o v i sions of this Agieement aie not viol.iir. e ot said
Constitution or B y - l aws
L'mallv. section I ? ( " A d j u s t m e n t of Disputes' ) p i o v ides foi
resolution of grievances, i n c l u d i n g " t m a l and hmdm-:"
arbitration by the "permanent" mdiistrv a i b i t r a t o i It also
provides (see. I 5 ( h ) ) t h a t :
Pending the f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of air. d i s p u t e , iheu
shall he no strike or lockout, nor shall theie be anv
change of working conditions or methods of operation
as they existed prior to the dispute except as tlu-v mav
he otherwise permitted bv this aurcemcni

Del uxc and Local 702 have been parties to a sciles of
collective agreements. Ihe most recent of which (ami the
one here i n v o l v e d ) covering the pei lod Octohei I. !%!>', to
October I, 1471. I h e bargaining unit consists of w h a t is
normally refened to as production and maintenance
employees, employed in \anousjoh titles and broken down
by clepaitment in accordance w i t h schedule A of the
contract. In the fall of 1970. when the pertinent events
arose, the bart!amine
u n i t at Del uxe consisted of about
C
t_
360 employees.
\
The contractual provisions relevant here include section
I providing for a union-shop clause (i.e.. u n i o n member2. ___Umo:i h v l a w s : the union semonlv rule
ship as a c o n d i t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t al'ler 30 da\ on the
job), notice to the Union of new l i n i n g w i t h i n 7 days
A i t i e l e 3. section 4. of Local 702's b y l a w s p r o v i d e s t h a t
thereof, and an employe! commitment to piovidc for union
"it shall be mandatory lot all members to obe\d l i v e up
security "greater t h a n t h a t specified" in t h e c o n t r a c t
to Ihe Union's Rules set forth in Article 2(\" I lute; a ' t i i u
( i n c l u d i n g Use of I oial 7(C as Ihe sole souice foi new
^(>. seclion ! ( ! > a mcn:l>ei mav be l i n e d , suspended 01
employees) if l a w f u l l y pernntled" |i|nc.iseol repeal ol the
expelled for v a r i o u s m l i a c t i o n s . m c l u d i n i ; "so'ncitnvj
Labor Management p \ct ol I ' M / " or an amend me ill
empliAinent in l.iboiatones undei collective a:Mee"ient
theieof Section 7. d e a l i n g w i t h "woik distribution a n i l
w i t h t h e U n i o n . v \ i l h o i ; t t h e U n i o n ' s consent " X n u U - ? '
lavolls," p i o v ides, inh'i <l!lil
p i o v i d e s t h a i "union s i a i o m v " n e . l e n g t h . ' l o v . < . '
In the e v e n t ol a l a v o l l in , i n \t lonsislmi:
liiemhei ship) ra'hei t h a n p l a n ! - e n i o i i t v %h i l l ^ o \ e : n
of more i h . n i one c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , il an cnipiov.ce in a
unemployed men.bers competing toi jobs I hiis sectu'll
hiL'hcr c l a s s i f i c a t i o n sh.ill I n it be affected b\h
l ( a ) o t l u a l a i l i c l e slates
la\ofl. such emplmee allecled. h a v i n g departmental
\Vhen one 01 m o i e u n e r . i p l o v e d membei - a i e Ci|iial!\U aiiJ. •.
sen ion tv shall h a v e the op lion io be i ev cried to I lie n e x t
lower classification in t h a t department in accordance
be g i v e n in the oidet of Ihe U n i o n s e m o i i i v o! s.iui
w i t h his departmental sciiiouty 01 .iciepl seveiance pa\d t h e employee f i n a l l y displaced shall b e l a i d o i l . In
respective u n e m p l o v e d memlvis. b u t i n t h e e v e n t t h a t
one or moie ol said a* ' l i a b l e u n e n i p l o x e d ' i i e m b e i i
the e v e n t t h e employee a f l e e t e d w . i s transferred Irom
were inducted or the s.m c dale, then ain! in th..M ev ent
a n o l h c i i l e p a l l m e n l 01 classification w i t h i n the p l a n t ,
p i e f e r e m e shall be 1'iven to such ol s.ud u i ' r e ' r . p l o x e . l
lie skill h . i v r the uption ol icv ei In:-, to a position in Ins
a v a i l a b l e membei-. w l u > had been u n e n i p i o \! !oi i|-.e
former d e p a i t m c n l 01 classification and lel.iin his
longest period of time.
accumulated s e n i o n t v in such t o i m e i d e p a r t m e n t 01
Oa
Septemhei 25. l l >7(i. [ho Union adopted a resolution
classification. In no e v e n t shall an employee be
applying its"unu>n seniority" rule not o n l v i , > u n e m p l o v e d .
t r a n s f e i i e d lo a n o l h e i department unless he had
but to emploved members, ineliiiiris; those in .1 i c v e i t i d
p i c v i o n s K been employed in t h a t department.
status so thai even 'hose employees co-iK 1 not accept
I his section also p n . v i d e s t h a t laid oil employees or
<'lher positions (even these t h e v held w i t h t h e i r o w n
employees reduced in cl.i .iiiicalion "shall be entitled to
e m p l o v e r |M 101 io t h e i ' l e v e r s i o n ) u n l e s s u m o ' i s e m o n l v
d e m a n d and i c e c i v e .seveiance pas" and upon p a y m e n t
was followed In e f l e c t . u n i o n s e n i o n t v was made the
theieof "the einplovees' l e n n i e in t h e plain shall he
contiollmg ciilenon for f i l l i n g v a c a n t jobs \vheihe r those
teniiinated." At the he.inn;:, the I nion conceded that all
|obs were being competed fvM bv u n e m p l o v e d membei s 01
laid-off emplo\ees i n v o l v e d in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g f a l l w i l l n n
those piesciltK emploved in othei c l . i s s i t i c a i . o i i i \ i c o i d t h i s calcL'orv and m a v he regarded as "funnel employee-."
ing to Union President and Business AL'C'II \ i t c l ! . 1 . the
I h e c o n l i . u l is s i l e n t w i l h respect lo i r e m p l o v n i e n l r i g h t s
Seplembei r u l e vi,.is ulopled "lor the ber.el'l ol t h e old
of laid-oll einplovees w h o did noi clei I lo t a k e scvci.mcc
l i n i e r s in tin. l o c a l " w i t h t h e k n o w l c d . ' C t h a t n v \ a s
p.IV I I is c o n c e d e d t h a i omission t ,| p i . i x i s i o i i s o n s u c h
c o n t i a i v to the contractual " l e v e i s i o i i i lansc- and i n
m a l l e i s "was d e l i b e r a t e and intended allei the discussion
"conflict w i l h the policies of Del uve " II is dear, an>1 I
of Ihe issues relaluii. 1 thereto in n<-:'oii.mons lor the
f i n d , t h a i a t leasi i , . the e x i e n : t h a t u n i o n M."iiuiiit\i
| i u i i e n t | agiccnicnl
I h e c o n l i . u l l o n l a i n s spccilu
made a p p l i c a b l e to e i n p l o v e e s in a l e v e l l e d s t a t u s who
provisions covering "temporary n . i n s i e i s "
sought to i c t u i n to the:; lormei positions and conk! not do
Section 1 provides t h a t no cmplov.cc "shall be discmmso because of then lower r a n k i i M ' as a m e m l v i . t h e t mon s
nalcd a g a i n s t 01 depnved of employment 01 piomolion
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resolution was contrary to ihe collective-bargaining agreemem
On M.nch II. 1971. ihc Union, iipun advice of counsel,
rescinded the September 1970 resolution. Since that date.
Local 702 has not required members in a reverted status to
abide by union scnionlv. However, the Union slill takes
the position that its members must comply with Article 27
of its bylaws, under which union seniority still is. and
a l w a y s has been, the rule with respect to members
acccpimi: new employment According to Union President
Vitcllo. "If an employei calls the Union, we will send out
member*according to I mon seniority."
3.

Cast referral and luring practices

I lie collective agreement, negotiated on a gioup basis, is
substantially identic.il to those signed by 14 employers in
the are.t. Union President Vitello estimated that normally
about 50 percent of the Local's members (membership
fluctuate-, around 2.000) are referred 10 new positions
through the Union's hiring hall on the basis of union
seniontv. lndusiii.il Relations Representative Slusser
testified that the Company "has historically used the
Union to obtain a trained source of employment,"
indicating, however, that it was "absolutely not" its sole
source General Counsel concedes that employers (including IVI ,ixc) arc not requ red to hire exclusively through
the I mon and t h a t the Union lias operated a nonexclusive
hiring hall.' According to Slusser. the Company generally
fills vacancies w i t h "ie\eitcd personnel" i.e.. it returns a
l.ud-ofl employee to the job or department where he
formcilv w o r k e d , or. if such cmplovees are unavailable, it
o f i e i s ihe \ a c a n l |ob !.> nlhcis in the plant (iisint; a posted
piomoiion list) o; to foimcr l.nd-off employee- "familiar
w .;h tiic geneial opeiation of the plant": or. as a last resort.
it icqiii sts new help Iron; the I 'mon or lures directK "from
the slice! " I in.MI President Vitello leslified that, in
aciord.incc w i t h the Union's In laws, the Union always
refeis emplovees "b\n seniority*" in response to
employer icijiicsis: .ind that in Ins "opinion*1 employees
can solicit then o w n jobs although "we would like them to
go thiouiih the union." \\'hen refened to article 26. section
Idi. forbidding members to solicit employment directly
" w i t h o u t the I mon's consent." Vi;ello indicated that he
could not i e s t i f \s to the opeialion of that clause nor
indicate the circumstances under which the Union would
consent to direct solicitation.
4

Ihe November h>"0 layoffs and attempts to
fill vacancies: the arbitration award

On November 9. I970."1 DeLuxe laid off 50 employees
for economic reasons In view of the contractual rights of
employees, in the even! of a lavoff. "to he reverted to the
next lowei classification in thai department" and "of
r e v e r t i n g to .1 position in his former deparlment or
classification" (Set lion 7 of the contiact). the lavoff
1 \ .Mit iiMu. iht- 1 M'.MI iix'k llu- [•'•sin,>n lli.tl il had .111 exclusive
idcir.ii .i^ui-iik-nl. hu' tin- pcmi-ini-iil ai hitia'.oi ruled otherwise and,
.llll'ljim' t.' t l l C I J l i . M l

II I].!' .iNdl'.i h\! dl'lerilim.llloM

' I nlost'lhoniise indi.atcd .ill .l.iu's in tins .IM.I subsequent sections .,,.l*j V
in s.vkiiif I., ii'.iki- llu letup." i i \v s.nsse: relied on h>
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actually involved 100 to 150 "moves" in a sort of "musical
chairs" or bumping action. In early December, four
vacancies developed in the printing department and
Industrial Relations Representative Slusser offered the jobs
to four employees (Mini, Zurenda, Mannelli, and Morgan)
who had been reverted out of that department during the
November lavoff. Upon informing the union steward
(IV/nlo) of this offer, the latter referred Slusser to Union
President Vilello. Vitello told Slusser that Ihe Union's
recent (September 1970) resolution (supra, sec. A.2) on
"union seniority" precluded the four employee-members
from reverting back and that he would have to hire "the
most senior unemployed" Local 702 members whether or
not they were previously employed by DeLuxe. explaining
at the hearing that the September union resolution was
passed because of "a high degree of unemployment in the
industry." When Slusser stated that he would then
temporarily transfer the four into the priming department
until "we could . . . iron out the problem." Vilello
objected, insisting again that the Company must hire the
"senior unemployed people."•''
The next day. Slusser spoke with three of the four
employees (Mini, Zurenda. and Morgan), advising them
that they were being "temporarily transferred." but all
three said they "could not take the temporary assignments"
because "they had been instructed by [the] Union not to
take it." At the hearing, the Union admitted the allegation
in the complaint that Vilello "directed" all foil! employees
slated for the reverted positions "not to accept transfers
upward or reemployment . . . and then warned them inat
failure to comply with such directive could result in
disciplinary action."
Unable to fill the vacancies with "reverted" employees.
Slusser subsequently (the ne.xt week) sought to rehire four
other employees (Giovanelli, Ploski. Cunningham, ami
Lawlar) who had been laid off or severed in the November
layoffs. All four had worked in the printing deparlment
(where the openings existed) an I were regarded by the
Company as among its best and most senior employees.
Advised of the Company's intention, Vitello said that he
did not believe that all four were "senior people in the
industry" and again insisted that the Company must hire
on the basis of the union seniority Slusser demurred,
explaining that he had "no intention to hire people from
another lab when there were [satisfactory! people on the
street who had worked at DeLuxe." He then contacted the
four employees and all accepted the jobs, filled out
applications and W-4 forms, and were scheduled to start
work on particular days and shifts. However, the Union
permitted only one of the four (Lawlar) to accept
employment after learning that she had the requisite union
seniority. Ihe others were instructed by the Union not to
woik because they lacked union seniority. Vitello sent
Cunningham a telegram directing him to report to the
Union's office instead of to DeLuxe, warning him that
"fonir.-u'iual ti£hi" to do so un.lcr set- 13 of Ihe colleilne agreement and on
a direthM' issue.( hy rhr permanent ar^nr.mtr m another tase on OuobiT s
thai dni-cliM' requneil cm|i|ovefN to accept temporary transfers .ind
pr.'Mde,! that am union objections to such transfers must he h.indleJ
Ihrouph (he £tie,ancc piocedurr

•
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"Failure to comply ( w i t h the Union's ordei | will result in
severe disciplinary action oy the executive board."
While C u n n i n g h a m anil I'lo.ski acceded to Ihi- Union's
directives, Giovanelli ( t h e f o u r t h employee offered employm e n t ) did not. After several meetings with Vitello on the
question of hiring. Slusscr on or about December IS f i n a l l y
i n f o r m e d Vilello t h a t C iiov.mclli would repoit lo w o i k .
V i t e l l o warned that il this lakes place, "there w i l l be no
printing in Del.uxe laboratory . . . I'll pull the whole
plant."' 1
The question of the Company's right to hire Giovanelli
was submitted for a r b i t r a t i o n by the Union and Company,
the latter referring to the Union's "threatened . . . mass
stoppage and walkout" if Ciiovanelh were put back to
work. In accordance w i t h the Union's request, Ciiovanelh
was not rehired pending determination of the dispute.
A f t e r a hearing on the issue, the permanent arbitrator on
December 28 issued his award, f i n d i n g that the hiring of
Giovanelli "is not and would not be violative of the
Collective Agreement." thereby rejecting the Union's
contention that the Company w a s required to hire on the
basis of uinon seniority. The a r b i t r a t o r also noted th.it
there "is evidence that the U n i o n committed two ad hoc
and temporary violations" of his p i i o r (Decembei 14, 1970)
award in another situation and that the Union here
"threatened one a d d i t i o n a l violation." T h e arbitrator
served notice on the Union t h a t he expected his orders and
a w a r d s "to be strictly followed "
5

1 he Union's disciplinary action against two
member employees who returned to work in
violation of the union seniority rule

Following the arbitration award, on January 4, 1971,
Giovanelli and Tardalo, another laid-off employee, returned to work. On the same day. Union President Vitelio
filed identical "charges" against each alleging t h a t they
violated article 27 of the Union's bylaws ( t h e union
seniority rule) because they "went to work w i t h o u t legard
to rights and seniority of fellow employees" and also article
26, section l(f). of the b y l a w s (precluding job solicitation
w i t h o u t union consent). 7 Fach was notified that "said
charges will be read at our ne\ membership meeting on
Friday. J a n u a r y 8. 1971." Ciiovanelh and Tardalo were
later tried and found g u i l t y of violating both b y l a w s by
Local 7()2's Executive Board on January 22, 1971. and
expulsion from membership was recommended. On March
6, 1971, the membership acted on t h a t recommendation
and both employees were expelled from membership and
their tender of dues returned.' 1 However, both continued to
work at Del.uxe w i t h o u t f u r t h e r union request for their
discharge.
B

I . The basic issues heie presented concern : (I) validity
f Respondent's "union siMiioiity" rule and ( _ ) application
* R.lscil on Shlssct's ocdili-il Ics1imon\. hilc Vilrllo ^.cncr.ilh ilrnu-J
llirc.ilrniri)' l ) r l imr u i t h .1 s l n h r iu woik slo|ip.ipr. IM mlmillril w;miin^
Slussrr i h . i " i h r u ui.iv l>c .1 stopp.ip i > \r ininlfDt which witt grl iwi id
control jnd Khieli I wouldn't lit- ablo lo control "
7 (iiov.-indli was prrviousK summniH'il lt> appear ill the t ' H I O I I ' N ofhic

and enforcement of that rule by the U n i o n through
attempts to induce and force Del.uxe and I 'nuni member
lo abide by that rule. The rule in question ( a r t . 27 of tli.
Union's b y l a w s ) provides that length of membership in t h <
Union (as distinguished from length of employment in th
plant or bargaining u n i t ) governs unemployed members
cor.ipetmg for jobs. Hy resolution adopted :n Seplembc 1
1970. the uile was broadened to applv lo all members
including those employed in the plant, so t h a t employee
members were barred from accepting permanent return o:
temporary transfer to higher classifications from which
they had been "revei'-.'d," except in "union seniority'
order. In other words, union seniority was the controlling
criterion for filling jobs both bv applicants for nev.
employment and members already employed.
2. Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act makes n an u n f a i r
labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce'
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7.
Under Section 7 employees are guaranteed the right to
form. join, or assist labor organizations, and "the right t.
refrain from any or all such a c t i v i t i e s . " H o w e v e r . th. proviso to Section 8(b)(!)(A) preserves the light of a umor:
"to prescribe its own rules w i t h respect to acquisition or
retention of membership therein" Applying those p r o \
sions, the Supreme C'ourt has held t h a t the language an.
legislative history of Section 8 ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) made il plain tha
Congress "left internal union a f f a i r s to union self-govern
ment" and that the section did not contemplate the
regulation of internal union discipline, such as fines or
expulsion from membership. \.L.R.fi \
A//IV Co.. 3HS U.S. 175, 185 Accordingly n i< not i m l . i w f u :
for a union to f i n e members for crossing a picket l i n e
( Allis-Chalniers. supra). or lo discipline employees foi
exceeding production ceilings (l^x-iii JV>'.', I'ruted Automobile Workers (Wisconsin Motor Corp}. 145 M.RB 1097.
1099 -O4, affd. xuh num. Scoftc!d\. \ 394 U.S. 42"<
Standing alone, the union-seniority rule here involve-.:
appears to serve a legitimate union concern to spreaJ
employment among members and, in my view, is no'
u n l a w f u l . It is conceded that the collective agreement
between Respondent and DeLuxe was not an c v c l i i w i
referral contract and that the contract du' not preclude
employees from obtaining employment directly fr.nr, the
F.mployer. Accordingly. I reject General Counsel's anc
Charging Party's contention t h a t the union semontv r u l e in
itself constitutes illegitimate exercise of union power and ;s
in effect per st* violative of the Act. Absent an exclusive
h i r i n g hall arrangement, a union may refer its members on
the basis of length of union membership See [-'rank l\iulev
etc.. International Association nf Bridge. SlructuNli am!
Ornamental Iron Workers, etc., (John f~. fifii.\le\- Conxirucl ion Company I. 152 Ml RB 1409. 1414
3. However, as the Supreme C'ourt pomte.1 in \r. >(V/</,
supra, both legislative history and its prior AHis-Chalnvn
decision (supra ) have "distinguished between intern. '.I and
external enforcement of union r u l e s " 394 U.S. at 4?8
1 hus, while a "union rule duly adopted and not the
on tVccmhrr ?l. aflct n t M i f u n l i o n lh.it he »;»<• in \iolnhon of i
sciiti'iil\. tiilitri l l t i r i t l ol ' aisi iphn.li \" il he (,-xilr.l l>
ui Ihr I n l . I n.tli
11 1 IM (wo nnplovrrs l i n v r . I J > | M .th .1 Iliru r x p
hut the lallci h.ut lu>l \cl <u Ic J Ihrrco
of the t.ilr of ihc hr
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a i h i i i . u v fiat of a union oflicci" is "enforceable against
v o l u n t a i y union members by expulsion or a reasonable
fine" (ihid ), it is not enforceable so as to affect a member's
emplo\nil-lit stains. As staled in Scofield. 394 U.S. at
428 429.
The Court [in Allis-Chalmers. supra ] thus essentially
accepted the position of the National Labor Relations
Board dating from Minneapolis Star A Tribune Co., 109
N L R B 727 (1954) where the Board also distinguished
i n t e r n a l from e x t e r n a l enforcement in holding t h a t a
union could f i n e a member for Ins failure to take part
in picketing d u r i n g a strike but lhat the same rule could
not be enforced bv causing the employer to exclude
him from the work foice or be affecting his seniority
w i t h o u t triggering violations of Sections 8(b)(l).
8(h)(2). 8(a)< I ) . 8(a>(2). and K(a)(3). These sections form
a web. of w h i c h Section S ( b l ( l ) i A ) is only a strand,
p r e v e n t i n g the u n i o n f i o m i n d u c i n g the employci to
use the emoluments of the |ob to enforce the union's
rules. (Footnotes omitted.]
The C'ourt (.194 U.S. at 428. fn M went on to affirm its
earlier pronouncement in Radii > Of/iccrs'
l/niun v.
\./..K K. 347 U.S. 17. 40. that "The policy of the Act is to
i n s u l a t e employees" jobs from their organizational rights.
I l i t i v Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow
employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be
good, bad or indifferent members, or abstain from joining
any union w i t h o u t imperiling their livelihood."
Here the record shows that Respondent's conduct was
not confined to "internal enforcement" of its union
seniority rule. It took repeated steps "to affect a member's
e m p K n m e n t status." (Scoficld. supra. 294 U'.S. at 428). Not
only did n threaten disciplinary action against employeemembers if the\d employment in contravention of
Us union seniority rule in "reverted" or new classifications,
bin it v igoroush sought to force the Employer to apply the
I mon's internal rule in all hiring, i.e.. it insisted that
preference in all employment he conditioned on length of
u n i o n membership. l o bring home t h a t this was not an idle
t h r e a t . U n i o n President Vitcllo threatened a mass work
stoppage if ihe I'.nplover hired ( i i o v a n e l l i in breach of the
union seniority rule Furthermore, as presently shown, by
seeking to force Del u\ to abide by the sweeping union
seniority rule (as promulgated in its September 1970
resolution) and b\r preventing four "reverted"
emplovces from accepting employment. Respondent effect i v e l y sought to impose unilateral terms and conditions of
e m p l o y m e n t in violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act.
Respondent was in effect seeking to require its members to
abet its own breach of the collective agreement—action in
itself contrary to public policy. See Local 12419. etc..
United Mine Worken of America (National Grinding Wheel
Compam. Inc.). 176 N L R B 628.
Under all the circumstances. I f i n d that Respondent's
conduct in seeking to enforce its union seniority rule had
its necessary and unlawful effect of encouraging union
membership, m violation of Section 8(b)(lXA) and (2) of
the Act Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators

and I'aperhnngers. etc., 242 F.2d 477, 481 (C.A. 10). See also
Patterson v. Tulsa Uicat No. 513, etc., 78 LRRM 2068, 2071
(C.A. 10).
4. As found (supra, sec. A, 2), on September 25, 1970,
during the contract period, but before the events here
involved, the Union adopted a resolution requiring
members already employed (as well as unemployed
members) to adhere to the union seniority rule. As a result,
four employee-members (Mini, Zurenda, Marinelli. and
Morgan) were precluded from reverting to positions
(higher classifications) they previously held in the printing
department, the Union insisting lhat the vacancies be filled
w i t h "the most senior unemployed" members, whether or
not formerly employed by DeLuxe. The Union similarly
insisted lhat Ihe Employer refrain from transferring these
employees lo ihe higher classifications on a temporary
basis all in bieach of the collective agreement and the
arbitrator's previous awards sanctioning such transfers
Respondent was in effect seeking to unilaterally change
terms and conditions of employment— both with respect to
initial hiring and upgrading working employees—by
attempting to foist and foisting upon the Employer its
union seniority rule, in breach of the collective agreement
under which the Employer was free to hire, revert, and
temporarily transfer employees without prior union approval. Furthermore, it is conceded that during the
contract negotiations the Union sought, but failed, to
achieve provisions of the type it now sought to impose
during the contract period. This case is, therefore,
analogous to Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America, etc., (Westgate Painting and
Decorating Corp.), 186 N L R B 964 where a majority of the
Board found that ihe union there unilaterally implemented
a production quota rule (forbidding employees to paint
more than 10 rooms a week), in violation of Section 8(bX3)
of the Act. The Board stated:
. . . the Union unilaterally effected changes in wages
and the workweek which were neither sanctioned bv
the contract nor accepted by the Employers. The
Union, by its action after the new agreement was
executed, thus sought lo secure without bargaining
what it had failed to achieve in bargaining. Therefore,
the Union's unilateral implementation of its 10-room
rule constituted a change in terms and conditions of
employment sufficient to preclude the continued
imposition of the rule without the agreement of the
Employer. Accordingly, we find . . . that the Union,
by unilaterally enforcing its 10-room maximum production quota . . . violated Section 8(bX3) of the Act.
Based on the above-cited decision, I conclude that
Respondent's unilateral actions here likewise constituted a
violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act. !<
5. As also found (supra, sec. A, 4). in addition to
barring reversions and transfers within the plant, Respondent invoked its union seniority rule to bar employment to

v In his hi iff. liener.il ( 'on use! .ui \.uucs \.itious ^loundv in addition IP
III.isc rrlu-d on in this Pension, lo |iisiif\s «f K(»(.t) violahons
Anutn^ ihcsf for ex.tmple, is ihi- HK-OIV lhat Respondent's conduct was "in

derogation" of previously rendered arbitration awards In view of the result
reached. I find it unnescssar) lo consider General Counsel's other theories
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three former employees (laid-off employees Ciiovanelli,
I'loski. and Cunningham).1" All w c i e offered employnieiit
directly hy the Employei and all accepted the offers and
were ready to report to work. While two of the three
yielded to u n i o n pressure to abide by the rule, the t h i r d
(Ciiovanelli) did not. On J a n u a r y 4, .subsequent to the
arbitrator's award upholding the Employer's contractual
right to lure employees without regard to union seniority.
Giovanelli and a n o t h e r employee ( l a r d a l o ) f i n a l l y returned to work. The Union, however, continued to press its
disciplinary charges against Giovanelli and also Tardalo
for violatiim the u n i o n seniority rule and on January 22 the
Union's Executive Hoard found them g u i l t y (supra, sec. A.
5)." On March 6, 1971, the Union "expelled both
employees from membership.
( l a v i n g found t h a t the u n i o n seniority rule, as enforced,
was illegally imposed on the employees, t h a t It was sought
to be enforced through the employer as a condition of
employment, and t h a t us i m p l e m e n t a t i o n was in breach of
the subsisting collective agreement, I Cm [her find and
conclude l h a ! the disciplinary action taken against Giovanelli and Tardalo for accepting the Employer's offer to
work c o n s t i t u t e d " r e s t r a i n t and coeicion" w i t h i n the
meaning of Seciion K ( h ) ( l ) ( A ) of ih, Act As in l^icul
J2-1JV, etc.. l.'nncd Mine H'wA<T\/ Anntica (Sationu!
(,rim/in^ HV;»v/ C/i/>i/hi>i\. Itn I. I 7 < > N l . R I J (>28, the
"penalty to compel conduct in violation of [the Union's
c o n l i a i l i i . i l | obligation is also one w h e n 1 the i m m u n i t y
based on the i n t e r n a l character of the discipline is
overcome by its offense to basic .statutory policy." In
Nalinnal (.irindin^ H heel the union fned l(> members for
crossing a sister union's l a w f u l picket line. However, the
governing collective agreement contained a no-strike
clause and, accordingly, the fines were held to be penalties
for n;> nihers' r e f u s a l s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n work stoppages
forbidden b\e collective agieeinent. I he Board adopted
the reasoning of my colleague. I nal Examiner A. Norman
Somers t h a t
The policy in tins case conceins the adherence to the
terms of a contract between representatives of employers and employees and the condemnation of their
violation. This is indeed i m p l i c i t in the preamble of the
Act from its inception (Sec I I and in (he reports of
both houses of Congress . . . . To hold t h a t a union,
despite the prohibition in Section K ( b ) ( l ) ( A ) against
1 1 1 I In- f o u r t h employee l l . i u l . i ' i was a l l o w e d l . « w o r k heeanse she had
the iei|<asiie union seniority
1 1 I hi1 two emplovees wer-.- also f o u n d lo h a \ ^ l o l a l e d (he I men's r u l e
a g a i n s t Mrticitinu employment w i t h o u t .anon .onsent. h u l i h e i e ts no
r v i d e i K c t h . i i t h e v soheiled Ihe | « ' l > s
'*' I n \. i < r Ihv ahnve-xJuled cunt ltiM.ni it iiKiiifis n.t| that llu1 t it ion
a l l o w e d '.hi l u o e i l i j > l o \ , - e s ! « w o i l - a f U i e x p u l s i o n l l o i : i l l i e m h e l s h l p
\ * i l h o i i l u n i o n i n k - i l i - i e m e I n ..n\l l l u - l » o « i - i e ik-pmed ol w o i k
d n n i l ; - I >,-, e n i t > e l . pi i»i lo l l u a l l ' l l f . i l a w . m t .is .: K - . n l : ol llu 1 m o i l ' s
a p p l u a t I- > l < o! t h e n u ' o n si-1 no • ! , : im
A' i n l l u i .is,- i.f Ins I n i l i i u m ol t h e - Sll.li ', issu, s ( u - n e i . l l I oiinsel sels
lor Eh . u l i l t l i o l i . i l p o u n d s l o t 11n,11nr i n d e p i - i u l e n l Ki OH 1 H \ \. K > I
i>' |.|> !•( .'I.) Oin- ol HH-M-. il, i l n , , . « i l l , . I . M i m i m ,1.', , , - i i t o U I - I I H I I I ol 111,
u n i o n s i - n i o ; i l \- ( i c
l o i , i i i ( - ih,- I i n p l o s n lo j.-ui- p n o n l \n
crnplov MU'nl to n u - n i l u r s u i l l , u i f . i k ' s l k - n i ' l l i o! i i n - i n t H ' i s h i p t . . i l i t - u K li.ts
hecn i-iiiiMili'ii'tl jirul foun,l lo IH- .1 X i h n l l l M ; i - » f l l .IN K l h K . ' i \ m l . i n , m

K i - s p < > m l , - n r ~ opl l . l l l .llso M o l . l l , - - . S,-l
S l l i l l I KM
because "n denies |ol> r e l e u a l s lo niinnit-tnl>fi\" ( l > i p 2 } } . if is.l.-.ii an.I
f i n d i h . n K , - s p o n , k m \*.is n.ii .i,le.|ii.ii.K .ippn.i-d ol t h i s issn.. no

restraining or coercing of employees in t h e i r r i g h t s
under Section 7 could nevertheless w i t h i m p u n i t N
penalize members for failing or refusint to participate
in a violation of a no-strike clause is to p r o v i d e an
incentive to unions and members to violate c o n t i a c t s .
This too runs counter to a basic policy of the s t a t u t e .
Accord: (jla:icrs Local Lnion ,\u. 1162, cic. / /'i<.\m (//in.v,
Inc.). I77NERH.W. 1 '-'
6. Respondent's basic defenses, as stated in its l e t t e r
memorandum to the Trial Examiner are: ( a ) that "if there
was any violation of the Act . . . it was cured both by t h e
arbitration process" and the Union's compliance w i t h the
arbitrator's award; and (b) that "in any event, the conduct
complained of and set forth in the complaint" was of s h o r t
duration and "tic minimi*) The short answer lo Respondent's second contention is t h a t the conduct aliened and
found to be violative is s u b s t a n t i a l and s i g n i f i c a n t ,
requiring remedial action. Thus, the record establishes t h a t
Respondent's insistence t h a t DeLuxe do all i t s hums; on
the basis of its union seniont\e made it impossible fot
the Employer to f i l l vacancies practically for the e n n r e
month of December. Moreover, Respondent did no!
rescind its September 1^70 resolution broadening the scopc
of the u n i o n seniority rule to employed n i e m b e i s ( f o i
"reversions" and transfers to higher classificationsl u n t i l
March 1972. Respondent continued to press itsdisciplir,.;; \s against
long aflei December 1S*7U. culminating in t h e i r expulsion
in March 1^71. despite the fact t h a t the December 2S
arbitral a w a r d upheld the Employer's position t h a t i t could
properly hire the two employees w i t h o u t regard to the
union seniority rule.
As to Respondent's contention t h a t its v i o l a t i o n s were
"cured" by the arbitr.il process and by its compliance with
the arbitrator's award t h e r c h v rendering umieccssar\d
superfluous the i n s t a n t u n f a i r labor practice pioccedmn
- Respondent relies on the Board's reccM Collver case.1-1
To begin w i t h . (W/ur is here inapplicable. 1'here. t h e
Hoard dismissed the complaint proceeding because of the
supposed availability of grievance-arbitration procedures
under the parties' collective agreement, u'sersing u n t o
itself, however, jurisdiction over the proceeding in the
event of t h a t he "e\pecl[ed] my orders and A w a u l s to be
stiiclly followed." 1 1 certain contingencies. U n l i k e in
Colh'cr, we are here concerned not w i t h defe:e:ue to
affouteil f u l l iipporliimu tn hue.ill- 11 SIT /c./. j/ /,-,'.' i ,••;• i M > SI K K
J i l l -Ml.. In IS. .S .S A,;,M,', i 1 , , v N I K H . 4 U - I .\ l.'.'s , , \,i
AccorUingl\o f i n d i n g s Jrc hasi-d mi i h i s pom! I ht- >.iuu- ;. h,:t- w n h
rcspci i k>General Counsel's contenlton ih.ii R r s p o u d v n i ' s u-fu^.i. to h.uullc
ot p i t K C s s gnc\.UKC> foi r i o n n u n i h c i ^ (and c\pt-iU-d i i u - i n h . i s i ts Mol.il:-.,
ol Si-i S | l > ) i l ) | M \ d i l M k - d K . !hr i-o!iip!.liill lll.uk- "..• Mu-li a l l i - i - . i ! - . ' - !
\k R c s p o n d c n l ' s ^ \ l l n t • s ^ . \. "jitinitli-vl" t h a t tin- I n i o n w o u k l not
. fir.!.
ship " I .
rcpi
tpu-p.
\pi-lli-il
on tin- !MSIS of l l u i r s t m i o i u ot itns smtilc
i l i . i i Ki-spoii.lt-in. as i h r i-v. l i i s i > . - rrpirMmUlite ol I > , | ,^,\.
w o u l v l f . u ! l o f u l f i l ! I K s L i i u i o i 1 , J u l \o i r p r c s r n l a l l i - n , ' > l . ' \ c c s i i i u i . . . ! i : i i noiiMii'lllbfisl. ,ihs.-:u . u K a t u c notac lo Rfspoiuk'nt t h a t i' wo;::.H- i\.- to
ntri-l sin h issu.-s Noi i s i h , ! , am showmj: t h a t Krspoiuk-nt ,-M-I u-li. -.1 10
[ t | > i t - s t - n t iioiinu-nil't i - w i t h i n I!K- K a r ^ a i m n ^ u n i t . L ndc-r I!K , IK i i n s t . i t n ; - s .
H-ra! ( iMinsd's ,l|>n| K .ition in h i s hncf (p 2('l -it t h i s Km- ilatv- "to .inn :i.l
llu
• fill.I
ih.•I" of « , l h
an Sd'H I »i \ \i 01: t h e hasis ol su, h ' pi ,s'!' is o, nu-,1
'•' ( ,.//!. f ln\u!Mf,l H m: •) < , » / / ,i'i.l l l , i , . - / i Vi >(.-»ni . o. pi.1 N l KM
No |sil
1 1 I o, Ilk,- H.IS.MI-. I u o u l d not i n OIIIII..-M.I l l i a l ll,,- II,-.o,I d . l r i lo
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notify and l>argam collectively with Del.uxe concerning
changes in terms and conditions of employment prior to
e f f e c t i n g such changes; t h a t it revoke Us disciplinary action
(expulsion) against employees Giovanelh and l a r d a l o and
restore to each of them union membership with f u l l union
seniority rights; and t h a t it make whole the employees
TiHuied in the complaint for any loss of earnings suffered
by them by reason of the discrimination against them. 1 ' 1
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with the
formula set forth in I H'. H'tmlvmrth Company, 90 N I . R H
389. with interest as described in Ixix Plunihin^ A Hcunn%
Co., I . 1 8 N I . R B 176.
Upon the foregoing f i n d i n g s of fact, conclusions of law.
and the entire record, and pursuanl to Section I0(c)of the
liv toicini: Del.uxe toAct.
LMVC Ipiioriu
employment
to recommended:
hereby missue
the following

arhitialion wheie a i b i t i . i t i o n piocecilings aie available.
Here the parlies submitted their basic dispute (applicability
of the u n i o n seniority r u l e ) to a r b i t r a t i o n . Moreover.
Respondent did no! raise a r b i t r a t i o n as a defense in its
answer to the complaint, did not seriously press it at the
hearint;. and voluntarily elected to l i t i g a t e the matters in
issue in the u n f a i r laboi practice proceeding. F i n a l l y , the
record here shows t h a t Respondent has ignored prior
arbitral awards, prompting the a r b i t r a t o r in his latest
(December 2S> a w a r d to deplore two e a r l i e r v i o l a t i o n s and
a d m o n i s h i n g Respondent
Accordingly. 1 conclude t h a t Respondent's defenses are
w i t h o u t m e r i t and lhe\e herehv rejected.
COM i I S I O N S oi |,A\.

emplovees w i t h greatest l e n g t h of membership, and bv
causing emplovees to reiect Del u x e ' s offers of employ
men! u n l e s s i h e v had such u n i o n s e n i o r i t y . Respondent
committed u n f . n t labor practices w i t h i n t h e meaning of
Section S ( h i ( hi \ anil (2 I of t h e \ c t .
2 Hv c . K i s i i i t 1 and a t l c m p l i n : ' to cause Del uxe not to
revet! 01 l i a n s t e t e m p l o y e e s M i n i , /urend.i. M a n n e l l i . and
Mor^.i:i to h i g h e r c l a s M l i c a t i o n s on the g i o u n d t h a t ihev
alle^edlv did n o t h a v e s u l l i c i e n l u n i o n s e m o i i t x . ResponJeii' l o m m i t t e d u n f a i r laboi piaehces w n h m t h e meaning
of Si\1 N h > i 2 i a n d I I K \ of t h e A c t .
liv s i i p . i l . u K causing Del.uxe to deny employment to
toriiiei cmplovccs Ciiovanelh. I'loski. a n d Cunningham
hei.iiisc i h e v al'cix'dlv had. i i i s u f l i c i e n l u n i o n seniontv.
Respondent c o m m i t t e d u n f a i i labor practices w i t h i n t h e
meainiit: ofScdion S ( h n 2 i a r d i l u \ l o f t h e Act.
-I Hv u m ' l a t c i a l l s c l f c c l i n t : chatit-'es in terms and
k-oP.d.'.ions ol c;r.plov i n c u t d n n i i f t h e lei m of U s c o l l e c t i v e
,i'j!iv:;icn! w i t h D e l ' r x e . R e s p . i i H l c n l committed u n f a i r
i.ihi-i p i . u t u es w u hi n t h e meamiiL' of Section S(b)i ,^i of t h e
\cl
•~ b\: and expelling Giosanclli and l a r d a l o
Tom m e m b e r s h i p u n d e i t h e i i i c u m s i a i i c e s described
M,;'"I.. si\. 51. R e s p o n d e n t c o m m i l l e i l u n f a i r laboi
. i i . i d i i c s \ \ i i l u a l l i e me.mint.' o l Scdion S ( b M l ) ( A ) o l t h e
Ac!
(' 1 . n i l of t h e a f o i e s a i c l u n f a ! labor [indices a f f e c t s
. i - m i n e i i c w i t h i n t l i e m e . i m n g o ! Section 2 ( < > i a n d ( 7 | o l
he \
I Ml

R l V | l Ml

mis i ICCISIOD entriiC'.1

1 1.)\' (ouinl th.il Respondent eiiL\i*jed in *.~ei l.in; unl.in

idior. lo e f l e c t u a l e t h e p o l i c i c s . i t ihe A c t 1 he a f f i r m a t i v e
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ll'tllkl'
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.ipplv-
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.Ml

.lU.lul

IwlH-tl

pll.'t

1 lank (i iovanclli
Rose I'l. iski
John ( 'unninghani

Mike Mannelli
( llll

t h a t ihe Respondent

Ul'.-:i-

1 lie Ki'llRMV

I c n v Mini
( ell /.ilicnda

aboi i - i . i i t i c c s . 1 s h a l l lecommend t h a t it be oideied to
ease a n d d.'sist t h e i e l r o m a n d t a k e c c i ; a i n a l l n m a u v e
a'tion w i l l nu'!i.,!c a ie.|iiii. :nc;it

ORD1.R"'
Respondent Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians.
I oca I 7 <>2. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e of ' T h e a t r i c a l Stage
l-inplo\ees and Moving F'icture Machine Operators of the
United Slates anil Canada. A l l . CIO, its officers, agents.
and Representatives, s h a l l :
1. ( ease and desist f i o r n :
( a I hnforcing. i m p l e m e n t i n g , and giving effect to i t s
u n i o n s e m o r i t \, as set lorth in article 27 of its b y l a w s .
In lorcmi; Del u x e G e n e r a l . Incorporated, to give priority
in employment to emplovces w i t h greatest l e n g t h of
m e m b e r s h i p and hs c a u s i n g employees to reject Del.uxe's
o f f e i s of e m p l o y m e n t unless they h a v e requisite union
seniority.
( b i Causing or a t t e m p t i n g to cause D e l . u x e to d i s c r i m i n a t e in the h u e . transfer, ami u p g r a d i n g of employees in
violation of Section 8(a)i3) of the Act.
(c) Unilaterally, anil w i t h o u t notice 01 c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h
the above-named employer, e f f e c t i n g changes in terms and
conditions of emplo\.
(d) Disciplining, im h i d i n g expelling employees from
membership, lor a n c p t m L ' o f f e r s of employment in
accordance w i t h practices and procedures sanctioned h\s
collective agreement w i t h Del.uxe.
(e) In a n v other m a n n e r restrainm;: or coercing its
employees in the exeicise of rights guaranteed b> Section 7
of the Act.
2 . l a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g a f f n m a t i v e a c t i o n necessary t o
e f f e c t u a t e the policies o| t h e A c t .
(a) M a k e w h o l e the employees listed below l u i an\s
of pay they mav h a v e s u f f e r e d because of the discrimination ai'.mist t h e m , in the m a n n e r set forth in t h e section of
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( h ) Upon request, bargain collectively in good f a i t h with
Del.u.xe prior to effecting changes in terms anil conditions
of employment.
(c) Rescind its expulsion of employees John C u n n i n g ham anil Gloria l a r d a l o from u n i o n membership; restore
the said employees to membership w i t h f u l l union seniority
rights; expunge from its records all reference and other
evidence in its files relating to t h e disciplinary actions
against t h e m ; and n o t i f y each in w r i t i n g of all such actions.
( d ) N o t i f y , in w r i t i n g . Respondent's lnternation.il to
which the two above-named employees have appealed their
expulsion, of the aforesaid actions, w i t h a copy of such
writing to the two employees
(e) Preserve and. upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, fur examination 01 copying, all records
relevant and necessary to compliance with above paragraph ( a ) .
(f) Post at its business office and m e e t i n g halls, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix " ' • Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 2. a f t e r being d u l y signed by Respondent's
representative, s h a l l he posted by il immediately upon
receipt thereof, and he m a i n t a i n e d hy il for 60 consecutive
days t h e r e a f t e r , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are c u s t o m a r i l y posted. Reasonable steps shall he taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or coveted by any o t h e r
material
(g) F u r n i s h the Regional Director for Region 2 signed
copies of said notices for posting by Del uxe General.
Incorporated, if w i l l i n g , in places w h e r e notices to
employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notices,
on forms provided by said Regional Director, shall, a f t e r
being signed by Respondent, he f o r t h w i t h returned to the
Regional Director for disposition by h i m .
(h) N o t i f y said Regional Director, in w r i t i n g , w i t h i n 20
days from the receipt of t h i s Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply h e r e w i t h . ' ^
I t is i t R I I I I K O K D I K I D that t h e c o m p l a i n t h e dismissed
in all other respects.

Pursuant to the recommended Order of a I rial L \.mimer
of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to
effectuate the policy of the N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Act.
as amended, we hereby notify you t h a t :
Wi w i l l M M enforce, implement, a n d g i v e e f f e c t t o
our u n i o n seniority rule (as set forth in a r t 2" of out
b y l a w s ) by forcing Del uxe General. Incorporated, to
give priority in employment to employees w i t h greatest
length of membership and by causing employee- to
reject Del.uxe's offers of employment unless t h e y had
requisite union semorit\
Wh wit i sot cause, or attempt to cause. Dcl.uxe to
discriminate in the hire, transfer, and u p g r a d i n g of
employees in violation of Section S ( a > ( . ^ > of t h e
N a t i o n a l Labor Relations Act
Wi win soi u n i l a t e r a l l y , and w i t h o u t nonce or
Consultation w i t h the above-named h m p l < ' \ e r . e f f e c t
changes in terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment.
\V't w i l l , sol discipline, i n c l u d i n g expel from
membership, members accepting employment in .u
cordance w i t h procedures sanctioned h\m a s ' i c c m e i i t
w i t h Del.uxe.
Wi w i l l make w h o l e t h e employees listed below loi
any earnings they may h . i \ lost as the r e s u l t ol out
objections to their transfer, u p g r a d i n g or h u e . because
of enforcement of our u n i o n seniority r u l e in I )ecember
1970.

Terry M i n i
Ceil Zurenda
Mike Marinelh
Cliff Moruan

Prank Gio\anell
Rose Ploski
John

Wl w i l t , upon request, bargain in g xv.1 f a i t h w i t h
DeLuxe prior ti> effecting changes in t e r n s and
conditions of employment.
Wl w n i rescind our order expelling f r a n k C n o \ a nelli and Ciloria LardaUi from u n i o n membership and
17 In the c \ e n t th.it the Ho.ud's Older i* enloued h\1 lndu'incm "I a
restoreI ahor
to Relations
said employees
l l u"I'uMcd
n i o n semorr.v
nizhts.
L'niteJ M.Ik's ( u n i t of Appeals t h e uords in the m i m e leadliij! "Posted h\r .if the Saturn.•!
Ho.nd" s h . i l lf uic.nl
pursuant

to a J i u l f i u c n ! of the I mtcJ Slates ( o n i l of Appeals en (on nit .in ( l u l c i ol
the National l.jhor Kel.ilions Ho.ml "
l v In iht e v e n ! 1tl.it t h i s recommended Onler is adopled In the Hoard,
t h i s pn>M-ion s h a l l lie modified l o i c . n l "SouK said Krfinii.il Direuor. in
wrilmj! w i t h i n III d a \ I n u n I h i - d a l e ol tlus O i d e i . w h a t slops Respondent
has taken l o i o t i i p k h e i c w ilh

Moi los Pu 11 KI
I \HOK y l i 'to I i . i i M ( i yss.
I (X M
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A I 1 l \ S l I Ml
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Si All
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An Agency of the U n t i e d Slates Government
I o all members of Motion Picture Laboratory T e c h n i cians, Local 702, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e of t h e a t r i c a l Stage
l.mployees and Moving Picture M a c h i n e Opcialors of the
U n i t e d Stales a n d Canada. A l l ( T O
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i v\T ARBITRATO

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Guffanti Film Laboratory
and
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

Opinion
and
Award

The Company contends that due to an error Ernest LaBracca

I

and James Havlland were overpaid in wages. The Company seeks
recoupment.
In the case of LaBracca the Company seeks the right to recover the overpayment by making deductions from his wages.

In

the case of Raviland the Company deducted what it claims he
owes from his severance pay upon his recent retirement.

The

Company seeks affirmation of the right to have done so.

i

Factually the LaBracca case is on all fours with the facts

in Case No. 69-A 27, Local 702, Motion Picture Film Technicians !
and Movlelab, Inc. Hence my Award in that case, namely that the j
Company is entitled to repayment by the employee of the amount
of wages overpaid him, is applicable to the instant case.

i
However, in the instant case, unlike its position in Movielab
I

the Union advanced the defense among others, that Section 193 of
the Labor Law of the State of New York allows only certain spec- [
i
ified deductions from an employee's wages. And that deductions
for overpayment of wages is not among them. The Union argues
that Section 193 thereby bars the Company from making deductions'
from Mr. LaBracca*s wages to liquidate the amount of overpayment.

- 2I need not Interpret Section 193 of the Labor Law, because I am satisfied that repayment to the Company can be
achieved without the Company unilaterally making deductions
from Mr. LaBracca's wages.

I rule that Mr. LaBracca's proper

rate of pay was as a Shipper (c).

I do not find that he was

either classified as or performed the duties of Head Shipper
(d), nor, because he was not a Shipper, Checker and Packer (b)
was he entitled to a 51 wage increase for "foreign shipments."
I find accordingly that he was overpaid by the Company in the
amount of $778.70. He owes that total amount of money to the
Company.

i

The Company shall not unilaterally make deductions

from his wages.

Instead I direct that he and/or the Union on his
iI
behalf arrange with the Company a mutually agreeable method of
repayment together with the other considerations to which I
made reference in my Movielab Award. However if the parties
are unable to agree upon a method of repayment within twenty
days from the date of this Award, the matter may be referred
back to me for determination as to how repayment is to be made.
The Haviland case is different.

Based on the evidence

before me I am persuaded that Mr. Haviland had reasonable
grounds to believe that the work he performed, namely "Jiffy
Tests," were "Reprints" and higher classified work.

And that

after performing that particular work for the requisite contractual period of time, he had reasonable grounds to apply
for a permanent upward reclassification.
Mr. Havialnd was told by his steward that Jiffy Tests
entitled him to a (c) Positive Joining Department rate.

For

thirteen weeks he performed that work and noted it as "reprint"

- 2on his card. He was paid at the higher rate without the Company
questioning it. Thereafter, consistent with the contract, he
applied for and was reclassified upward to the (c) rate, again
without question, refutation or inquiry by the Company, and
was paid at the higher rate for almost two years up to his retirement.
To my mind this is persuasive evidence of the reasonableness of Mr. Havlland's belief that he was properly paid the
higher rate for the Jiffy Test work and was entitled to a permanent upward adjustment in his wage rate. Whether he was
correct in fact is Immaterial.

For it seems to me that after

the first thirteen weeks, at the point that he was officially
I

reclassified upward, or within a reasonable time thereafter
the Company had the opportunity and should have protested or
eliminated the higher payment or at least looked into the bonafides of the upward reclassification it made. That it did not
means to my mind that the disputed work was higher rated, or
if not, by failing to take steps to correct the wage payment
for such an extended period of time it acquiesced in Mr. Haviland's reasonable belief that he was being properly paid.
Accordingly the Company did not have the right to deduct
$345.70 from Mr. Haviland's severance pay upon retirement. The
Company Is directed to return to Mr. Haviland that sum of money.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Agreement between the above parties and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the paties, makes the following
AWARD:

- 4Ernest LaBracca owes the Company a total of $778.70
in over payment of wages. He and/or the Union on
his behalf and the Company shall work out a mutually
agreeable method of repayment together with the details of any tax effect. Failing to do so within
twenty days from the date of this Award the matter
may be referred back to me for determination of how
repayment is to be made.
James Haviland was not overpaid in wages by the Company. Accordingly the Company did not have the right
to deduct $345.70 from his severance pay upon retirement. The Company shall return that sum of money to
him.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by the
parties.

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator!

DATED: October 30, 1972
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this 30th day of October, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me thj^t h^-e^ceprted
the same.
Case No. 72-A 6
Case No. 72-A 7

Noto-> Put'- S;o' 8 "e'Ne» York
No 4 1 II7C300
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CIVIL COURT OP THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OP NEW YORK
--- .--------------X
OUFFAKTI FILM LABORATORIES INC.,

:

Plaintiff, :

5

Index No. 24762/73

6
7

ERNEST LA BRACCA,
Defendant . :

8

X

9
10

S T I P U L A T I O N

11
12
13
14
15

Before:
HON. SHANLEY N . EGETH, Judge.
A p p e a r a n c e s :
Messrs.

16
\7
18

Trial term,
Part 40,
111 Centre Street,
March 19, 1973-

By:

POLSTTI, FREIDIN PRASHKER FELDHAN & GARTNER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
777 Thlrc Avenue,
New Yor-l;, New York.
ED*'ARD F. BEANS, ESQ.., of Counsel.

19

ERNEST LA BRACCA, Pro Se,
Defendant,

20

Brooklyn, New Yorlc.

21
22

643 46tn Street,
Stuart Flshmar.,
Official Court
Reporter.

23
24
25

P

1

1
2

S T I P U L A T I O N
E R N E S T

LA

BRACCA,

2
called as a witness

3

on behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn

4

by the Court, testified as follows:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:

9

Erreet LaBracca.
Where do you reside?
6^3 48tn Street,

Brooklyn, New York.
THE COURT:

10
11

State your name.

Put your stipulation

on the record.
MR. BEAKS:

12

V.j name is Edward F.

13

Beane.

I am. with the firm of Polettl,

14

Freldln, Prashker, Feldraar. & Gartner

15

appearing for the Plaintiff in this matter.
THE COURT:

16

Sir, you have spoken

17

to the lawyer for the Plaintiff in this

18

matter?

19

MR. LABRACCA: Yes.

20

THE COURT: You have worked out a

21

time payment plan with the attorney for

22

the Plaintiff.

23
24
25

Is that correct?

MR. LAERACCA: Yes, with a stipulation that if I miss a payment —
THE COURT: I am taking care of that.

1

S T I P U L A T I O N

2
3

I

MR. LABRACCA:

I an, not working

right now.

4
5

3

THE COURT:

You have agreed to pay

him a down payment?

6

KR. LABRACCA:

7

MR. B£AK£:

No down payment.

Your Honor, if I may,

8

Kr. Labracca is entitled to a $40.00 cre-

9

dit from Guffantl Film Laboratories. We

10

are considering the $40.00 credit as a

11

down payment.

12

THE COURT:

Fine.

You are giving

13

him a credit of $40.00 towards the entire

14

amour.t, as of now.

15
16
17

.

KR. BEANE:

Yes.

THE COURT: When is the first
payment to commence?

IB

MR. LABRACCA: June 1st, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: How are they to be paid?

20

MR. LABRACCA:

21

THE COURT: Then you agree to pay

$10.00 per week.

22

$10.00 per week beginning June 1st.

23

MR. LABRACCA: Yes.

24

TH£ COURT: Each week you will give

25

him $10.00 until this ie paid off.

1

S T I P U L A T I O N

2

la that correct?

3

MR. LABRACCA:

4

THE COURT:

It

Ye*.

In the event that

5

there is a default Ir. any of the weekly

6

payments, which shall continue uncured

7

for a period of three weeks following

8

written notice of default to him, from

9

you, by certified mall, return receipt

10

requested, you may then docket a Judgment

11

for the unpaid balance crediting the

12

monies paid on account.

Is that correct?

13

MR. BEANE: That's correct.

14

THE COURT: That's your understand-

15

ing?

I
16

MR. BEANE: Yes, your Honor.

17

TH2 COURT:

You won't have to

18

make a motion to get that docketed. You

19

can subir.it an affidavit to the Cler*c of

20

the Court setting forth the circumstances

21

of the default.

I
Do you understand that?

22

MR. BEANS:

Yes.

23

THE COURT:

Is that your understanding?

.24
25

MR. LABRACCA: Yes, air.

1
S T I P U L A T I O N

5

2

THE COURT:
3

*

The natter la settled.
•

•

4
5

Certified to be a true and correct
record of the within stipulation.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

f

22
23
24
25

Stuart Fishraan,
Official Court Reporter.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
'Cinef fects yColor Laboratory, Inc.
OPINION

and
AND

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

AWARD
CASE #72Q2

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties;
and having duly considered the evidence presented, renders the
following Opinion and Award:

For at least the last five years under the
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, and with the knowledge of and
without objection from the Union, bargaining
unit maintenance mechanics have been periodically
and regularly assigned to and have performed
certain work in the "Optical Section". As to
that particular work (the disputed work herein)
this consistent practice, over an extended period
of. time during which successive collective agreements were negotiated, pierced and eliminated
any "corporate veil" between the~C6rapany~anc the
Crneffects, Inc. (a sisTter corporation at the
same*location) and effectively classif.iea_jEhe
disputed^work ^performed by the""maintenance
mechanics at the Cineffects, Inc. or Optical
Section location as bargaining unit work under
the collective agreement between~"tRe Company and
Union even though Cinelfects, Inc. as a corporate
entity~is a not a^sigliatorjy'"to'the~c~61itract".'
Accordingly I render the following AWARD:
1. The maintenance mechanics have no
right to refuse to accept or to refuse
to perform, and the Union has no right
to direct them to refuse assignments of
work which maintenance mechanics have
previously performed in the Optical Section.

-22. When so assigned during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement and
under its terms and conditions, the maintenance mechanics shall continue to perform that particular work.
3. If the Union's notice directing employees not to perform the work is still
posted the Union shall remove that notice
forthwith. If the Union does not do so,
the Company may remove the notice.
4. The Arbitrator's fee and expenses
shall be borne by' the Union.

Eric/U. Schmertz

\t Ar

DATED: February 12th, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 12th day of February, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
MAUR.CE L SCHOE""'M.D

ii:JC. SUT: or TIE., row.
NO. 3WE:"j7:5

ty ,/
QuINi. t' ill HWSJU County
T*n Him" Mir Ji 30.
tf
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and

•

Award
Case No. 72A10

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proof; and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Employer has violated the contract by requiring
a single employee to run both the Total Vision Step
Printer and the Hollywood Printer in the 8mm Department. The Employer shall no longer require a single
operator to run both machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the/Employer.

Eric J., Schmertz
I
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: March ^> 1973
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of March, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to nie tc be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

MAURICE I. EC C-Ff'WAU
NOTARY PUbLIC. ".run OF NEW YORK
No. 3 ' . f c - 9 7 1 5
Qualifies in nassiu County /
Tw» Expires Marcti 30, 197f

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and
Movielab, Inc.

Opinion
Case No. 72A10

The stipulated issue is;
Whether the Employer has violated the contract
by requiring a single employee to run two machines in the 8mm Department, i.e. one Hollywood
Printer, and one Total Vision Step Printer? If
so what shall be the remedy?
Hearing;; were held on November 21 and November 27, 1972.
Thereafter the parties submitted briefs.
The Union's principal argument is that the Employer violated Sections 17(d) and (b) of the contract.

I find the Union's

case to be meritoreous.
The Total Vision Step Printer was placed in operation "ignificantly earlier than the Hollywood Printer.

Prior to the

introduction of the Hollywood Printer, the operation of the
Total Vision Step Printer was the sole and exclusive duty of
the operator of that machine, and I find it to have been a
"present method of (machine) operation" within the meaning of
Section 17(b) of the contract.
Thereafter (perhaps two years later) the Employer introduced the Hollywood Printer, which I find to be a "new" machine within the meaning of Section 17(d) of the contract.

The

Employer concedes it did not notify the Union in writing when
the Hollywood Printer was placed in production, as required
by Section 17(d).

- 2 The application of Section 17(d), in the instant case with
the introduction of the Hollywood Printer, expressly brings
into play the provisions of Section 17(b).

Obviously the Employ-

er should not benefit by relying on his failure to give notice
under 17(d) to avoid the express interrelationship of Sections
17(d) and 17(b).
When the operator of the Total Vision Step Printer was also
assigned the additional job of operating the subsequently introduced Hollywood Printer, a change in "operations from a single
to a dual operation of machines, so that one operator may operate two machine?" took place.

That language of Section 17(b)

makes no distinction as to which types of machines, when operated by a single operator, constitute a "dual operation;"
Therefore I am persuaded that the phrase "dual operation" is not
limited to the operation of two of the same type machines. Instead I am satisfied it encompasses the assignment to a single
operator, of the responsibility of running two machines whether
those machines are the same or different types. Hence when the
operator of the Total Vision Step Printer, also required to run
the Hollywood Printer, a "dual operation of machines" by one
operator was effectuated within the meaning of Section 17(b).
Section 17(b) allows for a change from a single to a dual
operation of machines "provided such dual operation is presently
or may hereafter be in existence in a laboratory operating under
a collective agreement with the Union." Testimony offered by
the Union that a dual operation of the Total Vision Step Printer
and the Hollywood Printer neither existed in any laboratory cov-

- 3 ered by the contract when the contract was negotiated nor subsequently, was not disputed by the Employer.

Accordingly the

condition under which the Employer is allowed to unilaterally
effectuate this type of dual operation of machines was not and
has not been met.
Therefore the Employer is directed to discontinue the dual
operation by a single operator of the Total Vision Step Printer
and Hollywood Printer.

The Operator shall no longer be requir-

•

•
ed to run both machine?.

Eric
Permanent Arbitrator

V.

\
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cinneffects Color Laboratories
Award
Case No. 73A1

and

Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702 IATSE
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The time limit for rendition of the Award as aet forth
in Section 15(b) of the contract vas waived.
There is just cause for the discharge of Dennis Torres.
In accordance with Section 15(f) of the contract,
which provides that the fee and expenses of the
Arbitrator shall be paid by the losing party, the
Arbitrator's fee and expenses in the amount of
$2000. shall be borne by the Union. To expedite payment thereof (which the Arbitrator believes he has the
right to expect) said sum shall be paid to the Arbitrator by the Company, and the Union shall reimburse
the Company in that amount.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator"
DATED: April 16. 1973
STATE OF Raw York ),, .
COUNTY OF Hew York)
|.
1

On this 16th day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Erie J. Schmerts to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case Mo. 73A1

-f

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

i1 Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
•Technicians, I.A.T.S.E. AFL-CIO
li
and
I DUART LABORATORIES

\!

' AWARD

and OPINION

Case #73A-2

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement in failing to make
proper wage payments to Orlando Temple?
If so what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on July 17, 1973 at which time Mr.
•I Temple, hereinafter referred to as "the gr levant" and repres"
•*•.
j| entatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded
>)

r

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
•\! and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath and the
M

<' contract time limit for rendition of the Award were expressly
waived.

.1

The grievance is denied.

I find that the disputed 25 cents

and hour attached to certain work performed within the Expediter
classification, and that the grievant first received that
i
;

additional sum when and because he performed "CBS" expediting

- in that classification.

:

:t

Based on the record before me I find that the grievant
agreed to assume the Expediter classification in January, 1967
provided he continued to receive his higher Negative B rate of
pay plus a shift differential.

The 25 cents in addition thereto

was not part of his pay when he was a Negative B worker but was
. added to the rate he carried over from that classification when
he comnenced work as an Expediter, because it was expressly and

•

-7 -•^-•^-, i«-J*S-^--.- "-.^-S^f- - -'-^ -V" • ' '

--

I

,.

uniquely applicable to the work of the latter classification and '
"authorized by CBS."

Therefore I consider it immaterial, whether !
t
'
j: as a payroll error as contended by the Company, or otherwise,
i
H

that he retained the 25 cents an hour after he returned to the

I! Negative

B classification in September, 1967 and for an extended
I
ij period of time thereafter. The fact is that inasmuch as the
'I
•
'
!| additional 25 cents attached to and was paid for certain Expediter
i
1 work, he acquired no contract right to that additional pay when,
jj as now, he is no longer in the Expediter classification.

Though

rj the Company may not recoup any such payments during the period he
• worked as a Negative B worker following his word as an Expediter,
d
i it is not now required to continue such payments from May 18, 1970
when he resumed the Negative B classification following a period
ii
X
!l|of time as a Printer No. 3.
i

Whether he would again be entitled to the additional 25 cents

h

,if and when he is reclassified as an Expediter is not presently
''before me and therefore need not be decided until and unless that
isituation occurs.
•|

The Arbitrator's fee and expenses totalling $210 (represents

ing one half-day hearing, one-half day for preparation of this
HAward, and room rental at the American Arbitration Association)
shall be borne by the Union.

':
~
Eric J; Schmertz
DATED: August 3, 1973
Arbitrator
'STATE OF New York )ss.
.COUNTY OF New York Y^."
'
On this fir-fft day of August, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

— ' - - "

ii
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TPERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 1ATSE
Opinion
and
Award
Case *73A 11

and
Movielab, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:

Was there just cause for the discharge of
Louis Chiocgo? If not, what shall be the
remedy?——
Hearings were duly held.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross *x«qitTW witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath and the
time for rendition of the Award were waived.
I find Mr. Chiocco, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," to have been negligent in two respects.

First, consid-

ering his many years of service and experience as a Developer,
he should have been able to make an adequate hand splice even
while the machine was running.

Second, I am persuaded that

he should have known that a "flash test" was running through
the Developing machine at that time and should have stopped
the Machine to Bake the splice.

He should have known that the

safer procedure would have been to stop the machine to insure
making a satisfactory splice, in order not to endanger the
original negative which followed.

His failure on either or

both counts resulted In irreparable damage to the original
negative.
However, considering the grlevant's long period of em-

- 2 -

ployment and the fact that only recently has he experienced
difficulty with his work resulting in two warnings prior to
the instant incident, I conclude that the penalty of discharge
is too severe.

Rather I shall fashion what I consider to be

a proper remedy as set forth below.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties, makes the following Award:
Louis Chlocco shall be restored to work without
back pay, but with his seniority intact. He shall
not return to an original negative Developer's job.
Rather the Company shall place him on a different
Developing job of its choosing, even if a reduction in pay is necessary. Following six months
of satisfactory service in the job in which he is
placed, Mr. Chlocco shall be permitted to exercise
his seniority to return to an original negative
Developer's job.
The Arbitrator's fee for three days of hearing and
one day for study and preparation of the Award and
Opinion shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric 4- Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 19, 1973
STATE OF New York )88 .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 19th day of November, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Cineffects Color

Laboratory

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated
the collective bargaining agreement
in failing to make proper wage payments to Joseph Ltnton, and if so,
what shall the remedy be?
Hearings were held on February 18, March 6 and April 8,
1975 at which time Mr. Linton, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was expressly waived.

Based on the record before me I am not persuaded that rhs
grievant is performing duties beyond his job classification of
can

carrier to the extent that would warrant an increase in pay

or reclassification

to vault man or expediter.

There are no formal descriptions of the jobs covered by
the collective bargaining agreement.

The evidence advanced by

the grievant and the Union on his behalf is inadequate to conclud;
that his duties in connection with carrying cans containing
negative film; the delivery of such cans to the vault room and

I

• -
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placement on racks therein; or their delivery to printing or

. ^fe'vs: •--.. "

other departments are outside the can carrier classification
flKSftftrV^

.' '

or significantly different from what is done by can carriers
paid at the can carrier rate at other laboratories covered by
this collective bargaining agreement.

Moreover it is undisputed

that these duties about which the grievant complains have been
part of his job assignment, and have not changed, since he was
first employed by this Employer in September, 1971.
While there is some evidence that some of these duties

expediter does, I am not satisfied that the grievar.t performs

\y on oc

;

that type of work either in quantity or with frequency that
would be necessary for an upward reclassification or an increase '
in pay.

Therefore the claim for pay at the vault man or expediter'
rate, or reclassification to either of those jobs, is denied.
However in the course of the hearing it was disclosed
that the grievant may not be receiving an extra five cents an
hour to which he is entitled for handling raw stock..

!

The Employer

and the Union shall look further into this matter, and if as it

||
i
appears, the grievant should have been receiving four dollars an !
i

hour instead of three dollars and ninety five cents an hour, the '•
employer shall make him whole retroactively as is appropriate.

-3-

be
and th. Employer.

-•
.

Eric,
«. Permanent Arbitrator
I

DATED: April 10, 1975
STATE OF New York )es .
COUNTY OF New York ) "

;

I
)

On this tenth day of April, 1975, before me personally '
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me '
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing '
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same, j

Public. S!»U cf Na« Tort
No. 24-4504976
Quitted in
ComiS»> Expire
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E

OPINION

•

and

and

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer paid employees
on vacation commencing October 1,
1974 at the wrong rate under the contract? If so what shall be the remedy?
The Union withdrew with prejudice a grievance contending

j
j

that the Employer violated the contract by not paying holiday
I
pay, November 28th and November 29th, 1974 or birthday pay to
those employees on vacation at that time.

i
I

Employees commencing vacations on and after October 1, 1974'
were paid by the Employer at the rates of pay in effect and
applicable to their job classification between the period May 1
1

through April 30, 1974.

It is the Employer's position that the

"vacation year" for purposes of calculating the proper vacation

\>

i
'

pay is period May 1 through April 30th of the year in which the j
i
vacation is taken, and that this has been his practice since
i
June 27th, 1974 when the Union insisted on that interpretation of

i
the contract in settling a grievance involving one George Flammer.
The Union's contention is simply that vacation pay is to
be paid at the rate which the employee is earning at the time

-2-

the vacation is taken.

The instant dispute arises because on

and after October 1, 1974 the rates of pay of the affected
employees were higher than the pay rates they received during
the .preceding period May 1 through April 30th,

This case is

novel in that the positions of the parties herein are complete- |
ly opposite the respective positions they took in the settlement
of the Flammer vacation pay grievance in June of 1974.

At that!

time the Union told the Employer that Flammer was entitled to
vacation pay at the May 1 through April 30th rate, which was a
higher rate because it included a shift differential than his
pay rate when he went on vacation.

(He had changed shifts in

i
the interim and the shift differential was not longer applicable^

Prior to that grievance the Employer had followed the practice
of paying vacations at the rate an employee received when he
took his vacation.

But, on the Union's insistence, the Employer

agreed to pay Flammer at his higher May 1 to April 30th rate.
The Employer confirmed the Flammer settlement in a letter dated
June 27, 1974 and took the opportunity therein to further inform the Union that henceforth it would pay vacation pay,"based;
on (the) classification rate of pay....that is in effect during
the May to May period plus shift premium....to conform with
your request."

In short whereas the Union now seeks vacation

j

j
i
I
pay at an employee's rate when the vacation is taken, it sought
a different application for Flammer in 1974; and whereas the
Employer prior to June, 1974 followed the practice sought by

- rf.'-.
'
«
&
.

:'..J?v

-3the Union in this arbitration, now argues that the Flammer
settlement is binding and constitites a jointly agreed to interpretation of the vacation pay section of the contract.
In further arguing its case the Employer suggests that
by virtue of the Union's position in the Flammer matter, as a
consequence of the Flammer settlement and the Employer's
letter of June 27, 1974 advising as to how the vacation pay
provision would thereafter be applied, the Union has "hoisted
itself on its own petard" and is now estopped from seeking a
new and different contract interpretation.
As the parties well know the Arbitrator is bound to the
language of the contract, where that language is clear . xAn prio:

bi-laterally negotiated grievance settlement oreven a prior
practice contrary to the clear contract language, is immaterial
to how the contract is to be interpreted now.^f find that to
be the situation here. The Flammer case was a grievance
settlement at variance from otherwise clear contract terms.
The Employer suggests that it was more than simply a grievance !
I
settlement, but a bi-laterally agreed to interpretation of the
vacation provision of the contract prospectively, or in other
words a negotiated contract change.

I do not agree. As I see ;
ii
it the Union sought vacation pay for Flammer at the May to
i
i
April 30th rate because it was a higher rate of pay than he was!
earning when he went on vacation.

The Arbitrator did not

participate in that grievance settlement. The Employer was not

-4required to accept or accede to the Union's interpretation of
the contract at that time.

It could have

continued its pract-

ice of paying for vacations at the rate the employee earned
when he took his vacation, and had the Employer done so this
Arbitrator would have upheld its position had the matter been
grieved and submitted to arbitration.

If the Union "hoisted

itself on its own petard", so did the Employer, by agreeing
to a method for the payment of vacation pay that differed from
the clear contract language when it was not required to do so.
Therefore I view the Flammer grievance as nothing more than the
settlement of a single dispute, by mutual agreement and on terms
j
different from the wording and intent of the contract. Nor,
contrary to the Employer's position can its June 27, 1974 letter
be construed prospectively as a bi-laterally negotiated or
agreed to contract interpretation or modification.

i
Though the :

Employer notified the Union that henceforth it would apply the '
vacation pay provisions of the contract as the Union had re-

;

quested in the Flammer matter, that statement by the Employer |
was not affirmatively accepted by the Union.

The Employer

!
!

argues that because the Union did not respond to that letter or
dispute or reject the Employer's notification of how he intend-'
ed to apply the

vacation pay provisions of the contract in the

future, it constituted agreement to that new approach.

If the

contract language was unclear or ambiguous I would agree with
the Employer's argument in that regard.

But otherwise the

Employer's expansion of the Flammer grievance settlement to

,•
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i
i

include a different vacation pay formula prospectively for all
employees was only unilateral and self-serving, and could not

•

go beyond the Flammer case to either a binding interpretation
|
;

of the contract or a modification thereof unless there was
positive and affirmative agreement by the Union.
the Union's silence cannot be so

In this case'

construed.

Obviously the foregoing hinges on the foundational
premise that the contract language is clear and unambiguous.
I am satisfied that it is.

!
"

Section 6(b) provides in pertinent

part that:
"Vacation pay shall be at an employee's
regular rate of pay including shift
premium."
Nowhere in Section 6 is there a provision calculating

[

vacation pay at an employee's rate between May 1 and April 30th
i
of the vacation year. Had the parties intended to measure
vacation pay by the rate paid during that period they could
have easily so provided somewhere in Section 6.

|
i
But they did j

not.
Nor can I read the Employer's interpretation within the
provisions of 6(d) of the contract.

That Section deals with

i
specific circumstances; for example, the rate of vacation pay i
ii
when an employee has worked in different classifications dur- j
r

ing the year and has accumulated 130 or more days in the higher
classification.

In that specific and limited instance Section

6(d) grants him vacation pay at the higher classified rate.
And in similar limited fashion 6(d) provides an apportionment

' J- .
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»

in vacation pay between the higher rate and a lower classified
i
I
rate when an employee works more than 65 but less than 130
i
days in the higher rated classification.

But 6(d) does not

provid'e for the payment of vacation pay generally, at the
I

rate an employee earned between May 1 and April 30th, and to •
read that into the otherwise specific and narrow provisions

]

of Section (d) is to do by gross indirection what the parties ,
could and should have done clearly and directly had they intended the first sentence of Section (b) ("vacation pay shall
be at an employee's regular rate of pay ....") to mean not his
I
rate when he took his vacation but a different and earlier
i
rate during the period May 1 to April 30th.

Indeed among the •

possible interpretations of 6(d) is that it represents an ex- '
plicit and limited exception to the otherwise applicable rule
i
that an employee receives vacation pay at the rate he is earning at the time he takes his vacation.

For example, if when

he takes his vacation an employee is classified in a lower

:

rated job, but during the vacation year ending April 30th he
worked 130 or more days in a higher classification, then, as

-

an exception, he would receive vacation pay at the higher

I

classified rate.

;
i

In that particular event, if an employee

would not otherwise get vacation pay at this rate at the time
he went on vacation, this exception would be unnecessary.

I

cite this example not to suggest that 6(d) supports the Union's
case herein, but rather that it can cut both ways and therefore,
neither by language nor intent does it provide an answer to
the instant dispute. It covers a different problem and does

|

-7not change the first sentence of 6(b).
Consequently, therefore, the first^sentence of 6(b)
remains clear, and subject only to one logical interpretation.
It means what is says, namely that an employee's vacation pay!
shall be his regular rate of pay including shift premium.
An employee's regular rate of pay, for vacation purposes,
must be the rate he is earning when he takes his vacation.
Absent any other definition, explanation or relevant modification, no other interpretation is realistic. And I have
found no other modifications, definitions or explanations in
the contract or by virtue of the settlement of the Flammer
matter.
Accordingly the Union's grievance is granted.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer paid employees on vacation
commencing October 1, 1974 at the wrong
rate under the contract. The Employer
should have paid the employees vacation
pay at the regular rates of pay including
shift premium which they were earning at
the time they commenced their vacations.
The Employer shall make appropriate pay
adjustments.
The arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally.

Eric./. Schmerts
Permanent Arbitrator

- • .r"
'*'•',
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DATED: December iff, 1975
STATE OF New York. )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)

~
On this twenty fri*eth day of December, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

Hour, PuWic. Sttti ol Hwi t«*
Ho. 2445M97*
ta Kmp Count»

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD

Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and
Radiant Laboratory, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Shale Dworan? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on March 31, April 5, April 8 and April
14, 1976, at which time Mr. Dworan, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the contractual time limit \r rendi

The grievant is charged with negligently causing scratches
on a negative film.

The Company asserts that this offense,

coupled with the grievant's prior disciplinary record which includes other errors and infractions, warrants his dismissal.
Obviously, for the discharge to be upheld, the last offense must
be proved.
This is a discharge case with the burden on the Company to
show, to the Arbitrator's satisfaction, that the grievant was at
fault, causing the damage to the negative film.

The standard of

proof required in such matters is well settled though variously
defined as "clear and convincing", or "by a preponderance of the

I
I
I
I

-2credible evidence", or by "substantial evidence."

In my view

.— _

all of these standards have the same requisites, namely that the
•

quantum and quality of the proof advanced and adduced by the

..- •
5,°"

I1

i

Company must be sufficiently probative and persuasive as to
satisfy the Arbitrator that the grievant committed the act
charged.

At least, in connection with offenses, as here, which

do not parallel a criminal charge (in which event this Arbitrator
tends to hold an employer to a higher standard but less than
'
-

-•»• ._

"beyond a reasonable doubt") there should be a showing of "compel
ling probability" that the employee involved was at fault or
committed the offense charged.

i

Therefore only to the extent that the standards of proof
in bailment or tort cases coincide with the foregoing, are those
standards applicable to a discharge case.

For it is noted that

in bailment and tort actions a defendant is liable only for
money damages if he has been negligent; whereas in the instant
case the grievant faces discharge, a more serious penalty.

•',£- •
^:--*:-.

The Company's case falls short of the requisite standards,
irrespective of which definition is applied.

The Company has not

proved, fully or even as a compelling probability that the
grievant was negligent.

It cannot show how the scratches occurred

It cannot point specifically to but rather speculates on what
the grievant did wrong that caused the damage.

The Company's

case has not foreclosed the reasonable possibility that the
scratches were due to machine malfunction or other operational
factors beyond the grievant's knowledge or fault.

This is not a

-3res Ipsa loqultor situation.

There are plausible explanations

for the damage other than negligence on the part of the grievantJ
The mere fact that the film was in the grievant's possession doea
not make him automatically liable for the damage.
absolute guarantor of the condition of the film.

He is not an
Rather, if

damage occurs, some actual or compellingly probable proximate
and causal relationship must be established between what the
grievant did and the damage.

That causal connection has not beer

shown.
The evidence on the grievant's alleged "admission against
interest", namely the Company's assertion that he admitted to his
foreman that he scratched the negative while taking it down, is
offsetting and inconclusive.

The foreman testified to that

"admission", but the grievant vigorously denied it.

While I

find no reason in the record why the foreman would falsify what
the grievant said, he may have been mistaken and there were no
other witnesses to the conversation.

One could conclude that

the grievant inspected the negative after taking it down, not
because that was his normal precautionary procedure, but rather
as an exception to his normal routine because he had done something wrong, thought he may have done some damage to the film,
and made the inspection to find out.

But on the other hand,

considering the grievant's prior record of errors and other
infractions and that he knew that future mistakes or negligence
would jeopardize his job, one could find it most doubtful for
him to have voluntarily and on his own initiative notified the

-4foreman that the negative was scratched, if he was responsible

--

for that damage.

And under that circumstance, it would be

equally doubtful that he would have acknowledged that he
caused the damage.
In sum, I conclude that the evidence on what the grievant
said to the foreman and its significance, is not sufficiently
unequivocal to sustain the discharge.

Or in other words, in

the absence of adequate evidence showing where and how the
grievant was negligent, his disputed statements to the foreman
are simply not enough to justify the imposition of the ultimate
penalty of discharge from the Company, and his probable loss of
employment in this industry.
However the record does disclose a serious failure on the
grievant's part which though not proved as the cause of damage,
is a serious enough violation of operating procedures to foreclose a full remedy.

The grievant ran his machine at a pro-

hibited high speed when taking the negative down and when
"piggy-backing" the second negative onto the first.

Though as

indicated a causal or contributory connection has not been made
between the speed of the machine and the damage, a disciplinary
suspension for that offense is manifestly warranted.
Based on the entire record before me, the Undersigned,
Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

-5-
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The discharge of Shale Dworan is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated but without back pay, and
the period of time between his discharge
and his restoration to duty shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension. He should note
that he has been given some benefit of the
evidentiary doubt in this case, and therefore
he is warned that future acts of negligence
on his part, other violations or misconduct,
would be grounds for his dismissal.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne equally
by the parties.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: May 10, 1976
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

.

On this tenth day of May, 1976 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

. ST^TL OF az*
He. 30l*;9725
jjiiliiii in KKJEI
Ittm Li:,11 KM* *».

October 12, 1976

In the matter of the arbitration
between
INTERIM OPINION
Local 702, IATSE and
of the
Cineffects Color Laboratories
permanent Arbitrator

In bhe instant case the Union contends that the reference to
"40 hours" in Article 29 (a) and 30 (a) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement includes overtime, hours worked as well
as straight time hours worked up to 40 hours worked in a week,
for payment of Welfare and pension contributions to
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702 )Pension Fund
and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund.
The Company does not dispute that contention. Therefore, in
this proceeding, there is no issue before the Arbitrator over
the interpretation of the foregoing contract provisions.
.,
pursuant to the foregoing, the Company has offered to make
payments to said Funds retroactive to May 1, 1975.<s*W JcU^^^fJ^^
The Undersigned, as permanent Arbitrator, refers the foregoing
Company offer to the Trustees of both Funds, and retains
jurisdiction pending wcrrd of action by the Trustees.

Per

Schmertz
tent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FIIM LABORATORIES

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local' 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD

and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

6?

In my Award dated December 18, 1969 between the above
named parties I upheld the Union's grievance and directed that
"the complement of the Gevachrome machine shall be three (3) men.
The question now posed is how the machine should be operated if it runs continuously through regular meal and break periods
•
The Union contends that the Company must obtain another operator
to relieve any of the regular operators during meals or break
periods to ensure a three-man complement at all times.

The

Company contends that for meals and break periods the assigned
crew members should individually relieve each other, and that
the machine may be run during those periods with only two operators present.
My Award of December 18, 1969 does not deal explicitly with
the instant question, and the contract is silent on this particular problem.
The Union relies principally on "past practice", asserting
that the practice has been for each member of the crew to be
relieved for meals and break periods by an operator obtained from
outside the crew, and that when the machine operated through thos

-2•

periods'there were three operators present at all times.

The

Company disputes this "past practice", contending that until
recently the machine was shut down during meal and break periods
i
and that the dispute arose only recently when the Company decided
to operate the machine continuously through meal and break period c
as well as during regular operating hours.
The testimony on "past practice" is sharply conflicting,
offsetting and hence indeterminative of the issue presented.
The Union offered testimony that for some time the machine has
been operated through meal and break periods and that a fourth
operator was obtained from elsewhere to replace whichever member
of the regular crew was at a meal or taking a break. On the othe
hand the Company offered equally probative testimony that the
machine has been shut-down during meal and break periods; or that
there was not enough work to run the machine through the meal
period; or that occasionally if the machine ran through the meal
and break periods the regular three man crew remained on and the
Company paid overtime for work performed through those periods.
Accordingly, based on the testimony in the record, I am unable
to decide whether there was a consistent practice relevant to
the issue before me, and therefore I am unable to direct,
pursuant to Section 17(b), that the "present method of operation
.... . continue without change."
However I am persuaded that the issue may be resolved by
a logical, and proper, albeit inferential interpretation of my
Opinion accompanying the aforementioned Award of December 18, 19f

I

-3together with a practice that is undisputed.

In that case -the

Union sought manning comparability between the Gevachrome machine
-•

and developing machines #1, 2 and 3. In establishing manning
comparability between the Gevachrome machine and developing
machines fl, 2 and 3, I stated:
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached
applicator. It is undisputed by the Company
that other color developing machines with
applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines #1, f2 and #3, are run with a
crew of three when one strand is developed and
with a crew of five for two strands. The testimony of Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the
Union and Company respectively, coincide on
one crucial point, and that is that by agreement between the parties, color developing
machines with applicators are and have been
run with a crew of no less than three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether
this latter referred to agreement applies to
"the Gevachrome machine, on which the applicator
is utilized only infrequently. I conclude that
it does. (Emphasis added).
In other words, in that Opinion, I determined that the
manning of the Gevachrome machine should be the same as the
manning on developing machines #1, #2 and #3.

In the instant

case, there is one past practice which is undisputed, and that
is that developing machines #1, #2 and #3 operate through meal
and break periods and the operators of developing machines #1,
#2 and #3 relieve each other during those times, thereby reducing the complement on those machines by one member during those
periods. The import and intent of my prior Award was to treat
the Gevachrome machine and developing machines #1, 2 and 3

-4similarly for purposes of manning. To grant Che Union's

5

grievance in the instant case would be to change that similarity
i
by according the operators of the Gevachrome, and the Union on
their behalf, a greater right or benefit than has been extended
to the operators of developing machines #1,#2 and #3 by practice
and under my prior Award. As indicated, I find no contractual
s

or "past practice" basis to support a distinction between the
way the Gevachrome machine is operated continuously during meal
and break periods and the way machines $1, #2 and #3 are operated during similar periods. Therefore the similarity or "parity"
of manning which was established by my Award of December 18, 196
shall continue to obtain, and the manning of the Gevachrome
machine during meal and break periods shall be handled in the
same manner as has been done on developing machines #1, #2 and
#3.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, Permanent
Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:
.

The Union's grievance is denied. When a
member of the three-man complement of the
Gevachrome machine takes a meal or break
period, he shall be relieved during those
periods by the remaining members of the
crew. The Company is not obligated to obtain
a replacement from another location.

-5The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by
the Union.

£"

J. Schmertz J
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 29, 1976
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )

X

On this twenty-ninth day of November, 1976 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

•S&SSR.
Qnillriit |n /»,«,„ cnn.t
T«» E«pi,« Utrt, 30 J97/
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GERALD SCHILIAN
COUNSELOR AT LAW

June -8, 1976

Mr. Eric Schmertz
••
.. , •
.
-....-•
122 East 42nd Street ,
•''."'-' ., : • -•' ; ; - :'. •' .-' . '
New York, New York '• ;:'...' ''•"'•. •' . '..-'. .;-<^ ; "- : .
..' Re:
^ • . .': '.'.- '

Matter of Arbitration between Local 702 '
and DuArt Film Laboratory ..' •. '•'. .. . ..

Dear Mr. Schmertz:

-..-•••:

* . ..;•••'•

The undersigned, as attorney for Motion Picture
Laboratory Technicians. Local 702 hereby demands, arbitration against DuArt Film Laboratories regarding the
following issue:
"Whether the employer is forcing employees
to run the gevert developer at times and under
circumstances which are improper and if so,
what shall the remedy be?"
•
' Would you be so kind as to schedule this matter
for hearing at your earliest convenience. .• . -.'..
Very truly yours,

C
cc:

.
Mr. C. W. Vitello
DuArt Film Laboratories

Gerald Schilian
- -"
. ,
•
. •. '

:

'

)
I

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FIIW LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between

Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702, IATSE

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Radiant-Technicolor Laboratory
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated Article
16(e) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties in failing to pay
the proper wages to working foremen and
sub-foremen, and if so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on
September 2ti, 1970 ut which time representatives of the above
named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the contract time

limit for rendition of the Award were waived.

The Employer and

Union filed post-hearing memoranda.
The pertinent part of Article 16(e) reads:
Working foremen and sub-foremen shall receive
no less than 10 percent above the highest base
rate in their respective departments
This case really involves deciding the meaning of "base
rate" In tlu.1 foregoing ArtJi-le.
addressed to that.

The Opinion nncl Award shall be

The Employer contend;; thai the base rate is

the schedule of rates for each of the groups and job classificar
i
tions set forth in Schedule A of the contract. The Union asserts

-2that the "base rate" is the actual compensation received.
For all purposes I do not: find the position of either
party to be correct, x^he term "base rate" is common in industrial
relations and has a traditional meaning.

It means the hourly

rate which an employee receives or which attaches to his job
classification, exclusive of such additional compensable items
as premium pay, fringe benefits, shift differentials, and
incentive earnings.^^I find nothing in this contract which endows the terminology "base rate" with any different or special interpretation.
I consider it irrelevant that employees receive overtime, holiday
yiny, v;ii-ai I tut p;iy, nick pay, severance unit liuroavcatent p-'iy
calculated on their actual compensation rather than on the rates
of pay set forth in Schedule A.

For it should be noted, not only

that these are additional items of compensation for each eligible
employee and not a formula for differential between an employee
and his foreman or sub-foreman, but that the contract provides
for the payment of holiday and vacation pay at an employee's
regular rate, and expressly provides for the inclusion of shift
premium.^/^he parties must have meant that there be a difference
between regular pay and base rate, because they used two different
terms, .^f am satisfied that the term regular pay means the actual
compensation an employee is receiving when he goes on vacation or
when a holiday falls, and the contract intends that during those
two periods of time he will be compensated as if he had been

-3working. The s.ame rationale and its irrelevance to Article 16(e)
•

applies to severance pay, bereavement und sick pay.
The Union asserts that the contract provides no definition
of "base rate." However the foregoing differentiation between
the contract use of "regular pay" and "base rate" together with
Article 4(c) impels a conclusion closer to the Employer's
interpretation than that of the Union.

In pertinent part Article

4(c) provides:
employees, if any, receiving wages
over the prior base rate of their respective classifications shall continue to
receive the same amount over the base rate
set forth in Schedule A, so long as they
remain in said classifications. (Emphasis added.)
In the absence of any ocher contract definition the foregoing juxtaposition of "base rate" and Schedule A, provides,
inferentially at least, a logical argument that Schedule A and
"base rate" are synonymous.

I recognize that Article 4(c) could

represent the use of Schedule A as the base rate under the specific
circumstances mentioned therein, and not for all purposes including the application of Article 16(e). Article A(c) does
provide for wages less than the scales of Schedule A for new
and inexperienced employees; the rates of Schedule A for new
and experienced employees; and for rates in excess of Schedule A
for thoM' who ti.-ul lu>on roci11 vlnt' •' hi)'.'1''1' v;ite.

Con fined to

those circumstances I would be inclined Lo agree with the Union
that Article 4(c) may not necessarily be interpretative of the
i
term "base rate" as found in Article 16(e). But frankly, I find

-4nothing else in the contract which supports the Union's unusual
view that base rate is synonymous with actual compensation, when
actual compensation includes premium pay, shift differentials,
merit increases and incentive earnings, and consequently I am
not persuaded that Article 4(c) should be so confined.
Therefore, based on the traditional interpretation of "base
rate"; the coincidence of "base rate" with Schedule A as set
forth in Article A(c); and in the absence of any other explicit
definition of the term, 1 must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the rates found in Schedule
A of the contract.

"However it should be noted that Section

16(e)

refers to the "highest base rate in their respective departments",
not lIn; "hlf.liusi bii.sc rntc of n class I flt-.-U \ in their respect-

ive departments." /fo my mind this means llu»L the "highest base
*
\" referred to in Article 16(e) is^th
to and received by the highest paid employee supervised by a
foreman or sub-foreman in a particular department(s), not merely
the Schedule A rate attached to the classification of that
employee. /And therein lies the exceptions to the use of Schedule
A as the base rate for the application of Article 16(e).

For

example, an employee may have been hired at an hourly rate in
excess of the rate for that classification as set forth in
Schedule A.

In that event, thnt mnnlnvr^ wc-nld receive a base

rate different from ;md lusher than the •Kf-Ucdulx.'-A base rate.
And if his higher hourly rate was greater than others within the
i
department, that rate of pay would constitute the "highest base

-5rate in the respective department" within the meaning of Article
16(f), mill the supervising foreman and/or sub-foreman would be
entitled to be paid at least 10 percent higher.

In other words

as between the Schedule A rate for a job classification and a
higher hourly rate paid an employee working within that classification, the base rate for purposes of Article 16(e) would be
the latter.
Similarly if an incumbent employee is transferred from one
job classification to another, and upon assuming the latter is
paid an hourly rate in excess of the Schedule A rate for that
job classification, his higher hourly rate would be his "base
rate." And if that was the "highest base rate" in the department
Lt would be the basis upon which the ArLiclc 16(c) diffcrenLiai
for foremen and sub-foremen would be calculated.
xXrhere

may be other instances in which an employee's hourly

rate, exclusive of premium pay, fringe benefits, incentive earnings! and other special compensationjmight exceed the hourly rate
set forth in Schedule A.

The formula, as referred to in the above

examples, should be followed in those instances as well.
S
One specific question remains, and that is whether merit
increases serve to increase the hourly rate or base rate within
the meaning of the foregoing discussion. The record is not clear
us to wliciluT HUT It liicfi'iiiios arc red circled iuul se|Kiiral:cd from
an employee's hourly rate or base rate, or whether they arc
merged into his hourly rate causing an increase in that rate and,
by consequence, the establishment of a new and higher hourly rate.
«k

If the former is true a base rate would not include merit increase
If the latter is true, merit increases would have to be included

'
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Ln the calculation of "the highest base rate."

That phase of

llic issue I leave to the parties for application and iniplementuciot
with their respective rights reserved to refer to me for specific
resolution disputes or questions arising therefrom.
One final point.

Though no evidence of the negotiation

history of Article 16(e) was introduced, I think it probable,
and agree with the Union, that the intent of Article 16 (e) was
to provide compensation for foreman and sub-foreman in excess of
the pay received by those they supervise.

1 would expect with

my ruling that the phrase "highest base rate" means the highest
actual hourly rate received by an employee whom a foreman or sub, many oC the possible Instances In which

subordinate employees would receive more money than their foreman
or sub-foreman, would be corrected. On the other hand if subordinate employees are earning more because of overtime payments,
shift differentials and incentive earnings, and if this frustrates
an intent of Article 16(e), it can only be cured by negotiations
and not arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
he phrase "highest base rate" In Article 16(e)
l the ronl rm-l mivnis llu1 hi Kite.•••(. actual hourly
rate paid to an employee in the department or
departments supervised by a working foreman and/
or sub-foreman. In most instances that "base rate"
will correspond with the rates of pay set forth in
Schedule A of the contract. However where an
i

-7employee is \hired at an hourly rate higher
than the Schedule A rate; transferred from
one classification to another and upon assuming the latter receives an hourly rate Mgher
than the Schedule A rate; or under other .similar
circumstances with the same result, the "base
f"Strep'shall Bethe higher rate. Because,"base
rate" is JLipited-Jbo the "hourly rate" "It does
not include incentive earnin^sV^remTum pay,
shift differentials or fringe benefits .^Whether
merit increases are to be included in or excluded
from the calculation of base pay is remanded to
the parties for interpretation and implementation
consistent with the foregoing OPINION.
The parties are directed to apply the foregoing
AWARD to the circumstances presented in the instant grievance, and to make adjustments, if any,
in the pay of foreman and/or sub-foremen under
Article 16(e) of the contract retroactive to the
date of the grievance.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared by the parties
equally.

Eric J. Schmertz
/Arbitrator
DATED: May 24, 1977
STATE OF: New York )ss
COUNTY OF:flawYork )
On this twenty fourth day of May, 1977, before me personall
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

VALERIE R. HANSEN
Notary Public. Sis', of N.w York
No. 3M5I9MI
Qualified in Nauau
Term iipim March 30,

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, J.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has breached the
contract by excluding a new employee
hired to perform plant clerical functions
in the Maintenance Department from the
bargaining unit. And if so, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held on August 1, 1977 at which time

I!

representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded ful
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
For about ten years the clerical duties which are the
subject of this case were performed by a bargaining unit
employee classified as as Maintenance Mechanic B.

Those duti

constituted his principal straight time hours assignment.
I consider this extended and undisputed history of
how and by whom the work was performed, to be constructive
if not explicit acknowledgement

and acceptance by both sides

that those duties were within the contractual

jurisdiction

of the bargaining unit, and hence covered by Article 1 of the
contract.

Particularly so, as here, in the absence of any

-2specific job description.which does not include those duties
within that classification.
That other types of clerical duties elsewhere in the
laboratory have and are being performed by non-bargaining ur
employees is immaterial.

None of those situations had any

history-let alone such an extensive history-of

being perfoi

by a bargaining unit employee as a principal part of his
bargaining unit classification.
That the incumbent bargaining unit employee who
performed that work has now retired does not mean that the
work is lost to the unit, nor does it mean that the Company
may now unilaterally remove it from the unit and assign it t
a non-bargaining unit new hire.
bargaining unit assignment

Having ripened into a

for reasons previously stated,

it must remain so placed unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer has breached the contract
by excluding a new employee hired to
perform plant clerical functions in the
Maintenance Department from the bargainIng unit. The Company is_directed either
to include,.that employee within the bargaining unit at a rate of pay to be negotiated
by the parties, or to return the clerical
duties to the Maintenance Mechanic B
classification, or establish a new bargain-

-3-

ing unit job covering those duties
and negotiate with the Union the
wage rate for that job, which, in
my judgement, should be less than
vhat is paid a Maintenance Mechanic
B.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne
by the Employer.

Schmertz
Arb/trator

J

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

i!
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FIIW LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

-

OPINION AND AWARD

an8
r

Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Is the Employer in violation of the
Agreement by operating the Photomec
16nra color reversal process with a
crew of less than three? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A "quickie" arbitration hearing was held on August 15,
t which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
On July 14, 1966, when the NOTE at the end of the
reference to Negative Developing Department in Schedule A of
the contract read as it presently reads, the then Industry
Arbitrator Joseph E. McMahon held (Case 702-66 Al) that develop
ment of color reversal film stock, then done on the Fako machin
was not "color negative developing" within the meaning of the
NOTE.

!i

In pertinent part he stated:
"The type of work performed by the Pako
machine is the crux of this dispute.
The machine processes color reversal film
stock.
"
the Pako machine does not fall
squarely within either the Positive or
Negative Developing Department."

^*s&es*aaa*!eia*aeiti£asai^^

-2"The note in Schedule A relating to
color negative developing, fixes the
crew-complement. That provision is
not binding here, in view of my prevr
ious determination that the Pako machine
does not come within the Negative Developing Department." (Underscoring supplied.)

:

He ruled therefore that a crew of three operators on
the Fako machine was not required by the contract, and that
the Employer could operate that machine and run the color
reversal development process with a crew of two.
Whether Mr. McMahon was correct is immaterial. His
Award is binding unless the parties by mutual agreement reject
or change it, or unless by contract negotiations or other agreement its effect is amended, changed or nullified.
None of this was done.

Following the McMahon Award,

no change, expansion or modification in the NOTE was made,
nor was there any other contract provision or agreement entered
into covering color reversal development.
So, the McMahon decision remains as the "definitive
word" on color reversal development performed onthe Pako
machine.
The issue before me involves color reversal development
on the Photomec machine.

Though the Photomec is different

from the Pako, the process or "type of work" (which Mr. McMahon
said was the "crux" of the earlier case) is still color reverse
development.

" w-,*.
'..-*.
. :-.
*•c- ,..-•- ---

I

,
;
.
.
«
»
— 'V*--V

t.-. '*•-. • - . -'
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I fail to see how, in the face of the McMahon

ruling on the nature of the process of color

reversal develop-

-3ing, and in the absence of any subsequent contract provision
or any other agreement to deal with that process, I can now

-•V

hold that color reversal development on the Photoraec machine
is color negative developing within the meaning of the NOTE.
As I see it, the question still remains a matter for bargain
ing between the parties and not for arbitration.
Nor can I presently consider the question of the mam
of the Photomec machine on operational grounds.

As yet that

machine has not run enough to determine its complexities,
difficulties, and its demands on its operators.

It ran for •

short period in 1970, which obviously cannot be used as a
contemporary experience, and then again for only a few days
this month. The number and frequency of breaks, if any, the
physical, mental and other operating demands on the operator
assigned cannot yet be determined, and must await the passag
of a reasonable running time.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named part
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties makes the following AWARD:
The NOTE referred to in the contract
at the end of the reference to the
Negative Developing Department in
Schedule A does not apply to color
reversal developing performed by the
Photomec machine. That process is
not "Color Negative Developing" within
the meaning of the NOTE. Therefore the
Employer is not in violation of the Agreement
by operating the Photomec 16mm color reversal
process with a crew of less than three. It
may operate the machine with a crew of two.

-4-

The Arbitrator's fee shall be borned
by the Union.

ric^ZT. S
Eric^T.
Schmertz
Arbitrator
rbtftrato

DATED: August 17, 1977
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On the seventeenth day of August, 1977, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowled to me
that he executed the same.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE
OPINION AND AWARD
and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

At the first hearing on October 13, 1976 the parties
stipulated the issue as:
Whether the Employer violated Section 16(e)
of the collective bargaining agreement by
failing to .pay proper wages to John Gazaway,
and if so what shall be the remedy?
Thereafter, on May 24, 1977 I rendered an Opinion and
Award in the case between Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE and Radiant - Technicolor Laboratory.

That

Opinion and Award dealt with the calculation of pay for working
foremen and subforemen under Section 16(e) of the industry-wide
contract.
At the request of the Employer, the instant case was reopened and a second hearing held on August 1, 1977 at which, based
on the evidence and argument of the parties the issue was narrowed1
1

to whither the rates of pay for employees operating the New Eastmai

I

!

, Color Negative II Processor (F.CN II) under the separate agreement j
j
[
' between Local 702 and TXiArl d.itcd September 17, 1975 are "base
j
j rates" w i t h i n the meaning of n;y Opinion and Award in Radiant Technicolor.

(Presumably the parties felt that with a determina-

tion on that they would be able to claculate the pay of working

|

-2-

forcmati John Gazaway under Section 16(e)

of the contract and under

the formula established by my Award in Radiant - Technicolor.
However, that remains unclear because as the Employer (DuArt)
points out in its brief, the parties have yet to fully

litigate,

and T have not decided whether "merit increases" are part of "base
rates" within the meaning of Section 16(e), and also unlitigated
is the question, apparently involved in the instant case, of wheth
the pav of a working foreman may be compared with an employee with
in his Department but who works a different shift.)
In Radiant - Technicolor I stated inter alia:
"The parties must have meant that there be
a difference between regular pay and base
rate, because they used two different terms;"
and
"....I must conclude that "base rates" are
more often, and probably most often, the
rates found in Schedule A of the contract."
Though I pave some examples of circumstances under which
a "bape rate" would be higher than the rates set forth in Schedule
A, I stated that a base rate "does not include incentive earnings,
premium pay, shift differentials or fringe benefits."
In the instant case I do not find that the rates of pay
for the Color Wet Developer Type 3 and the Dry End Man Color Type
3 on the ECN II machine, as set forth in the agreement between the
parties of September 17, 1975, f i t w i t h i n the categories of ex-

,

ceptions to which I referred in Radiant - Technicolor.

!

Rather I

conclude th.ir the instant, ciispxitccl rates constitute Schedule A
"ba=e ralrs" plus a bonus of S.A5 and $.30 an hour respectively

;

-3when the machine is operated by a crew complement of two.
The separate agreement of September 17, 1975 uses the
phrase "special rate." As in Radinnt - Technicolor. I must conclude that the parties meant those rates to be different from the
"base rates" because they used a different identifying phrase.
Had they intended the rate for the two operators, made up of the.
Schedule A rate for a negative developing machine plus $.45 and
$.30 per hour respectively, to constitute the "base rate",
could and should have said so.

But they did not.

they

Instead they

referred to it as a "special rate", which in my judgement, meant a
base rate to which something else is added, in this case a bonus
or nn incentive of $.43 and $.30 per hour respectively, as a quid
pro quo for a willingness to run the machine with only two operators .
The ncmorandurr itself is also supportive of a conclusion
th.it Hie rates of pay are in txeess of a contractual "base r.ue."
It expres-ly provides for the circumstance under which the "special
rate" is ra -ire 1 lerj.

Sr leng ,i.c the machine is operated with a

rompltTicn: <'f two men I he special rate

is applicable, but when,

the mrvhhie is rur 01; n fv I i ni'ou;; has i s , the crevs' complement ' "
' h(. :; i r'.c':"i a^i'il I %> I ' i i l n ;• !'-:'ci <>;• J i v e in aci'Or'l.'inc't with

the

• ,nr J M i - '>)\ isi c'n> nl" ! In- '..••<;,->i i-'C ')c'vo lop) n.u Department as set '
. r'. li in ; h.- i c n ' i u ;, ,i!i'i i hi "spt-c- i a I rate" is cancelled.

'!'"

r-\ r-i)-!(i • i nt ~i an:- i!\'i u!:Jcr circumstances where the crew complc-<
mcnt coincides with the contractual manning requireirent for negative

•

•'•

--'•'. •

• •• -••- -• .•

.. ' . .

developing, the operators receive the Schedule A base rate.

When

the crew is reduced to two, those operators are paid more than
the base rate i.e. a bonus or an incentive for the extra work or
attention required by the reduction in complement.

Because thev

are demonstrably different, I am unable to conclude that the
higher "special rate" for two operators, and the lesser Schedule
A rate for a complement of three or five operators are both
synonymous with "base rate."
Because it is not certain that with this determination
Gazaway's pay can be calculated under Section 16(e), it is my
ruling that the Arbiteator's fee for this proceeding thus far be
shared equally by the parties.
AWARD
The "special rates" set forth in the
separate agreement between Local 702
and DuArt dated September 17, 1975 are
not "base rates" within the meaning of
Section 16(e) of the contract or my
Award in the Radiant-Technicolor case
dated May 24, 1977.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared
equally by the parties.

s

Errc J. SchmertK
Arbitrator

DATED: December 1, 1977
STATi: OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF Now York )

On this first day of December, 1977, before me persoml'v:
ramp and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to'
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and lie acknowledged to me that he executed the sane.

T.™

S (J

DU ART FILM LABORATORIES INC.
DU ART COLOR CORPORATION
245 WEST 55 ST. NEW YORK. N.Y. 10019
PHONE: (AREA CODE 212) PL 7-4580

September 17. 1975
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN DU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC. AND MOTION
PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS LOCAL 702 I.A.T.S.E. CONCERNIKG
THE COMPLEMENT OF THE CREW FOR THE NEW EASTMAN COLOR NEGATIVE II
PROCESSOR AS INSTALLED BY DU ART FILM LABORATORIES. INC.:

This letter will serve as an Agreement between Du Art Film
Laboratories, Inc. and the Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E., Whereas Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. has
installed the new Eastman Color Negative II (ECN II) process.
It is agreed that Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. will pay a
special rate to the assigned personnel on this machine and will
pay an override pay per hour in the event other replacement
personnel are used on this machine when a two man complement is
used on this processor.
Classification - Color Vet Developer, Type 3 - Rate as outlined
in the current Contract under Schedule A plus .45 per hour.
Classification - Dry End Man Color, Type 3 - Rate as outlined
in current Contract under Schedule A plus .30 per hour.
It is our understanding that this processor will continue to
operate as it does now on a non continuous basis. This special
pay to the assigned personnel will remain in effect as long as
this type processor is operating with a complement of two men.

(Cont'd.)

- 2 In the event, however, that it becomes necessary to operate
this cachlne on a continuous basis, i.e., without interruption
for leader, etc., the foregoing Agreement re special rates is
cancelled, and the complement will be as specified in the
Collective Agreement.

Agreed To
vice President

Agreed To:
Chuck vitello, Business Agent
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

,
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ORLANDO TEMPLE

3
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4

TECHNICOLOR INC.,
RADIANT DIVISION

5

77 Civ. 2233

6

May 25, 1978

7
8
9
10
11

[In open court; jury present:]
C A R M E N

12

O L F F ,
THE COURT:

13

DIRECT EXAMINATION

14

BY MR. JACOBSON:

15

Q

resumed.

Mr. Jackson, continue.

[continued]

Mr. Olff, you were testifying yesterday about

16

having done certain work in the negative room that didn't

17

have production tickets attached to it. Did that work carry

18

identification of any kind?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

What type of identification?

21

A

Many times I worked on film that had Film

22
23
24
25

Chateau's
Q

identification.
Film Chateau.

Is that the company located

upstairs?
A

Correct.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y - 791-1020

-^\

•. —•.

1

***

.

..^us^Lsi^ua^ui*.-

'-

-

11 bssr

Olff - cross/redirect

2

MR. ROSENFELD:

3

No further questions.

4

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

5

BY MR. JACOBSON.

6

Q

Roberto Cruz, Ismael Medina.

As far as you rcall, were all of the people

7

whose names you checked here on the afternoon shift with

8

Mr. Temple?

9
10

A

No. That is in all three shifts throughout

the lab.

11

Q

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

If I was to hand you a list of the balance

Of all the 110 to 130 employees?

14

of employees, the white employees, the 100 or so of them,

15

would you recognize all of thosa names and what shift

16

they were on?

17

A

No.

18

MR. JACOBSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE WITNESS:

21

No further questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Olff.
You are quite welcome.

[Witness excused.]

22

MR. JACOBSON:

23

THE COURT:

Plaintiff rests, your Honor.
Ladies and gentlemen, at this

24

time the plaintiff has rested, which means that he has

25

finished the presentation of their direct case, and I have

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.V - 79I-IOJO
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12 bssr

2

legal matters of law I have to take up with the attorneys

3

as a result of that fact.

4

If you retire to tha jury room we will be

5

with you shortly.

6

(Jury excused.]

7

THE COURT:

8

Mr. Rosenfeld, I assume you want

to move to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's case.

9

MR. ROSENFELD:

10

THE COURT:

I do, your Honor.

I would like to have —

as I said

11

to both sides yesterday —

12

motion because I think there is a serious possibility of

13

my granting it and I therefore would like to have each

14
15

!

a complete argument on the

side present, as fully as it can, tha position which it
believes we are in at the moment.

16

MR. ROSENFELD:

17

THE COURT:

Shall I proceed?

Yes.

I think you will do yourself

18

the most good by getting to the heart of what the plain-

19

tiff has proved and not —

20

all doubts, as we must.

21

MR.ROSENFEFLD:

giving him the benefit of

Your Honor, plaintiff has the

22

burden at this point of establishing a prima facie case

23

of discrimination in the discharge of Mr. Temple.

24

THE COURT: Right.

25

MR. ROSENFELD:

Plaintiff is attainting to

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOIM-
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2

carry that burden by offering evidence of discrimination

3

in two areas, as I understand:

4

statements, and perhaps related conduct, by Mr. Stroud,

5

who was Mr. Temple's supervisor for the last two or three

6

weeks of Temple's employment only, and who didn't make

7

the decision to discharge Mr. Temple, and who had —
THE COURT:

8

The first area involves

I think a more accurate way of

9

saying it, is the record doesn't indicate who made the

10

decision, but there is no evidence that he did; merely

11

that he was pleased that it occurred.

' 12

MR. ROSENFELD:

The record has testimony that

13

on July -- on the night of July 1, when Mr. Temple got

14

back to the laboratory and Stroud

15

at the time clock, Stroud said "Elio said to dismiss

16

you. "

17

was waiting for them

The second area, as I understand plaintiff's

18

case, in which they are trying to carry their burden of

19

establishing discrimination on

20

Temple was required to punch out before lunch and punch

21

back in after lunch. This is alleged to be a singling

22

out on the ground of race.

23
24
25

this point is that Mr.

I think that plaintiff has succeeded in
neither of those two areas of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOI^r
FOLEV SQUARE. NEW YORK. N Y . - '9l-lo:n
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2

table and said here they are, the company nevertheless

3

knew or should have known the practice that was going on

4

in the plant of men taking 45 minutes or more for lunch.

5

If they used Mr.Temple's lateness as an excuse

6

for firing him, I think that's all it was was an excause

7

because they would have had to clean out the entire plant.

8

THE COURT:

9

I have really heard enough.

I understand that, Mr. Jacobson.
I am prepared

10

to consider the matter.

11

room and review the evidence myself with my law clerk,

12

and I will be with you shortly to let you know what my

13

conclusion is.

I want to retire to the robing

14

MR. ROSENFELD:

15

THE COURT:

16

I
i
Do you want the exhibits. Judge?

If I want any I will ask you for

them.

17

(Recess.)

18

(In open court; jury absent.)

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Gentlemen, I am ready to rule

on the motion.
I should point out that although I have taken a

22

short period of time since the end of argument, and have

23

considered some factors that I couldn't consider in open

24

court, in the sense that I have reviewed matters in my own

25

mind and in discussion with my clerk, that there was very
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2
3
4
5
6
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little testimony this morning, and I have, of course, been
aware of the fact that the motion was going to be made
this morning and I have reviewed in my mind the testimony
of the past days before the end of the argument this
morning

7
8
9
10

"l am prepared to grant the motion.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I am

aware of the fact that such a motion, that is, a motion
for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's
case, requires the defendant to meet a high threshold.

11
12

....

I thoroughly understand the arguments made
by Mr. Temple's counsel, who have been complete and zealous
in their presentation of the case.

Nevertheless, I find

that the evidence establishes that the decision to discharge here was made by Mr. Pesato; that the witnesses
for the plaintiff

readily admitted that Mr. Pesato's

reputation with regard to race, racial matters, was good.
I don't doubt that Mr.Stroud had contemptible attitudes for
racial minorities, including

the minority of which I am

•

a member.
I don't doubt that Mr.Stroud was pleased when
Mr. Temple was discharged, but I find that the plaintiff
has not established or borne his burden to establish that
Mr. Stroud's authority was such as to have brought the
;

discharge about on his own.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS. U.S. COUR TH(

'-.

1

2
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7
8

(Pause.)
THE COURT:

1981 applies or not, although I must say that the recitation
given this morning by Mr. Schoolman and Mr. Rosenfeld
raises more doubts than I had thought might have existed.
(Jury present.)

10

(Jury discharged with the thanks of the Court.)

11

13
14

MR. JACOBSON:

17
18
19
20

Of course, Judge, I don't think

we have to put it on the record, but I will do so anyway.
We of course take exception to the ruling.
not necessary

15
16

Because of my determination of

course it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Section

9

12

-

simply advise them that the case has been concluded.

4

6

.•

58- bsb

3

5

-• • ^Irt

—

THE COURT:
understand.

vJhile it is

I would expect you to, and I

If you decide that you want to appeal the

verdict I would understand it.
I don't think there are any other motions that
are necessary at this time.

If there are, you are granted

whatever time you need to make them.

21
22
23
24
25
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2
3
4

Moreover, and very much to the point, this
record is like a battlefield pockmarked with the shells
which have dropped as to Mr. Temple's own undependability.

5
6
7
8

Indeed, I was struck by the fact that half of
his testimony related to a narration of his own previous
offenses which had brought on discipline, not only in the
case of the defendant here, but of his previous employer.

9
10
11
12
13
14

Objective determiners of the facts in the past
have found that he was away from his post on numerous
occasions and he came perilously close to discharge at
Du Art on two occasions, and one has a right to infer that
the work habits which existed at Du Art were not substantially changed at Technicolor.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I share with all the people in this room a
sense of revulsion at matters involving discrimination of
race.

For whatever it is worth, I assure Mr. Temple

that had I for a moment believed that a jury here could
conscientiously decide in your favor, I would not have
ruled as I have.
For all the reasons I have stated, I direct
a verdict in this matter, in this case, in the defendant's
favor and I will now so advise the jury.
Call the jury, please.
I won't advise them of the result.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF LOCAL 702 AND V I T E L L O GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED JUNE 27, 1979
(pp. A163-A169)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHALE DWORAN,
Plaintiff,
-againstMOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS
LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING
PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, An unincorporated
association, COSMO VITELLO, as President
of Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702, International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the United
States and Canada, an unincorporated
association, and TECHNICOLOR, INC.,

78 Civ. 118KPNL)

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

Defendants.
On August 24, 1977 Shale Dworan was discharged
from his position with Technicolor, Inc. (the "Employer").
Dworan's union, Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local
702, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada
(the "Union") refused until February 1978 to demand arbitration
of Dworan's discharge. When the Union finally demanded arbitration, the employer refused. Dworan brought this action in
November 1978 against the Union, its President (Vitello)
and the Employer, alleging breaches of the Union's duty
of fair representation and two breaches of the collective
bargaining agreement on the Employer's part, discharge without
just cause and refusal to arbitrate.

S

_

.
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The Union and Vitello now move for summary judgment.
The uncontroverted facts are these:
Dworan was employed by the Employer at its plant
at 321 West 44th St., N.Y., N.Y. from 1971 until his discharge
in August 1977. Dworan was represented in his employment
by the Union.
The Employer had regularly complained to the Union
2

about Dworan's performance and behavior while he was employed.
The collective bargaining agreement between the
Employer and the Union provided for binding arbitration
following unsuccessful adjustment of "any dispute arising
under this contract."

2
In their answer the Union and Vitello alleged
Dworan had been the subject of "regular and continuous employer
complaints both with respect to his work performance and
his behavior." 1112. Ten 'negligence reports' concerning
Dworan, most of which show that they are addressed to a
Union representative, are annexed as part of Exhibit A to
the answer. Whether Dworan's affidavit in opposition to
the motion intends to controvert these allegations is unclear.
(See US of Dworan's affidavit dated November 20, 1978 in
opposition to Union Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.)
Dworan apparently contends these complaints or reports are
immaterial. But insofar as the Union is aware of them they
are certainly material to its assessment of the likelihood
of success at arbitration and thus to the questions of arbitrariness, capriciousness and lack of good faith, which are at
the heart of an action for unfair representation. See Vaca
v. Sipes infra. -Dworan's argument of immateriality is unpersuasive if not frivolous. When confronted with a motion for
summary judgment one cannot rest on mere conclusory denials.
S.E.C. v. Research Automation Corp, 585 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1978). Dworan's affidavit does so. For this reason I may
treat the allegations as uncontroverted.
In his deposition Dworan himself admitted the
Union had intervened on his behalf to resolve problems that
he had with management from eight to a dozen times. Dworan
deposition at 127.

.

. . ..
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In February 1976 Dworan was suspended pending
discharge for carelessness. Dworan filed a grievance
and his grievance was pursued by the Union to arbitration.
In May 1976 the arbitrator rendered his award, reinstating
Dworan without back pay and adding:
He [Dworan] should note that he has been
given some benefit of the doubt in this
case, and therefore he is warned that
future acts of negligence on his part,
other violations or misconduct, would
be grounds for his dismissal.
Exhibit B to Defendants Union and Vitello's Answer.
On August 4 or 5, 1977, Dworan was suspended
for taking an excessive coffee break, but at the Union's
instance was reinstated. (Dworan deposition at 119).
On August 24, 1977 Dworan was suspended pending
discharge for taking an excessive coffee break. The
next day representatives of the Union and the Employer
met with Dworan to discuss his discharge. Following
this meeting the union representative (Vitello) met
with Dworan. At this meeting Dworan insisted upon full
reinstatement without loss of pay. (Dworan deposition
at 29-30).'
Vitello then consulted with the Union's Shop
Steward and with the Union Vice-President to determine
On August 10, Dworan wrote Vitello, thanking
him for his efforts, "Dear Brother Vitello: Once again
I wish to thank you for your continued support and
invaluable assistance in the matter of my most recent
'suspension* at Technicolor Laboratories. ..." Exhibit
F to Defendants Union and Vitello's Answer.
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the validity_of Dworan's defense (a pervasive practice
of excessive coffee breaks) and was told there was
no practice of taking breaks of the length to which
Dworan had admitted (35 minutes). Vitello later consulted
with Union counsel Schilian, who advised Vitello that
there would be little chance of success at arbitration.
During this period, Vitello also approached the Employer
to propose reinstatement. The Employer was adamant.
Vitello concluded arbitration would not be appropriate
but Dworan was given the opportunity to appear before the
Union's Executive Board to present his case for decision.
Dworan met with the Executive Board September
9, 1977. The Board determined that arbitration was not advisable.
After Dworan won an unemployment insurance award
in October 1977, his lawyer requested the Union to reconsider
its decision not to demand arbitration. The Union's position
remained unchanged. However, Dworan's request for an opportunity
to appeal the original decision to a meeting of the Local's
general membership was granted.
In January, 1978 Dworan appeared before the membership,
which denied Dworan's request for reconsideration.

flFH(l»mT,--«Tr,:,-H. 'r-ilif TiiKina.--, - -
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In February 1978 Dworan appealed this decision
to an International body with which Local 702 is affiliated.
Counsel for the International then contacted the local Union's
counsel to ask whether something could be done to avoid
litigation. At counsel's urging Vitello agreed to demand
arbitration.
The Employer refused to arbitrate.

The essence of plaintiff's claim is that his.union
arbitrarily, capriciously and in bad faith delayed taking
4
his grievance to arbitration. An arbitrary, capricious
or bad faith refusal to process a grievance is a breach
of a union's duty of fair representation under the NLRA
cognizable in the federal courts. Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct.
903 (1967).
It may be argued (with support from case law
and commentators, see 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
1T56.16 at 56-668-669 and cases cited) that where motive
and intent are at issue, as when bad faith is alleged, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
X

Dworan claims a 1975 intra-union disciplinary
proceeding in which he was charged with making accusations
against fellow employees and which resulted in a $500 suspended
fine, left a residue of ill will against him. Dworan Affidavit
dated November 20, 1978 in opposition to Union Defendants'
motion for summary judgment at HU9, 15.
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But the essential soundness of that proposition
does not mean that there are no limits to its appropriateness.
Where the uncontested record shows, as in this case, such
persuasive abundance of apparent justification for the Union's
refusal to demand arbitration, especially when coupled with
conceded evidence that the Union made efforts on the plaintiff's
behalf, both previously and in the instance called in question,
is it reasonable to withhold summary judgment because of
the theoretical possibility that the Union may have been
motivated by bias, rather than by the valid factors? Indeed,
when an admitted bad record and the correspondingly small
likelihood of success at arbitration makes the Union's refusal
so clearly objectively correct regardless of the motivation,
the further question arises whether bias, malice or other
motivation are even relevant. The correctness and justification
for the decision are not diminished by the presence of malice.
I conclude that, contrary to the usual rule, summary
judgment may be granted against a claim of a union's malicious
refusal to demand arbitration if the admitted facts demonstrate
with clarity that the decision is objectively justifiable
- all the more so when admitted facts show that the Union
expended efforts in reaching the decision.

>
Were this not so, the mere inclusion of a claim
of malice would require unions to incur expensive litigation

.

.

.
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for every refusal to demand arbitration, no matter
how clearly justified.
The Union and Vitello's motion for summary
judgment against the plaintiff is granted.
SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: New York, New York
June ^,-7, 1979
Pierre N. Leval
U.S.D.J.

.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER D E N Y I N G P L A I N T I F F ' S M O T I O N FOR R E C O N S I D E R A T I O N
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1979
(pp.;Al77-Al78)
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-nqainstMOTIOM PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, an
unincorporated association, COSMO
V1TELLO, as President of Motion
Pictures Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702, International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, an
unincorporated association, and
.\, INC.,

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendants.

Pierre N. Leval, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of this court's
order of June 29, 1979 granting summary judgment to the
defendant union. He contests the validity of various suspensions
and complaints on his record which were referred to in the
opinion-as an "admitted bad work record ...." Dworan v.
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
1181

Local 702, 78 Civ.

(op. at 6HS.D.N.Y. June 27, 1979.
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Plaintiff misconceives the significance of this reference.
It implied no finding as to the facts underlying any blemish
on che plaintiff's work record, but only a recognition of
the fact of numerous supensions and complaints. The use -v
of the word "admitted" did nnt mean that plaintiff admitted
having committed the infractions, but only that he did not
contest that those suspensions and complaints appeared on
*

his record. The union was entitled to give due weight to
the "face value" of the plaintiff's work record in assessing
the likelihood of success as a f.nctor in the decision
or not to demand arbitration.
The motion is denied.

SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: September /(/, l
New York, Mew York

Pierre N. Leval

whether

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DATED

JUNE 9, 1980

(pp. A324-A33I)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT '
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHALE DWORAN,

Plaintiff,
-againstMOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS
LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE
OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND
MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, An
unincorporated association, COSMO
VITELLO, as President of Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local
702, International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the
United States and Canada, an unincorporated association, and
TECHNICOLOR, INC.

78 Civ. 1181(PNL)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

PIERRE N. LEVAL, U.S.D.J.

This is an action brought by a discharged employee,
Shale Dworan, against his employer Technicolor, Inc., alleging
wrongful discharge.
Along with other defenses, the employer raises
the objection that the arbitration clause of the collective
bargaining agreement bars plaintiff from proceeding otherwise
than by arbitration. Plaintiff counters that during discussions
over the dispute, the employer repudiated the arbitration
agreement and therefore cannot be heard to invoke it as

a bar.
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Over plaintiff's objection, trial was conducted
without a jury on the limited question whether plaintiff
can show that the employer repudiated the arbitration clause.
Both sides agree that by reason of the arbitration clause,
plaintiff cannot prevail in the action without showing repudiation by the employer. I find that plaintiff has failed to
show such repudiation and accordingly remit plaintiff to
such remedies as may remain to him at arbitration.
The facts are as follows:
On August 24, 1977 Oworan was discharged from
his position with Technicolor. Plaintiff then requested
his union, Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada
("IATSE"), to take his claim of wrongful discharge to arbitration.

However, the Executive Board OA. Local 702 voted on

September 13, 1977, not to take the matter to arbitration.
The plaintiff then initiated a series of unsuccessful intraunion appeals in February 1978. While an appeal to Local
702's parent, IATSE, was pending, Steven Spivak, Esq., counsel
to IATSE, contacted Local 702's attorney, Gerald Schilian,
Esq., and suggested informally that Local 702 attempt to
arrange for the arbitration of the plaintiff's dispute with
the employer.
For reasons set forth on the record I found that
trial of the question of repudiation of the arbitration
agreement by the employer was wholly severable from, and
did not involve common issues of fact with, the trial of
whether plaintiff had been discharged wrongfully. I found
that the question whether plaintiff was entitled to be freed
from the contractual provision requiring arbitration by
reason of his employer's repudiation was essentially an
equitable dispute not giving rise to the right to jury trial.
2
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In response to the suggestion, Schilian ascertained
on February 15, 1978 that Eric Schmertz, the permanent industry
arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between
the employer and Local 702 in effect from October l f 1974
to September 30, 1977, was available for arbitration on
February 22, 1978. The agreement provided that, unless unavailable or unwilling, Schmertz was to conduct all arbitrations
arising in the industry under the contract. Schilian informed
plaintiff's counsel that he intended to seek the employer's
agreement to arbitrate the plaintiff's discharge before
Schmertz on February 22. But plaintiff's counsel informed
Schilian that plaintiff did not wish to arbitrate before
Schmertz and asked Schilian to attempt to arrange for arbitration
before a different arbitrator. Apparently in an earlier
dispute involving plaintiff, Schmertz has rendered a decision
which plaintiff regarded as unfavorable to him.
Schilian called the employer's counsel, Eric Rosenfeld,
Esq., to discuss the matter. Rosenfeld declined to make
any agreement. He expressed the view that the Local, by
its refusal to seek arbitration in September, had waived
the right to have the matter arbitrated. He wrote to Schilian
on February 16, 1978 as follows:
Technicolor has not agreed and does not agree to arbitrate
the matter of Oworan's discharge last August, and reserves
all rights and positions with respect to any claims
by Local 702 or by Mr. Dworan that either the collective
bargaining agreement then in effect or the collective
bargaining agreement presently in effect, requires
arbitration now over that discharge.

J
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The Local never took the matter any further. The
Local and the plaintiff understood that the arbitration
provided for in the contract called for Schmertz as arbitrator,
but the plaintiff did not want Schmertz. The position expressed
by the employer made it clear that, inter alia, it would
not agree voluntarily to conduct an arbitration in a manner
not required by the contract as would have been the case
if a substitute arbitrator were sought. The Local thereafter
made no demand for arbitration.
On March 6, 1978, the plaintiff sent a letter
to the employer noting the employer's "refusal to arbitrate"
and demanding reinstatement. The employer did not respond.
On March 16, 1978, plaintiff brought action in
this court against both the Local and the employer, alleging
respectively unfair representation and wrongful discharge.
Summary judgment had been granted in favor of the Local
before the action against the employer came to trial. Two
motions by the employer for summary judgment had been denied,
one on the ground that the question of repudiation presented
triable issues of fact.
Where a party is found to have repudiated an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, it
can no longer insist on compliance with that or related
provisions, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Proof
of repudiation requires more than evidence of a disagreement
between the employee or union and the employer regarding
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whether or not a given dispute is arbitrable, see Rabalais
v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1978).
Repudiation has been found where arbitration procedures
have been ignored, see e.g., E.T. Simonds Constr. Co. v^
Local 1330, 315 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1963); Radiator Specialty
Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938), or where
one party has raised an unjustifiable bar to proceeding
with arbitration notwithstanding that the dispute in question
is clearly arbitrable, see Lane, Ltd, v. Larus & Brothers
Co., 243 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.

1957). See also 6A A. Corbin,

Contracts $ 1443 (1962) (cited with approval in Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. at 185) (question of good faith).
The plaintiff contends that the employer's counsel's
letter of February 16, coupled with the employer's failure
to reply to plaintiff's counsel's March 6 reinstatement
demand, establishes repudiation by the employer -of the arbitration provision. I disagree for the following reasons.
A first reason why the employer's statements did
not amount to repudiation of the arbitration agreement is
that the context in which these statements were made was
not a discussion of arbitration in the form required by
contract. It appears that the discussion between Schilian
and Rosenfeld included the question whether Technicolor
would "agree" to an ad hoc non-contractual arbitration before
an arbitrator other than the one called for by contract.
Rosenfeld's statements in his letter that Technicolor "does
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not agree to arbitrate" make sense only in this context.
For the employer's agreement is in no way required when
arbitration is invoked under the contract. The agreement
being sought was to engage in a procedure not contractually
required.
Refusal to submit to
a procedure not required
«
<
by contract cannot properly be interpreted without more
as refusal to submit to the procedures which are required.
Second, the Local never demanded or initiated
arbitration. All it did in February was to discuss the
possibility with the employer.

2

I recognize full well that

on appropriate facts a repudiation may occur without a demand
having been made. For example/ this might be so where the
words or conduct convey a clear refusal to arbitrate, and
particularly so where the reasons given in justification
are baldly inadequate
or smack of bad faith. Nothing of
s *
. * * *- • .
the kind happened here.
i

.

"•.-•-,'•-.

•

-Rosenf eld's conversation with Schilian and his

< -j ~

subsequent letter conveyed the view that if arbitration
were invoked a valid procedural defense of waiver by the
2

The procedure for invoking arbitration under
the collective bargaining agreement involved filing a written
notice of dispute and, under the 1974 agreement, a written
reference to Eric Schmertz. Plaintiff's contention that
industry practice was for references to arbitration to be
made informally was contradicted by the proof. The evidence
showed that during the course of the collective bargaining
agreement, arbitration had been initiated exclusively through
this formal mechanism. In fact, arbitration of the plaintiff's
claim following his 1976 discharge was initiated formally
by a written reference to Schmertz.
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Local would lie. These communications did not amount to
statements that the employer would not show up if arbitration
were invoked. To the contrary, as I interpret them, they
meant and were understood to mean, that the employer would
show up and would defend, at least initially, on the ground
that waiver should prevent the arbitration from reaching
the merits. Indeed, plaintiff's counsel testified at trial
that part of his reason for seeking to maintain the action
in court rather than at arbitration was because he anticipated
that the arbitrator would be more inclined to sustain the
defense of waiver. If anyone repudiated the arbitration
contract, it was not the employer, but the plaintiff, who
did not wish to have his case judged by the contractually
agreed arbitrator and who furthermore believed he would
get a more sympathetic decision in a federal court.
As plaintiff's counsel conceded on cross-examination,
Technicolor's position to the effect that a defense of
waiver would prevail to defeat an arbitration on the merits
was neither frivolous nor in bad faith.

See 6A Corbin,

/
v.

supra. Technicolor had been significantly prejudiced by
the delay from the time in September when the Local refused
to arbitrate to the time in February when it reopened the
issue. An adverse decision in February would have involved
six months rather than three weeks of back pay liability.
In the meantime, furthermore, Technicolor had hired a replacement
for plaintiff.

The fact that this replacement employee
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had not yet acquired permanent status under the collective
bargaining agreement may mitigate but does not dispel the
prejudice. The firing of the probationary employee might
well have invited litigation or at least caused poor labor
relations.
Under the circumstances, I find that the employer's
conduct did not constitute a repudiation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
The complaint is accordingly dismissed in its
entirety.

SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: New York, New York
June 9 , 1980

Pierre N. Leval
U.S.D.J.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Administrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration between :
Du Art Film Laboratories/ Inc.,
•

: Case No. 1330 0203 79

-and-

:

OPINION

and
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.,
AFL-CIO

:
:

Appearances

For the Company:
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker,
Feldman & Gartner, by
Eric Rosenfeld, Esq.
For the Union:
Gerald Schilian, Esq.

Before:

I

Morris P. Glushien,
Arbitrator

AWARD

OPINION

The undersigned was designated as Arbitrator
under the procedures of the American Arbitration Association to resolve a dispute between Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. ("Company") and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO ("Union").

Hear-

ings were conducted on six days between June 12, 1979 and
October 9, 1979, at which the parties presented their
evidence, examined and cross-examined
stated their positions.

witnesses, and

At the final hearing the Union

made a full closing statement.

Subsequently the Company

filed a comprehensive brief to which the Union made a
written response.

The main issue before me is whether the proper
manning for simultaneously operating two side-by-side
machines, the Gevachrome (t60) and the ECN II (#61) , is
five men as the Company claims, or six men as the Union
contends.

A second issue is whether the Company is enti-

tled to damages for the period in which the Union allegedly, by threat of strike, refused to permit the five-man

-2-

operation desired by the Company.

I uphold the Union's

position that the five-man crew is improper/ and I also
deny the Company's claim for damages.

The Company is a leading motion picture film
processing laboratory in the City of New York.

It does

large-scale commercial work, and is one of a number of
such enterprises which have been in contractual relations
with the Union for decades.*

For a number of contracts

prior to the current 1977-1980 agreement, the industry
contract named a "permanent arbitrator" to resolve disputes, first Joseph E. McMahon, then Eric J. Schmertz.
The current agreement contains no such permanent designation, which accounts for my ad hoc selection in the instant case.

Under the collective agreement as well as longtime industry practice, there are two sets of developing
classifications, positive developing and negative developing.

The collective agreement sets forth a set of wage

rates for the jobs in the positive developing department
and another higher set of rates for those in the negative

*

The contract is jointly negotiated but separately signea by
each participant.
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developing department.

The wage rates in the latter are higher

because the responsibilities, skills, and care required of the
workers are greater since they are handling irreplaceable
original film material where a mistake is fatal, which is not
the case in the preparation of positives or duplicate
positives.*

The contract also contains a provision regarding the
minimum manning of color negative developing machines.

It

requires a three-man crew for handling one machine and a
five-man crew for two such machines operating in tandem.

On a

single machine there is a wet end man, a dry end man, and a
bridge man who acts as relief for each o- the others at
lunchtime and other needed occasions.

On the tandem operation,

the machines have the same complement of wet end and dry ena
men, but there is merely a single bridge man to service both
machines; he stands on a common bridge and relieves each of the
other four as needed.

While the contract contains no explicit provision as
to the crew size of positive color developing machines, the

*

Not surprisingly workers in the positive developing department generally aspire to be promoted to the negative department with its higher wages.
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parties are in accord that by industry practice the same manning requirements that apply to.negative machines apply also
to positive developing machines, both as to a positive machine
operating alone and as to two positive machines operating in
tandem.

Turning now to some pertinent history, the New York
industry in the years through the 1940's had worked only on
black and white film.

In the early 1950's the Company became a

pioneer in the Nev; York market in color development.

To ac-

complish this, it acquired two machines that are referred to in
the record as the #1 and the |2 machines.

Each machine had the

capacity to develop negatively and positively, depending on the
chemical baths used.

The two machines, which had a common bridge, were
operated in tandem by a crew of five.*

This was by agreement

between the Company and the Union, first tacit and subsequently
in writing.

As the Company president himself testified, the

great majority of the work performed by the machines was positive, but the machines also ran negative some of the time, and

*

This is a precedent on which the Company heavily relies in
the instant case as we shall see.

-5-

on occasions one machine ran positive while the other ran negative and vice versa.

Important to note, however, is that the

basic five-man crew -- although the large bulk of theit work
was positive on both machines -- were paid at the (higher)
negative rate for all their work.*

The tandem operation of the

fl and $2 machines by the basic crew at full-time negative
rates continued for twenty years from 1954 to 1974.**

At this point reference should be made to a decision
by Arbitrator McMahon of August 23, 1968, on which the Company.
places stress.

The decision involves the |2 machine above

mentioned, and another machine, the |3, which could only do
positive work and, operating by itself, had used a crew of
three.

A breakdown having occurred on the £1 machine, so that

it could not operate in tandem with the f2, the Company sought
to operate the 12 in tandem with the |3, using a crew of five.

*

A significantly lesser amount of work was done on the machines on another shift, again by a five-man crew, but there
each man was paid according to the type of work he was doing
at the time, positive or negative.

** In 1974, the Company acquired a color negative ECN II machine which plays a part in the instant dispute and is discussed hereafter.
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The matter came to arbitration, and the Arbitrator
decided against the Company, holding that the |2 and
the £3 must each have a complement of three men.

Some

of the language he used, from which the Company
advances an argument to which I shall later refer, is
as follows:
"A personal examination of the Company's
three developing machines, the testimony and
evidence, establish quite conclusively we do
not in this situation have a three machine
unit. Machines #1 and #2 constitute a unit,
and the parties agree that the crew complement for this unit is five men. We have an
entirely different condition with respect to
Machine #3, which was designed, installed and
operated as a single unit with a three man
crew. This conclusion is further supported
by the fact that the bridge between #3 and #2
is considerably lower than the common bridge
between #1 and 12, and such bridge was not
planned as, nor does it constitute, a common
bridge (emphasis added).
"The Company testified that Machines #2
and #3 were never operated as a.pair. In
addition, it appears that no attempt was made
prior to the breakdown of Machine fl to operate t3 and |2 or 13 and #1 with five men."
Another decision by Arbitrator McMahon dated July 14,
1966, upon which the Company also relies, may well be mentioned
at this point.

A little while earlier, the Company had acquired

a new type of color reversal processing machine, the Pako.

This

machine developed first a negative image and then produced a
positive print.

A controversy arose with the Union whether the
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workers should be paid at positive rates or negative, ana whether the proper complement -for the machine was two men or
three.

Arbitrator McMahon, declaring that because of its dual

capacity a color reversal machine "does not fall squarely within
either the Positive or Negative Developing Department" (ana
consequently was not covered by the contract provision relating
to negative developing), nevertheless decreed that negative
rates should apply inasmuch as a negative image was originally
produced, but that from the evidence before him "a two-man crew
is sufficient to operate the Company's Pako machine."*

And .now, with the foregoing as background, we come to
events which pose the problem in this case.
••
In 1969 the Company acquired another type of color
reversal processing machine, the Gevachrome |60 (which is one or

*

Years later, on August 17, 1977, Arbitrator Schmertz who haa
succeeded McMahon handed down a similar decision with respect to another kind of color reversal development machine,
the Photomec. He held that the McMahon Award of July 14,
1966 was "binding" in its determination that color reversal
development was not comprehended in the contract provision
concerning negative development. Arbitrator Schmertz so
held although apparently he himself might not have reached
the McMahon result initially, as indicated by his statement,
"Whether Mr. McMahon was correct is immaterial."
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the machines involved in the present controversy).

Unlike the

Pako and the Photomec machines abovementioned, it has at all
times been manned by a crew of three.

This is so because, as

Arbitrator Schmertz held in an Award dated December 18, 1969,
the parties had agreed years earlier, when color development
was first introduced, that color machines with attached "applicators" (which the Gevachrome has too) should be run by a crew
of three throughout its operation even though the applicators
were not being used some of the time.

The Award accordingly

rejected the Company's position that two men sufficed for the
Gevachrome without its applicators.

Thus the Gevachrome has always had a crew of three.
And what, in my view, is vitally important to note is that,
whatever the machine's innate capacity to perform other work
too, it has in fact been used only for the purpose of making
positive duplicate prints --

with the three-man crew being

paid at positive, viz., the lower, rates.

In 1974, five years after acquiring the Gevachrome
160, the Company purchased an ECN II color negative processing
machine, referred to in the record as the #62.
machine up next to the Gevachrome.

It set the

The new machine was

strictly a negative machine, and it is undisputed that the
contract specified a crew of three for its operation.

However,

the parties made a special arrangement for operating the
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machine in some circumstances by a crew of two men who, as the
quid pro quo, were paid premium rates.

The special arrangement

continued until it was cancelled on September 22, 1978, with
the operation reverting to a three-man crew performing the
negative work at contract negative rates.

Throughout this period as noted, the Gevachrome #60
and the ECN #62 were operated disjunctively and never as a
tandem unit.

The Gevachrome had its own crew of three

performing positive duplicate work at positive rates; the ECN
#62 had its crew of two producing negative prints and receiving
premium rates under the special arrangement, or its crew of
three receiving the contract negative rates.

Meanwhile, in early 1978, the Company had acquired
another ECN II negative machine, referred.to as the #61.

As

the Company avowed at the hearing, it had ordered the machine
in 1976 and received it in 1978 with the intended purpose -which it admittedly did not communicate to the Union -- of
setting it up in a tandem unit with the Gevachrome #60 so as to
operate the two machines together with a crew of five.

After receiving the #61, the Company spent some months
getting the machine ready for operation.

Then, in September
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1978, it installed it at the site where the #62 had theretofore stood (next to the Gevachrome #60), moving the #62 over
just beyond the newly installed #61.

Thus the three machines

in sequence were the Gevachrome #60/ the ECN #61, and the ECN
#62.

The Company did something else too at the time it
fashioned this arrangement.

It constructed two common bridges,

one between the #60 and the #61, the other between the #61 and
the #62.

This made it possible for a bridge man to place

himself between either set of two machines.

What the Company

had in mind (again without telling the Union) was to operate
the #60 and the #61 in tandem with a five-man crew, or to
operate the #61 and the #62 in tandem with a five-man crew,
whichever was the cheaper method at a particular time.

Thus,

if all three machines were operating simultaneously, the
Company would "tandem" the two negative machines, the #61 and
the #62, paying negative rates to the five men on these
machines, while paying positive rates to three men operating
the #60.*

*

But if only the #60 and the #61 were operating, and

There is no dispute that this would be perfectly proper
under the contract which, as we have seen, specifically
allows tandem operation of two negative machines.
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the #62 was not, then the Company planned to operate the #60
and 161 in tandem, paying negative rates to the two men on the
#61 and to the bridge man, while paying positive rates to the
two men on the 160.

This, as i say, is what the Company envisaged

(but dia

not communicate) when it built the two common bridges in
September 1978.

But for about five months thereafter until

nearly the end of January 1979, it did not act on the plan.
Instead, it operated the #60 with a three-man crew who were
paid positive rates, and the #61 with a three-man crew who were
paid negative rates; and it so used these six men even when
both machines were operating simultaneously.

Then, on January 26, 1979, with no notice at all to
the Union, the Company attempted to effectuate its design.

It

ordered that the #60 and the #61 be operated in tandem with a
five-man crew -- and this order the men refused to obey.

Vvhat

is more, the men threatened job action to shut down all operations if the five-man order were implemented.

And throughout

the succeeding months, the employees did not change their
stance.
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There is a good deal of conflicting testimony in the
record regarding the Union's participation in the men's refusal, the Union maintaining that the men acted altogether on
their own and that the Union had no hand in or responsibility
for their action.

However, one would have to.be naive inaeeo

to accept this view.
_

_
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I am convinced from the evidence that the
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Union, through President Charles Vitello and more directly
through Steward Mitchell Demrovsky, instigated, led ana at the
very least condoned the men's conduct.

It might be appropriate at this point to note that in
discrediting the Union's testimony on this aspect, I am equally
unbelieving of the Company's testimony on another subject.

A

top official testified that he did not notify the Union and
take up with it in advance the five-man tandem operation of the
160 and #61 because he thought that "there was no problem" and
that it would constitute "normal operating procedure" in light
of the Company's past history with other machines.

It seems to

me inc reel ible^ that this was really his view and the basis for
his silence.

I say this in view of the vital distinctions

between the past operations and the contemplated one, distinctions which he must surely have recognized and to which I shall
soon address myself.

•
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Coming back now to January 26, 1979, and the weeks
immediately following, the Company took no disciplinary action
when the employees refused to operate the #60 and the #61 in
tandem.

Instead the Company continued to operate each machine,

as it had before, with a three-man crew, and meanwhile it held
discussions with the Union.

The matter was not resolved,

however, and on February 17, 1979, the Company filed for
arbitration.

It sought a ruling from the arbitrator declaring

the tandem operation to be proper, and also an award of damages
because of the compelled use of six men when in its view it was
entitled to operate with only five.
•.
And now we come to the Company's basic arguments, two
in number, for its claimed right to utilize a five-man crew to
operate the #60 and the #61 in tandem.

The first argument is

founded on the fact that the contract, particularly as
interpreted by the 1966 and 1977 decisions of Arbitrators
McMahon and Schmertz (supra, pp. 6-7) , contains no
classifications or rates for the processing of color reversal
film, which is the type used in the Gevachrome #60.

The other

argument is predicated on the assertion that under many, many
years of practice, the Union has recognized and acceded to the
Company's right to use the tandem operation which the Union now
challenges.
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I have given most careful thought and consideration to
the Company's views/ expounded at length in its well-written
brief, but conclude that its position in both respects-is
lacking in merit.

1.

I shall consider the two matters in sequence.

It is true that the contract, as construed by the

two arbitration decisions, contains no provision
particularizing classifications or rates for work done on color
reversal film.

But it hardly follows from this that the

Company is left at large to compel its employees to work on
color reversal film in whatever classifications ana at whatever
rates the Company unilaterally chooses to impose.

Ana even it

arguendo it were so entitled, it surely does not toilow that
the Company is also given freedom to tie together in a tandem
relationship a color reversal machine assumedly unregulated by
the contract with a negative ECN machine which undeniably is
regulated and covered by the contract.

As to the initial part of what I am saying, that the
Company is not to be deemed at large and given carte blanche on
classifications and rates for color reversal work, one need
only look at the two arbitration decisions to which the Company
refers.

While both Arbitrators held that the existing contract
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provisions on Negative Developing did not apply to color
reversal film (which was to be deemed in a class by itself
absent any contractually negotiated provisions tor such film),
yet it was not the Company by fiat but the Arbitrator wno fixed
the appropriate complement and the rates for doing the color
reversal work there involved -- two men on the machine ana
payment of negative rates in each of the cases.

Likewise, in

the decision regarding the Gevachrome -- the very color
reversal machine that is involved in the instant case -- it was
the Arbitrator who fixed a complement of three men when the
Company desired to use only two (sjupra, pp. 7-8).

Since this then is true as to a color reversal machine
standing alone, it is doubly true when the machine is coupled
with a negative machine that is clearly controlled by the
contract.

The Company has no more absolute right than does the

Union to fix the complement for the two machines operating as a
pair.

Rather it devolves upon the Arbitrator to determine the

proper complement upon all the circumstances presented.

I

reject the Company's assertion that "In the absence of any such
provision [a contract provision specifically covering color
reversal work] the Company remained free under the contract ana
the McMahon and Schmertz awards to determine crew for the #60
and #61 machines run as a pair."
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2.

The issue of course remains what complement I

should appropriately fix for the two machines operating
together.

The Company, as its second argument, cites

historical events over a lengthy period of time which it
asserts are controlling precedent for a five-man tandem
operation of the #60 and #61.

I find to the contrary,

upholding the Union's view (a) that the cited happenings differ
basically from the instant case; and (b) that a look at the
particular history of the machines here involved calls for a
six-man, not a five-man crew.

(a)

The Company's principal citation is the

1954-1974 history of the #1 and #2 color development machines
which, with Union consent, were operated in tanaem by a
five-man crew for these twenty years (supra, pp. 4-5).*

In my

view, however, the situation there is of little persuasive
force for the instant circumstances.

*

The Company also cites the history of certain earlier black
and white development machines, but the considerations which
lead me to reject the pertinency of the #1 and |2 events
apply to the black and white machines too.
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It is true that on occasion the §1 or the #2 operated
negatively while the companion machine operated positively, so
that the five-man crew was at that point intermingling both
kinds of work.

But this was a minor and distinct exception to

the major operation.

For the great bulk of the time both

machines were operating positively, a situation in which a
five-man tandem operation is admittedly normal and proper.

Not

only that, but the basic five-man crew was at all times paid
the higher negative rates, even though almost all their work
was positive -- an obvious trade-off for the Union's allowing a
crew doing essentially positive work to perform the small
amount of negative work when it was needed.

This seems to me a

far cry from the present case where the Company proposes to
place in tandem a machine doing only positive work (the #60)
and another machine doing only negative work (the #61) -- and
beyond that paying the lesser positive rates to two of the men
in the five-man crew.

There is yet another reason why, even if the two
situations were more parallel than they are, the #1 and £2
operation would not constitute a meaningful precedent for the
Company's #60 and #61 attempt.

At the time in the fifties when

the #1 and #2 color machines were introduced, the Company was
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the innovator in bringing color film development into the New
York market, and the Union was.willing to grant concessions to
help bring this about.

Had the Union insisted upon one crew to

handle the color positive work and a separate crev/ to do the
color negative work, the Company would not have gotten into
color work at all, as the Company President himself testified.
Besides, since the amount of negative work was quite small, it
would have been a form of featherbedding for the Union to
demand a separate crew just to do that work.

In these circumstances, it is plain to me that the #1
and 12 case differs markedly from the instant one.

A situation

where the Union gave the Company a break to help it introduce
color work is scarcely a controlling precedent when the Company
is now well established in color operations.

(b)

Having concluded that the Company's view of

controlling past practice is deficient, I examine the otner
side of the coin.

Here I find in accord with the Union that

the history of past operations, particularly with respect to
the machines here involved, dictates a six-man and not a
five-man crew for the $60 and f61.
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As we have seen, the Gevachrome £60 was acquired in
1969.

Under the award of Arbitrator Schmertz, it maintained a

crew of three men at all times (supra, pp. 7-8), a crew which
made duplicate positive prints, were considered to be in the
Positive Developing Department, and were paid positive rates.
In 1974 the Company acquired the ECN 162 negative machine,
placing it right next to the #60.

It manned the machine at all

times with men in the Negative Developing Department, either
two men receiving premium rates (above contract negative) unaer
a special deal with the Union, or else three men receiving
contract negative rates.

The point that leaps to mind immediately is that the
#60 and #62 were operated disjunctively and not in tandem for a
period of four years, from 1974 to 1978.

Nor did the Company

even attempt to build a common bridge between them, as the
Company President testified could easily have been done.

Then starting in September 1978, when the Company
placed a different ECN negative machine, the #61, next to the
Gevachrome #60 (this time building a common bridge for the two
machines), it continued for nearly five months to operate the
two machines disjunctively/ each with its own crew of three men
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or a total of six.

It was only at this point that the Company,

out of the blue, took it upon itself to change course and order
the two machines to be operated in tandem with a crew of five.

This history, it seems to me, is enough to demonstrate
that the Company acted outside the proper bounds in directing a
tandem operation.*

This would be so even if the collective

agreement had no provision directly applicable.

It is all the

more certain when the contract specifically states

(Section

"The parties agree that present methods of
operation within the laboratories shall continue
without change" [with certain exceptions not
applicable here].

*

I am unimpressed by the Company's argument (citing the
McMahon decision of August 23, 1968, supra, pp. 5-6) that by
building a common bridge between the #60 and #61 in
September 1978, it acquired the right to introduce a tandem
operation. First of all, it waited five months before
attempting to do so. And second, even if it had acted
immediately, I would not accept the thesis.
I do not read
the McMahon statement (which to a degree is dictum) as
meaning that a Company may operate any two machines in
tandem whenever it builds a common bridge; rather I take his
statement to mean that the absence of a common bridge
constituted still another factor why a tandem operation was
there improper.
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- The foregoing is in my view sufficient to determine
the result.

Nevertheless I would like to add another facet

that reinforces the validity of the conclusion I reach,

I refer to the fact that in the long history of this
industry there appears never to have been an instance

(at least

involving larger firms such as the Company)* in which a firm
has been permitted to work with a five-man crew in a tandem
operation when one of the machines was producing positive work
exclusively and the other machine was producing negative work
exclusively.

Throughout the industry the practice has been to

keep negative and positive work separate and not to commingle
the tasks.

Thus to permit it here would be going directly

counter to what has been a decades-long practice in the
industry/ and would upset what everyone heretofore has taken
for granted.

*

As a top official of one of the major firms

The record does show one instance where the Union permitted
a small firm, which did not have enough manpower and which
the Union wanted to keep alive, to operate a color reversal
machine and a color negative machine in tandem.
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testified, it has not been done and would be ^unethical" were
positive work and negative work to be operated in tanaem.*
(
^
•
^
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•
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For the reasons stated, I reject the Company's claim
that it is 'entitled to operate the Gevachrome (#60) and the ECN
II (#61) in tandem with a five-man crew, and uphold the Union's
position that three men are required on each machine or a total
of six.

The issue of damages is eliminated by the result I
have reached.

Since the Company's damage claim is based on the

compelled use of a supposedly unnecessary sixth man, my holding
that" a sixth man is necessary washes away the claim.

An Award will be entered accordingly.

*

He also declared that to dp this would be "suicidal^. I
"might add that,because both parties asked me to retrain
from evaluating the feasibility of a tandem operation of the
#60 and #61, I have not done so, although there was a
considerable amount of testimony bearing on that question.
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AWARD

I hold that the Company's grievance against the Union
is lacking in merit, and I award and direct as follows:

1.

The proper manning for the simultaneous

operation

of the Gevachrome (#60) and the ECN II (#61) machines is six
men as the Union contends, not five men as the Company claims.

2.

The Company"is not entitled to any damages

because of the refusal to permit a five-man operation.

Dated:

New York, New York
July 17, 1980

Morris P. Glushien
Arbitrator.

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

:
SS.
:

On this 17th day of July, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared MORRIS P. GLUSHIEN, to me known and known to
me to be the individual described herein and who executed the
Award herein, and he duly acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
Case No. 1330 0108 83
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between *
TECHNICOLOR, INC.

^

OPINION & AWARD

and
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS, «.
LOCAL ?02_L I.A.T.S.E.. AFL-CIO
_
APPEARANCES :
For the Employer
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker & Gartner
by Eric Rosenfeld, Esq.
For the Union
Gerald Schilian, Esq.
At the commencement of the hearing before me on
March 30, 1983 at the New York City offices of the American Arbitration Association, the Employer proposed that
the issues to be arbitrated were:
1. May the Employer operate a Film Line
black and white positive developing machine with two men rather than with three
as demanded by the Union?
2. Is the Employer entitled to damages
as a result of the Union's compelling
the Employer to use three men on that
machine?
The Union refused to accept the wording of the proposed issues but agreed that the hearing should proceed
and that I, as arbitrator, shall determine the nature
\

of the controversy which was presented to me.
Both parties were present at the hearing and were*
afforded an opportunity to present evidence and argument
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in support of their respective contentions.

Post-hearing

memoranda were received from both parties.
The Contract
The following provisions were referred to by one
or both of the parties as pertinent to this controversy:
Article 15(h). Pending the final determination of any dispute, there shall be
no strike or lockout, nor shall there
be any change of working conditions or
methods of operation as they existed prior
to the dispute except as they may be otherwise permitted by this Agreement.
Article l?(b). The parties agree that
present methods of operation within the
laboratories shall continue without change,
except its operations from a single to a
dual operation of machines, so that one
operator may operate two machines, provided
such dual operation is presently or may
hereafter be in existence in a laboratory
operating under a collective agreement
with the Union. In the event of any such
change the Employer will pay the base
rate applicable to such dual operation.
(c). Employer shall be permitted to install and operate new, unusual and reconstructed equipment, and accelerate the
speed of existing equipment after negotiating wages and conditions with respect
thereto with the Union. In the event
that Employer and the Union shall fail
to agree within ?2 hours after Employer
shall request such negotiations as aforesaid, then the matter shall be deemed in
dispute and referred to arbitration, as
provided in Section 15. Pending the decision of the arbitrator, Employer shall
have the right to operate such new, unusual, reconstructed or accelerated equipment and the decision of the arbitrator
shall be retroactive to the date of such
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operation. However, if such new, unusual,
reconstructed or accelerated machinery or
equipment is the same as presently or may
hereafter "be operated in any other laboratory with which the Union has a collective
"bargaining agreement then the Employer
shall have the right, upon notification
to the Union and upon the mutual agreement
that said machinery or equipment is the
same, to operate such equipment in the
same manner as the other laboratory upon
payment of the base rate of wages applicable to the machine or equipment operated
in such other laboratory. In the event
that the Employer and the Union fail to
agree within ?2 hours that said new machinery or equipment is the same, then the
matter shall be deemed in dispute and referred to arbitration, as provided in
Section 15.
(d). As to new, unusual, reconstructed or
accelerated machinery or equipment or dual
operation of machines introduced in a laboratory after October 1,- 19?2, the Employer
will notify the Union in writing. The procedures of (b) and (c) above shall then
apply. Such operation of the new, unusual,
reconstructed or accelerated machinery or
equipment or dual operation of machines
introduced after October 1, 1972 may not
be used as a precedent by any other Employer unless such operation^-has been agreed
upon between the first Employer and the
Union, or has been decided by an arbitrator,
or the continued operation of such equipment
has been permitted by the Union without protest after written notification has been
given.
Background Facts
The Employer operates a film processing laboratory
for both color and black and white film servicing both
«

the motion picture and television industries.
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It is one

of several establishments in the New York metropolitan
area engaged in this type of "business whose employees
are represented by the Union.
At present, the Employer utilizes four developing
machines, two of which are machines for developing color
film, one is a spray machine for black and white positive
film and the fourth, which is involved in this controversy, is a Film Line black and white positive developing
machine.
The color developing machines are operated by three
men when only one machine is used or by five men when
both machines are in use simultaneously.

The third or

fifth operator is utilized to -relieve the other operators
during coffee and lunch breaks so as to permit continuous
operation.

The individual also monitors an "applicator"

which enhances the sound track and which is installed on
color film machines but not on black and white machines.
The spray machine for positive black and white film
processing is a small old machine usually operated by two
employees.

According to the Employer, this machine is

presently being considered for either replacement or reconstruction because its process is too slow and obsolete.
«

The Film Line machine has been used for various
purposes since about 1970.

Up until 1977 the machine was

manned "by three operators and was used for developing negative color film.

At that time, the negative color process

became obsolete and the machine was converted for positive
color developing.

From May 1979 to October 1980, the ma-

chine was converted to positive black and white developing.
The machine was operated sporadically at that time and a
three man color crew was used on the machine when there was
a need for positive black and white processing.

In 1980,

there was a major reconstruction of the machine to a new
color positive process.

The reconstruction which took

eral months was completed in October 1980.
machine was operated by a three man crew.

sev-

Again, the
At the end of

January 1983 the machine was -converted to its present positive black and white process.
The hearing testimony indicated that the initial
conversion of the machine in 1977 or 1978 from black and
white to color developing involved changes in gears, wiring
and tank configurations.

Similarly, the 1980 changes from

black and white to color were considered to be major,.

On

the other hand, changes of the machine from color to black
and white processing only required the dumping of the old
developing solutions, cleaning of tanks, changing gear^
I

speeds and bypassing of the application which is used only
«

with color film.

The color to black and white conversion

is usually done within three or four days by in-house main-
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tenance employees and,allegedly, does not involve the more
comprehensive changes which were needed for color processing
in the past.
The Current Controversy
At the end of January 1983• the Employer notified
the Union that it was converting the Film Line machine to
black and white processing and that it intended to use a
two man crew to operate the machine.

The Union president

responded that the question of utilizing a two man crew
would have to go to arbitration and that until there was
an arbitrator's determination, three men would have to be
used on the machine because the Film Line machine had always
been manned by three operators.'

The Employer presumed that

it had no choice but to operate the machine with three
operators pending the outcome of this proceeding. It stated that
it feared a job action in view of the Union president's comment that he would hate to have to shut down the plant if
only two men were used to operate the machine.
Apparently, since the most recent changeover, the
Film Line machine has been used intermittently.

For about

five weeks after the changeover the machine was in use only
40$ of the time.

At the time of the hearing it was estimated

that the machine was in operation for only about three hours
a day on three days a week.
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The Employer presented several witnesses from competing firms also under contract with this Union.

A

Precision representative testified that when it operated
its black and white machine part time, three or four hours
a day, it only utilized a two man crew.

When it operated

on a continuous full time basis, a third man was utilized
to cover breaks and lunch periods.
A DuArt representative testified that it operates two
black and white machines only with two man crews.
machines

The

are shut down during lunch and break periods.

A Guffanti representative testified that it operates
four black and white machines continuously with two three
man crews.

Each three man crew operates two machines

simultaneously.

Only if one of the two machines is temor-

arily out of service for repairs, will the three man crew
work on one machine.

The Guffanti machines, however, were

described as old machines which operate at a slow rate of 4-0
feet per minute as contrasted to the 180 feet per minute
operation of the Technicolor machine in question.
The Union president testified that throughout the industry all black and white machines are alike.

Yet, he also

distinguished between single strand machines which are run
«
by three operators as contrasted to spray machines which, in
«

accordance with a 1959 arbitration award, are operated by two
men.

He pointed out that spray machines are much smaller
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than the black and white machine involved in this proceeding.
Th e Emplover's Arguments
The Employer contends that, in effect, it was intimidated by the Union president to utilize three men
on the machine pending the outcome of this arbitration
proceeding.

It also pointed out that this Union has had

a history, ten and twenty years ago, of engaging in selfhelp threats and actions at other laboratories when it
disagreed with actions taken by those employers.

Here, allegedly,

the Union president had stated that he would hate to shut
down the Employer's operations if the Employer attempted
to operate the machine with only two men.

The Employer

alleges that utilizing the third man on the machine costs
a total of $3,^47.66 over a five week period.

It seeks

an award which would grant it damages in that amount.
The Employer relies on Articles 15(h) and l?(c) and
(d) of the contract which, allegedly, permits it to adopt
the type of manning utilized by competitive laboratories
for black and white machines.

In this respect, it pointed

out that the president of the Union had characterized all
black and white developing machines as being essentially
alike and that the contract makes no distinction between
spray machines and the Film Line machine.

As the machine

in question, which allegedly has been reconstructed, is
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similar to the machines operated "by competitive laboratories then, according to the Employer, it should "be permitted to use the same type of manning which is applicable
to the black and white developing machines operated by
those other laboratories.

The Employer believes that

type of manning to be a two man crew for non-continuous
operation of the machine.
Finally, the Employer argues that as the machine
had been reconstructed there was no existing method of
operation which could be continued.

It considered its

prior operation of the machine with a three man crew to
be irrelevent because it operated the machine on a sporadic basis and because it unilaterally assigned a three
man color developing crew to the machine without consulting the Union.
The Union's^Arguments
The Union makes two primary arguments, first that
the machine had not been reconstructed so that the Employer was obligated to continue the practice of using a
three man crew and second, that there was no strike or
other job action to coerce the Employer so that no Award
of damages is warranted.
«

It points out that the Film Line machine has been
in use since 1970, always with a three man crew.
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It denies

that the changeover which was made in January 1983 from
color to "black and white positive developing constituted
a reconstruction of the machine which would permit a review of the manning requirement for the machine. Allegedly,
that changeover only required the emptying of the tanks
containing the developing solutions and the disengagement
of the applicator, "both of which had been done in a couple
of days "by an in-house work crew.
The Union contends that the contract requires the
continuation without change of the existing methods of operation as the machine had not been reconstructed.

It

points out that the long standing manning applicable to
this particular machine was with a three man crew and that
no consultation with the Union was necessary either in
the past or in the present to legitimize the manning of
the machine with three operators.
Insofar as the damage claim, the Union questions
the propriety of the Employer's reliance on National Labor
Relations Board decisions of ten and twenty years ago involving other employers to buttress its contention that the
Union had a propensity for coercion.

With respect to the

situation involved in this proceeding, the Union points,.
«

out that there was no strike or other job action and that
*

the Employer was contractually bound to continue using
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three operators on the Film Line machine.

It, therefore,

seeks a dismissal of the Employer's claim for damages.
Discussion and Conclusions
The Employer relies greatly on the characterization
made by the Union president that all "black and white developing machines are essentially alike.

It therefore

argues that the Employer is being placed in a non-competitive position if other laboratories can operate their
I

black and white machines with two men while it is compelled
to use three employees.

I do not know in which respect

the Union president believed the black and white machines
to be all alike.

The available evidence indicates that

the spray machines are small, old and slow, as contrasted
to the Film Line machine which is large and fast, operating
at a speed of 180 feet per minute.

Along the.same lines,

the Guffanti representative testified that although a three
man crew operates two machines simultaneously in that laboratory, the speed of their machines are only ^-0 feet per
minute.

From the evidence,'I conclude that although the end

product of the machines may all be alike, the speed of the
Film Line machine makes it much more productive, even with
a three man crew then either this Employer's spray machine
or the Guffanti black and white developing machines.
The primary question to be answered, in my opinion,
is whether the January 1983 modification of the Film Line
machine constituted a "reconstruction" within the meaning

of the contract.

If the machine had been reconstructed

and the reconstructed machine was similar to machines
operated by other laboratories, then the Employer could
operate the machine with two men, unless otherwise directed
by an arbitrator.

If it had not been reconstructed, the

status quo ante, or operation with three men, appears
to be required by the contract.
There is little guidance for making a determination
of what constitutes reconstruction.

Here, 'the only

available evidence is that the January 1983 modification
consisted of emptying the solution tanks and disengaging
the applicator which is not needed in black and white
developing work.

The modification apparently was accom-

plished in a couple of days by in-house employees.

This

is in sharp contrast to the modification made in 1980
from black and white to color developing where the work
was described as a major reconstruction which took a
number of months.

At that time, new wiring, gears and

tanks were installed and parts had to be designed and
manufactured in order for this machine to be able to do
color work.
Based on the available evidence, it is obvious,
considering what took place in 1980, that one can assume
that the Film Line machine had been reconstructed at that
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time.

What took place in 1983 with the machine, however,

hardly compares in scope with the 1980 changes.

In 1983,

apparently, nothing was rebuilt and little time, comparatively, was spent in making the changeover from color to
black and white.

Under such circumstances, I conclude

that there was no reconstruction of the Film Line machine
and the Employer was contractually obligated to continue
utilizing three men for operating the machine, as was the
continuous practice for that machine in the past, regardless
of whether the machine was being utilized for color or
black and white developing.
I find little merit in the Employer's arguments
that the past use of a three man crew was a unilateral
act by the Employer without having consulted the Union
or that the three man crew utilized in the past on the
Film Line machine was actually the crew assigned to another color machine who, in order to avoid the layoff of
one man, were kept intact as a crew when they were occasionally assigned to work the Film Line machine.
Neither argument is persuasive.

Binding practices fre-

quently are established by the unilateral actions of an
employer.

Where such practice is followed openly and con-

sistently over a period of time without any objection by
the Union, it does become binding on both parties unless
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there is a specific contrary contract provision which
covers the subject.
I find no existing contract provision which specifies the number of operators to man a Film Line machine.
I also find that the Film Line machine when used in the
past for black and white developing work has been consistently manned with three operators.

Therefore, it

is my opinion that the Employer was obligated to continue
utilizing three operators on the Film Line machine after
it modified that machine in January 1983 "to perform black
and white developing work.
In the absence of any evidence that the Union had
conducted any strike or other job action in January 1983
and in view of my conclusion that the Employer was obligated to utilize three operators for black and white
developing work on the Film Line machine, the Employer's
claim for damages for being compelled to operate the
machine with three operators is without merit and is
denied accordingly.
Therefore, the undersigned to whom this controversy
was submitted, hereby makes the following
A

W

A

R

D

1. The Employer is obligated to utilize
a three man crew for the operation of the
Film Line machine for black and white posi-

tive developing work.
2. The Employer is not entitled to any
damages from the Union.

NATHAN COHEN, Arbitrator

Dated:

June 28, 1983

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NASSAU

nn:

Pursuant to Section 7507 of the New York State Civil
Practice Law and Rules, I hereby affirm that the foregoing is my AWARD in the above-captioned matter„

NATHAN COHEN, Arbitrator
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
In the Matter of the Arbitration
Docket No. 1330-0060-83

between
DU ART FILM LABORATORY, INC.,

Re:

Recall kights

"Company"
Hearing:

-andLOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E. ,
"Union"

APPEARANCES
For the Company:
POLETTI, FRIEDAN, PRASHKER & GARTNER
William E. Malarkey, Esq., Of Counsel
For the Union:
Gerald Schilian, Esq.

Kay 6, 1983

BACKGROUND
This grievance protests the Company's refusal to
permit P. Schreiber to return to his prior Negative Vault
Man-Active position.

The Union claims the Company's action

violated the Agreement.

It asks that Schreiber be awarded

that job retroactively (to December 1982) and that he be
made whole for lost wages.
The basic facts are not in serious dispute.
Schreibcr's service with the Company dates from March 1979.
Initially, he was classified as a Can Carrier.
moted to Splicer.
Man-Active.

He was pro-

He was again promoted to Negative Vault

That position is in the Vault Department.

For

many years, the basic crew there has consisted of three men,
including a Working Foreman (J. Falciano).
In April 1982, Schreiber was bumped out of his
Negative Vault Man-Active position by G. Frank.*

Schreiber,

in turn, bumped back to a Splicer position in the Raw Stock
Department.
In December 1982, the Company hired V. Sadano.

It

classified him as a Negative Vault Man-Active and assigned hi:
to the Vault Department.

He became the fourth member of the

*Frank has suffered a heart attack in 1979 and had, upon his
recovery, been placed on a less taxing job in another department. He was well enough in April 1982 to return to the
Vault Department. His right to have displaced Schreiber is
not at issue.
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crew there.

That gave rise to this dispute.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The Issue
The parties failed to stipulate to a specific issue
at the hearing.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the central

question posed here is whether the Company improperly failed
to reassign Schreiber to his former Negative Vault Man-Active
position in December 1982.
The Agreement
Article 7 deals with Work Distribution and Layoffs.
Section (c) (i) thereof reads:
" In the event of a layoff in any
department consisting of more than
one classification, if an employee
in a higher classification shall
first be affected by such layoff,
such employee affected, having
departmental seniority shall have
the option to be reverted to the
next lower classification in the
department in accordance with his
departmental seniority or accept
severance pay and the employee
finally displaced shall be laid off.
In the event the employee affected
was transferred from another
department or classification within
the plant, he shall have the option
of reverting to a position in his
former department or classification
and retain his accumulated seniority
in such former department or classification. In no event shall an
- 3 -

employee be transferred to r.nother
department unless he had previously
been employed in that department."
Position of the Parties
The Union stresses that the Company chose to increase
the crew in the Vault Department from three men to four.
was under no obligation to do so.

It

However, once it opted to

do so, it insists it should have permitted Schreiber to "push
back" to his former job before anyone was hired from the street.
In support, the Union relies heavily upon C. Vitello's
testimony.

He has been a Union official for the last 18 years.

He noted that Article 7 (c) (1) has been part of the industrywide Agreement for over 30 years.

The "standard procedure," he

asserts, has always been to permit employees to revert to jobs
from which they had been bumpc'd before going to the street for
a new hire.

The practice, he states, is referred to throughout

the industry as a "push back."

Vitello is unsure as to whether

any "push backs" have occurred at Du Art.

But he knows th^t

other firms in the industry have not strayed from the "standard
procedure."
The Union recognizes that the Company regards Sodano
as a "super numerary."

That is, as someone simply being trained

to replace Falciano who is scheduled to retire soon.

It also

notes that the Company insists it has no "need" for a fourth

employee in the Vault Department except for that purpose.
the Union's view, that argument lacks merit.

In

It contends

that the terms of the Agreement must be observed at all times.
Once the Company chose to add another Negative Vault Man-Active
position, it believes it was obliged to offer that job to
Schreiber before hiring from the street.
In support, the Union points to a 1969 decision by
Arbitrator E. Schmertz in a case involving Movielab.
Company Exhibit 1.)

(See

He ruled, it maintains, that employees do

have recall rights to their prior positions.

That ruling, it

argues, has application throughout the industry.

It is con-

sistent with the Union's view of the "standard procedure" in
the industry.

The Company, in any event, failed to establish

that a different practice has existed here.

Under the circum-

stances it argues the Company should be bound by the industrywide practice.

It asks that Schreiber's claim be upheld.

The Company disagrees sharply.
arguments.

It raises several

First, it asserts that there was no real need for

a fourth employee in the Vault Department.

The volume of work

there has remained constant for the past 15 years.

If Sodano

had not been hired, there would not be a fourth man there today
It decribes his role as that of a "supern jmerary. "

He was

hired to replace Falciano, who is due to retire soon.
doing nothing more than training for that job.
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He is

Second, it relies upon the Schmertz Award.

It states

he found the Agreement did not by its terms afford recall rights
However, he found the parties had established such a right by
practice when a need (however brief) existed for an employee to
fill a job in a higher classification.

It regards the Schmertz

Award as limited to situations in which a need exists for an
employee to fill a job.

Here, it insists, no such need existed.

Nor has any practice developed at Du Art.

It asserts I have no

right to establish a recall right when one has not been arrived
at either contractually or by practice.
Third, even if an industry-wide practice exists, the
Company contends it is not bound by it.
to support that view.

It cites several cases

(See Brief pp 12-14.)

Fourth, the Company stresses that the Union must bear
the burden of proof here.

It simply has failed to establish

a contractual violation occurred.

At most, it has alleged the

Company's action is inconsistent with the practice of other
employers.

However, it failed to document that allegation.
Fifth,

the Company asserts the equities of this case

do not support the Union's position.

It suggests that had it

not agreed (at the Union's behest) to treat G. Frank specially,
it would not find itself in arbitration.

Were it not for those

special arrangements, it states, Frank would not have been in a
position to displace Schreiber from the Vault Department in
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April 1982.

Schreiber would, in other worus, still have been

in the Vault Department in December 1982 and this grievance
would never have arisen.
Finally, the Company asserts that to return Schreiber
to the Vault Department would be a vain act.
no more than a pyrrhic victory for the Union.

It would create
For it would

simply promote Sodano to Supervisor and reduce the Vault
Department staff back to three (i.e., Falciano, Frank and
Grossman).
For all of these reasons, the Company asks that the
grievance be denied.
Opinion
On balance, I believe this grievance must be denied.
There are several reasons which lead me to that conclusion.
To begin with, the Company correctly notes that the
Union bears the burden of proof here.

It must establish that

Schreiber's contractual rights have been violated.

It simply

has not met that burden.
Article 7 (c) (1), as I read it, is limited in scope.
Its first sentence deals with a layoff in a department which
contains more than one classification.

It provides tbat an

affected employee in a higher classification has two options:
(1) he may bump down to the next lower classification in the
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department in accordance with his departmental seniority; or
(2), he may select severance pay.

The terms of Article 7 (c)

(l)'s first sentence simply do not apply here.
layoff in the Vault Department

There was no

in December, 1982.

The second sentence of Article 7 (c) (1) provides
that if an employee affected by a layoff was transferred to
his (expiring) job from another department or classification
within the plant, he has the option of reverting to a position
in his former department.

That text served as the basis for

Schreibcr's return to a Splicer job when he was displaced from
the Vault Department by Frank.

He was, in short, granted re-

version rights when he was affected by a lay-off.

In this case,

there was no layoff from the Raw Stock Department in December
1982.

Schreiber, accordingly, had no right to invoke Article

7 (c) (l)'s second sentence at that time.

It did not establish

for him a right then to revert back to the Vault Department.
The simple truth is that Article 7 is silent upon the
question of what happens to an employee bumped from one department when a vacancy reopens in that department.

As Arbitrator

Schmertz noted in 1969, "...the contract is silent on the procedure for recall from reversion."

At Movielab, he held, a

practice existed wherein reverted employees were accorded a righi
to return to their former jobs.

However, that practice, plainly

applied only "when work again [became] available."
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(F. 3)

It is worth noting that the Schnu.rtz Award was issued
in 1969.

Several contracts have been re-negotiated since then.

The Union, however, never succeeded in closing an obvious gap
in Article 7 (c) (1).

(The record, in fairness, does not re-

flect whether it tried to do so.)
I am not entirely convinced that Sodano is simply
a "supernumerary."

The fact that he holds a bargaining unit

job title (classification) and is covered by the Agreement
strongly suggests otherwise.
Falciano.

He may be "in training" to replace

But it is less likely that that is all he is doing.

I am, accordingly, willing to presume for the purposes of this
case that work in the Negative Vault Man-Active classification
did exist in December 1982 when Sodano was hired.
The real question, then, is whether the past practice
referred to by Arbitrator Schmertz in the Movielab case is necessarily binding at Du Art.
is.

I am not prepared to

rule that it

Not, in any event, where not a single instance of a "push

back" has been shown to have occurred there.
could not point to any specific examples.
is that there were none.
testimony of R. Smith.

Certainly, Vitcllo

The reason, undoubtedly,

That, at least, is the unrebutted
He knew of no instance when an employee

who had been reverted per Article 7 (c) (1) was granted a recall
right to his former job.

Nor did his research uncover any.

I have no reason to quarrel with the Union's assertion
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that a "push back" practice exists elsewhere in the industry.
However, I cannot conclude that such a practice must be imposed upon this Company.

After all, the very essence of a past

practice is the mutual agreement that a particular situation
should be dealt with in a certain way whenever it occurs.

That

has not happened here.
Under the circumstances, I am obliged to deny the
grievance.
AWARD
The grievance is denied.

STANLEY L. AIGES, Arbitrator
DATED:

July 30, 1983

STATE OF NEW JERSEY )
: SS.
COUNTY OF BERGEN
>
On this 30th day of July,

1983, before me personally

came and appeared Stanley L. Aiges, to me known and known to me
to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and
who acknowledged before me that he executed the same.
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GAIL VALENTINE
A Notary Public o! Ne* Jersey
My Commission Expire? Jan 7, 1987

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD
and

Technicolor,.Inc.

ox

r

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied William Cohen the
option of reverting to the Chemical Mixing
Department on December 2, 1983? If so what shall
be the remedy?

,

A hearing was held at the offices of the Union on December '•
20, 1983 at which time Mr. Cohen, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
I

Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity
i

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The Company is correct in its assertion that Section 7(c)

i

(1) of Llie contract does not give the grievant the right of
reversion he seeks.

To revert to the Chemical Mixing Department

;

from the Vault Department is to move from a lower rated job to a
i

higher rated job. By its clear language, Section 7(c)(l) accords
a right to "revert to the next lower classification...." (emphasis
added).

Hence, assuming that the other conditions of Section 7(c)

(1) were met, the reversion which the grievant claims in this
case is barred by that express language.

,* :*

i

-2However this does not mean th.^t the parties could not waive i
or amend that restriction and agree, on an ad hoc basis, to a

i
right of reversion under different circumstances. A bi-lateral
agreement between authorized representatives of the parties that
is different frosv the contract is enforceable

in the situation

covered by that .agreement, and constitutes a valid contract

variation.

'(
*

*

That is what the probative evidence shows happened here.

i

At the intervention of the Union and in lieu of dismissal for

i

repeated offenses, and any protest of that dismissal, the

:

grievant was demoted and transferred to the Vault Department
from the Chemical Mixing Department. Based on express discussions,
.
the Company agreed that in the. event of a layoff in the Vault
i
Department (where the grievant had low seniority) the grievant i
would be allowed to revert to the Chemical Mixing Department.

i

The evidence on this point, from the Union's testimony is
I
sufficiently unequivocal, clear and convincing to be accorded
i
credit.

The Company's testimony in rebuttal is insufficient.

Specifically, the testimony of Messrs. Vitello, Perdikakis
|
and Voepell of the Union as well as that of the grievant persuade
me that with the grievant"s demotion to the Vault Department
Mr. Pesato of the Company accepted the condition that if the
grievant was laid off from the Vault Department he could return
to his previous job in the Chemical Mixing Department.

Mr.

Pesato's testimony was that he "did not recall" or "had no
recollection" of any such understanding, and in response to what

<Q!

•• T-x" *'?
i

i»if

|

-3would happen if the grievant was laid off from the Vault that
"he'd deal with that at the time it happened."
those statements wit^> a flat denial.

I do not equate

The probative evidence,

therefore, supports the Union's version of what took place when
•
the grievant was demoted to the Vault from Chemical Mixing. 1
am not prepared to conclude that there was false testimony under
oath.
Under the foregoing circumstances, and limited to the facts
in this case, I find that the grievant had the right to revert
to the Chemical Mixing Department when he was laid off from the
Vault Department.

I find that the special arrangement agreed to

between the Union and Company, though at variance from the contract language, is an enforceable variation of the contract
applicable to this case, and falls within the stipulated issue
in this matter.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Permanent Arbitrator in the contract between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated the collective bargaining agreement as varied in this case by an
agreement between the Union and the Company,
when it denied William Cohen the option of
reverting to the Chemical Mixing Department
on December 2, 1983.
The Company shall accord the option to Mr.
Cohen, and if he exercises it, he shall be
returned to his previously held job in the
Chemical Mixing Department and made whole
for the time lost since December 2, 1983,
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less his earnings, if any, from gainful
employment elsewhere during the period
involved.

DATED: January 16, 1984
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J/r Schtnertz
Permanent Arbitrator
/

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

•»./>.
*
' ''

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
66-Duart
3/22/84

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

E.J.

Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

Schmertz

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories
The dispute involves the suspension, the involuntary transfer to the day shift and the subsequent discharge of Mr. Rafael
Salinas.
A hearing was held on March 19, 1984 at which time Mr.
Salinas and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Salinas stated that he
did not want his disputes with the Company decided in arbitration
that he had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunitie
Commission; that he wanted the disputes determined solely by the
EEOC and the courts; that he would not participate in the arbitra
tion and did not want the Union to proceed in arbitration on his
behalf.
The Union stated that though it was ready and willing to
represent Mr. Salinas in the arbitration it could not do so without his participation.

The Union asked for an indefinite adjourn-

ment of the arbitration hearing.
request.

The Company opposed the Union's

I ruled that in the absence of a mutual request for or

an agreement on an adjournment, I was prepared to proceed with
the hearing and would entertain motions.

-2The Company moved that Mr. Salinas1 grievance be dismissed
with prejudice because of the failure of the Union to proceed
with the arbitration in view or Mr. Salinas' refusal to participate and his position that he wanted his case decided in another
forum.

I granted the Company's motion.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Impartial Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Mr. Rafael Salinas
and the Union's request for arbitration on his behalf, are dismissed
with prejudice. The rights, if any,
of Mr. Salinas and the parties in any
other forum are reserved.

DATED: March 22, 1984
STATE OF New York)ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)

Erio'J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

\,

